

THE
Measures of Submission
TO THE
CIVIL MAGISTRATE
CONSIDER'D.
IN A
DEFENSE
OF THE
DOCTRINE

Deliver'd in
A SERMON Preach'd before the
Rt. Hon. the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and
Citizens of *London*, Sept. 29. 1705.

The *Second Edition*. In which is added a PREFACE
in Answer to Several Objections.

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L O N D O N:

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P R E F A C E.

THE following *Treatise* hath now been long enough in the World to engage all, who are heartily concerned against the *Principles* maintained in it, to endeavour to their utmost to hinder the pernicious Effects of them, by shewing plainly and seriously the Weakness of those *Arguments* by which they are supported. But it is very observable after what manner they have been pleased to shew their Zeal and Concern for the *contrary Cause*. For, 1st. Since the *Publication* of this *Defense* there hath appeared but *one*, and that a very short, obscure, and neglected *Piece*, which so much as pretends to advance any thing against the *Doctrine* I have taught: and this so contrived, that many of the *Arguments* which are proposed by me for the *contrary Doctrine*, and seriously considered,

sidered, and answered, are here repeated without the least notice taken of any such *Reply*. Nay, 2^{dly}. Tho' I took the pains to collect into one Body all the *Objections* against any thing I had advanced which I could possibly at that time hear of; neither neglecting the *least*, nor dissembling the *greatest*, but giving to every one a distinct and particular Consideration; yet hath not any one *Writer* undertaken publickly to consider, or disprove, any one Particular of all that I have alleged in answer to those *Objections*. Instead of this, 3^{dly}. General Reflexions, Hard Censures, Unkind Insinuations, Abuses public and private have been liberally bestowed; without so much as the Pretense of entering into the Merits of the *Cause*. I am not so vain as to attribute this Management of theirs to the unanswerable Strength of my poor Performance: Perhaps I have written after so weak a manner as to render my *Arguments* worthy only of their Contempt, and Neglect. But however they think fit to manage themselves; I have not esteemed it for the Interest of Truth, or for the Advantage of the *Cause* I have espoused, to neglect any thing that carries with it any seeming Contradiction either to the main *Principle* I defend, or to any *Reasoning* by which I have defended it; whether *privately*, or *publicly* advanced. To this purpose I have made it my Business to gain the best Information I could,

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concerning the Sentiments of those who have professed most Zeal, and the greatest degree of Concern against what I have advanced: And because I am still of Opinion that this is a very important Cause, and worthy to be duly considered, and clearly stated, it is my Design, in this Preface, faithfully to represent, and consider, whatsoever hath come to my knowledge, since the Publication of the following Defense, by way of Objection either against the main Doctrine I have laid down, or any part of the Reasoning I have made use of to support it.

And what I have now to say I chuse rather to present here at one view, than to insert it into the Body of the Book itself; that such Persons as have the *First Edition* of it may, if they please, furnish themselves with all that is, in *this*, added to it.

I. In order to answer the Design now propos'd, I must first take notice of the small Piece just now mentioned, which appeared in public soon after this Defense, Entituled, *The Plea of Public Good not sufficient to justify the taking up Arms against our Rightful and Lawful Sovereigns.* This I shall do the rather, because it is the only Piece that hath appeared against what I have Written: Tho' before this I could not determine myself to do it, because it was long before I found that any Persons paid the least regard to it; and because eve-

ry thing that I have said in my own *Defense* is wholly overlooked in it. Indeed it seems to have been *Written* before this *Defense* was put forth; tho' not *Published* till afterwards. However that be; since some (as I now understand) are willing to think that the *main Principle* I defend is sufficiently confuted in it; I readily embrace this Opportunity of examining how justly they think so; and how fully this *Author* hath handled the *Subject* He hath undertaken. And,

1. The *First Argument* used by Him against my *Doctrine* is implied in the *Question* which He saith it is sufficient to ask, *viz.* *What is that Public whereof I so frequently speak? Is it not that whereof Kings are the Head?* So that, as He goes on, *the Good of the Public, which is of so much Force, must be their Good and our Good in conjunction, &c.* p. 3, 4. I answer, 1. If the *Public* be *that* whereof *Kings* are the *Head*, as He saith, then the *Good of the Public* is the *Good of that* whereof *Kings* are the *Head*; *i. e.* the *Good of the Body*, not of the *Head*; unless this *Author* will make *Kings* the *Head* of the *Head* as well as of the *Body*. This I say according to his own Reasoning; in the very beginning of which He hath forgotten himself, and hath, against his own Design, proved the *Good of the Public* to be what He would not have it be. So that it is sufficient to answer this main *Question* of
His

His only by returning the same upon Himself. But we must speak a little more distinctly.

2. Therefore, Supposing that *Kings* are the *Head* of the *Public* (tho' I should think that *King, Lords, and Commons*, are more properly the *Head* of that *Public* in which we are concerned;) it is not at all just to argue from the *Metaphorical* use of the words *Body* and *Head*: as if because the *Natural Body* cannot subsist without that particular *Head* to which it is once joyned; therefore the *Body Politic* cannot possibly be benefited without unviolated regard to one particular Person, who hath once been the *Head* of it. No one can deny but that *Usurpers* may be the *Heads* of the *Body Politic*; as the *Cæsars* were at first: Yet I dare say this *Author* will allow that the *Body* may seek *their own Good* as distinct from that of *Usurpers*. A *General* of an *Army* is the *Head* of that *Body*: yet may that *Head* be in many *Cases* changed to the great Advantage of that *Body*. A *Master* of a *Family* is the *Head* of it: yet if He be in any respect incapable of prosecuting the Interest, and preventing the Ruine of it, the *Laws* of many Nations allow a regard to the Good of that *Body*, separate from the Interest, and Good, of this *Head*. Many more *Instances* might be given, sufficient to shew that it is not of any force in this *Cause* to urge that *Kings* are the *Head* of the *Public*; because the *Interest* of

the *Body Politic* is not tied to one particular Head; and so may be distinct, and sought distinctly, from it: Tho' the Good, and Interest of the *Natural Body* depend entirely upon one particular *Head*. And that the *Good* of the *Public* (called the *Body Politic* only in a *Figurative* sense) is not so tied to one particular *Head*, is evident from the *Death* of some, and the Succession of other *Heads* to the same *Rule* over the same *Body Politic*; as this *Body* itself answers not exactly to the *Natural Body*, but is in a much more flux Condition, continually changing it's Members, and within such a *Term* of Years perfectly new, and different from what it was. 3. The *true Interest* of *Kings* can never be separated from the *true Interest* of that *Public* of which They are the *Head*: i. e. as long as they are at the Head, it is their chief, and great Interest to promote the *Public Good*: But if They turn aside from this great End, and are endeavouring to overturn, and ruine this; in such Case (which is ever in my Supposition) the *Public Good* cannot be the same with any thing inconsistent with it; with the *private Advantage*, the imaginary, mistaken Interest of any Person whatsoever who is attempting the Destruction of it. Nor can the Members of the *Body Politic*, in this Case, seek *their Good together with*, and *under* such *Head*, because the *Head* is seeking another imaginary *Good* of his own; and their acting,

acting, in conjunction with *Him*, as this *Author* speaks, would be, in this *Case*, the joyning in their own Ruine. And whereas He saith that the *looking only to themselves is a pulling of the Public, whereof the Sovereign is Head, to pieces*; it is manifest from himself, that *Themselves* being that *Public* of which the *King* is the *Head*, to look to *Themselves* is to look to that *Public* of which He is the *Head*, and not to pull it to pieces: As it is likewise plain that, in the *Case* now mentioned, to act in conjunction with their *Head* would be indeed the pulling in pieces the *Public*; or worse, the utter Ruine of it. He himself speaks afterwards of the *Disservice* of *Allegiance* to the *Public* in some *Cases*, and of always keeping under a just *Authority*, even to falling with it. And this, I suppose, under the notion of seeking our own Good in conjunction with that of the *Head*: which is a new way indeed of seeking Good, by such a Compliance as ends in Ruine. But I pray, if the Good (that is, the Temporal Grandeur) of the *Head* must never be disregarded, why must the *Public Good*, the Good of the *Body* be trampled upon? Is this so mean a Matter in comparison of the outward *Estate* of one Man as to be worthy of nothing but Neglect? May the *Head* seek an imaginary private Good, in distinction from the real Good of the *Body*; and shall it be represented as impossible that the *Body* should consult it's own real Good, in distinct-

distinction from this *mistaken Good* of the Head?
 4. Either the *Public Good* is in every Case the
 same with what this *Author* calls the *Good* of
 the *King*; or it is not. If it be, then my *Do-*
ctrine is as much against *Resistance* in any Case
 as *His* can be: If it be not, then may it be
 consider'd, and regarded, as something, in
 some Cases, distinct from it. 5. Such Arguing
 as this will equally prove it unlawful for any
Member of the *Body* to make opposition in any
 degree, or of any sort, to the *Head*; so much
 as to try their *Rights* in the *Legal Courts*: for
 this is not *seeking* their own *Good* in *conjuncti-*
on with the *King's*; this is looking to *themselves*
only, whereas the *Good* of the *King* is their
Good, and can never be separated from it.
 They are but *Members*: and the *Good* of the
Head must be the *Good* of the *Members*. 6. If
 He mean by the *Good* of the *King*, his being
 unresisted, and continuing in the possession of
 his *Headship*; his *Business* should have been to
 prove that this would be more, in all Cases, for
 the *Public Good*, than *Resistance*. This can't
 be done merely by alleging that the *King* is
 styl'd the *Head* of the *Public*: for notwith-
 standing this, the *Good* of the *Public* may be
 distinct from the *Good* of the *King*, in this no-
 tion of it. Yet this is all that this *first Argu-*
ment pretends to. Let us see therefore what
 follows.

2. *The very worst Governours are incomparably better than none; Tyranny than Anarchy, &c.* p. 5. I see it is invain to answer to those who will not read what they pretend to answer. Let the Reader consult this Book, p. 75. He will find a very distinct Reply to this Argument: Tho' methinks this Author himself might have been so just as to remark that I never defended *Anarchy*, or pleaded against *Government*; and so wise as to remember that tho' the worst Governours are better than none, yet they are not better than those who are better than the worst; and that tho' Tyranny be better than *Anarchy*, yet it is not better than the Government of good Princes: and that this way of Discoursing tends to nothing but the obscuring the Question now before us.

3. The next Argument I can frame out of what He advanceth is this, *That the Public Good is served in some Degree by all, even the worst, Princes; that therefore Allegiance to all serves the Public Good.* I desire the Reader to turn to the following Defense, p. 82. where He will find this Objection distinctly considered; tho' this Author hath not here paid the least regard, or given the least Reply, to what is there said. It is easy to see that the doing some good is not a sufficient Recompense for the Evil done by some Governours; or a sufficient Argument against Resistance. A Master of a Family may, in some respects, keep up a little Order

der and *Decorum* in it; yet doth it not follow that *He* is not to be controlled, or resisted, in any Attempts He may make. The late unhappy K. *James* would, in his *Civil Government*, to be sure have done *some good*, and kept up some *Order* in the *State*: But could this be any *Reason* why He should be suffered to turn our *Constitution* into an *Absolute Monarchy*, or to establish the insupportable *Tyranny* of the *Church of Rome* in this Land?

4. He goes on, p. 6. Supposing *the keeping of Allegiance* (as his words are) *should seem to any one at some time not to serve the Public Good, so well as the casting it off would; that rare and accidental Disservice must be overborn by the goodness of the general Rule, and is abundantly compensated by the general and ordinary Convenience.* Now,

1. If He speak here of the mistakes and false Judgments of Men about *Public Good*; my *Doctrine* is no more concerned than his own. I do not patronize, or justify them: but leave them to God who knoweth the heart. 2. If He mean to grant that *Allegiance*, in some cases, may not promote, but destroy *Public Good*, as He appears to do; then here is a confutation of his own first Argument, and an acknowledgment that the *Public Good* may be something very different from, and in some Cases inconsistent with, what He calls the Good of the *Head*.

3. The whole of this Argument is founded upon the goodness of the *General Rule* which enjoins

enjoyns *Allegiance*. Now I think a *General Rule* is distinguished from a *Rule* that holds absolutely true and good in all *Cases*; and is thought to be such an one as admits of some *Exceptions*. If the *Rule*, therefore, concerning *Allegiance* be only a good *General Rule*; this implies that it is not *absolutely*, and in all *Cases* obligatory: And if there be *Cases* in which *Allegiance* to a particular Person is not for *Public Good*, as the supposition here is; it is wonderful to hear any one say that this *Disservice* must be overborn by the goodness of the *General Rule*: Whereas a *General Rule* is not made to overbear particular *Cases*, but only to be a *Rule* in all *Cases* but such as are excepted. So that we see, from its being a good *General Rule*, it will follow that there may be *Cases* in which it is not good. Nor will the calling this *Disservice accidental* at all help the Cause. For the *Disservice* done to *Publick Good* by *Allegiance* is no more *accidental* in some *Cases*, than the *service* done by it is *accidental* in others. The *Disservice* of it is as certain when the *Head* seeks the ruine of the *Body*, as the *service* of it is on the contrary supposition. 4. This reasoning holds as good with respect to *Active Obedience*; which indeed the *Rule* concerning *Allegiance* respects chiefly, and primarily. *Active Obedience* is a good *General Rule*: but must the *Cases*, in which no honest Man allows it to be lawful, be all overborn by the *general and ordinary Convenience*? If not, why

why must it be otherwise in what is called *Passive Obedience*? But, 5. This *Author* is so little acquainted with the nature of *general Rules*, that He affirms what He saith of this to be no more than what we see in all *general Rules* to this purpose. All the *Commandments* of the second Table have for their End *Public Good*; and are not, He saith, to be suspended or set aside in any particular Case, where that *Public Good* seems better serv'd by their Contraries. He instances in this, *Thou shalt not Kill*: and affirms that if a Man be never so ill an Instrument or Mischievous to the *Public*, this *Commandment* may not be broken to get rid of Him. On the contrary, we know, and see, that it hath been allowed in all Governments to get rid of such Men by putting them to Death. The *Commandment* indeed is not broken, because it never was designed to forbid it: And this is always by *Expositors* made an *Exception* from this *General Rule*. The *Magistrate* indeed is to do it: but this *Commandment* is a *General Rule* against *Killing* to Him, as much as to the meanest Subject; and yet it's being a good *General Rule* doth not hinder the *Killing* Men on some occasions. Nay, It is lawful for a private Man to kill another in his own necessary *Defense*: And in this Case likewise the *General Rule* is superseded; not broken indeed, because it was never designed to reach it. And as all *Killing* is not *Murder*, so all *Resistance* is not *Rebellion*: Again, *Thou shalt not bear false Wit-*
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ness is said to be of the like nature. But indeed it is not. For there is an Eternal and Unalterable Evil in *falsehood*, and *unjust* and *groundless accusation*; and therefore the *Law* about this is not a *General Rule*, but a *Rule* absolutely obliging. The mere *Act* of depriving a person of life in this state is not of this nature: because it may be wholly free from all Malignity and Evil within; and in some *Cases* be founded upon *generous* and good *Principles*, as in those before mention'd. God Almighty himself performs the one every hour; but hates and abhors the *other* in all *Cases*. The like may be said as to *committing Adultery*: It is ever *Evil*, and of *Pernicious* consequence, and against *Public Good*. The *Crown standing in need of an heir*, and the like, are pretenses founded upon the weakness and folly of Men; for which God *Almighty* makes no *exceptions* in his *Moral Laws*. The *Publick Good*, we know, may be served without adhering to the next Heir in a *Lineal Discent*. He next instances in, *Thou shalt not Steal*, and, *Thou shalt not Covet*: and affirms that it is unlawful to *steal* from a Covetous Man, at a time when the Public labours under great necessities, tho' He refuseth to give, &c. On the contrary, it is certainly lawful and fitting (and what is actually often done) to take by *Violence* for *Public Necessities* from those who will not otherwise give what is demanded. Nay, a *Poor Man* is allowed to take from others by *stealth*

stealth, what is necessary for his *subsistence*, if by no other means He can get it; and justified in the doing it. So that we see these *general Rules* are superseded in such *Cases*. The truth of the matter is; These *Rules* all hold *absolutely* as far as they were designed: but were never designed to extend to such *Cases* as it is reasonable and fitting to *except* in the interpretation of some of them. We see then that those *Commandments* which are properly *general Rules*, are so far from not admitting *exceptions*, that every body allows and knows them; and that these *Exceptions* are founded upon *Public*, and *General* good. So that the business of this *Writer* should have been to have shewn, either that *Resistance* doth in no *Case* promote the *Public Good*; or that, notwithstanding this, *God Almighty* hath *absolutely*, and in *every Case* forbidden it; and this in so many words, because we see from other *Cases* that *general Expressions* are not sufficient, and that good *general Rules* do admit of particular *Exceptions*. But nothing of all this hath He attempted; but indeed hath rather argued after such a manner, as to furnish Arguments against the *Cause* He hath undertaken. I allow, and contend, that *we must not do Evil that Good may come*: but this is still speaking at large. The *Question* is, what is *Evil*? and whether such a *Resistance*, as is necessary for the preservation of the *Public*, be any more *Evil* in the *Society*, than it is in a

Private

Private Man to *kill* another in order to the preservation of his own Life. It is an easy matter to speak in *general Terms* without coming to the *Point*: but it will be found a more difficult matter to prove that, notwithstanding other *general Precepts* require *Restrictions* and *Exceptions*, yet this concerning *Allegiance* cannot admit of any; tho' perhaps there be greater reasons for it than can be given for allowing them in any other *general Precept* in the whole *System* of Religion. But to proceed to those *Arguments* which this Writer himself hath more distinctly and professedly propos'd.

5. Upon my *Principles* which are founded upon *Public Good*, He argues p. 8. *There would be no Allegiance due to Tyrannical Powers, either Oppressors, or Persecutors. But Allegiance is due to such. Ergo, My Doctrine is false.* Now, 1. Here is an acknowledgment that *Allegiance* to *such* is against the *Public Good*, because He argues that if we attend to *Public Good*, no *Allegiance* is due to them: and so we see He cannot help owning himself, that the *Public Good* cannot be the same with the particular *Good* of such *Powers*, or be sought in *conjunction* with that *Good* of theirs which consists in the *Allegiance* of their *Subjects*. 2. The *Point* here to be proved, and indeed the whole matter now in *Debate*, is whether *Allegiance* be due to such as He here speaks of. This he endeavours to prove by observing, 1.

1. The behaviour of *David* to *Saul*. 2. The Evangelical Doctrine of the Cross. 3. The Allowance of the necessity of a *Submissive Suffering*, when the Laws of the Land are against Us. Under all these He is pleased to oppose nothing, except his own affirmations to what is at large discoursed in the following Treatise: but wholly overlooks it, as if nothing had been said upon these Subjects. But the *Reader*, I hope, will be more candid; and if He be, He will find, 1. The Example of *David* considered p. 128, and will observe, for this *Author*, that *David* took up Arms against *Saul*, upon a less occasion than *Public Good*; even for his own private preservation: And this would not be accounted *Allegiance* in any, in our Days. If therefore he will adhere to *David's* Example, *Self-preservation* is a sufficient *Plea*, in Case of private Injuries, for a *Subject* to take up Arms. Upon what *Authority* He represents *Saul* in this place as a *Public Tyrant*, and his *Government* as a great *Grievance and Burthen to the Common-wealth*, I am at a loss to know; unless it be on his own, and that his *Cause* may appear in better Colours. But I refer the *Reader* to the page before mention'd. 2. As to the suffering *Doctrine* of the *Gospel*, every one grants that it obliges none to suffer any Misery, which can honourably, or lawfully be avoided: and whether *unjust Persecution* be of that sort that *Inferiors* may, if they have it in their Power, defend them-

themselves against it, must be tried by other *Arguments*, and cannot be determined by *general Precepts* concerning suffering *Patiently*, and the like. All this is particularly answer'd in those *pages* of this *Book*, in which I handle the *Arguments* for *Absolute Non-resistance* taken from the *New Testament*: And methinks if this *Author* thought it worth his while to argue with me at all, He might have thought it worth his while to do me the justice to consider what I have said upon the *particulars* He mentions. 3. As to the *Concession* of some, that all *Persecution* is to be submitted to when back'd by *Laws* of the *Land*; I am not answerable for it. If He chuse to argue with me, He should argue against my *Principles*, and not against *others*. These (as far as this matter is concern'd) the *Reader* will find p. 96, &c. Where it is shewn that no *Governours*, or *Legistators*, have any *Authority* from *God*, or *Man*, to make such *Laws* as are *Unjust*, and *Oppressive*, and destructive of *Public Good*; nor the *People* consequently any *obligation*, in point of *Conscience*, to submit to them: tho' when they are not *such* to a great degree, *Public Good* may induce them to such *Submission*. He will find likewise the *Case* of *Persecution*, and that of the *Primitive Christians* largely handled, p. 129, &c. tho' not thought worthy of the *Notice* of this *Writer*.

6. He argues that upon my Principles *there would be no Allegiance due in Absolute Governments*. I answer, As much as in any *Governments* whatsoever : and this inviolable, as long as the *Prince* acts not in opposition to the *Public Good*, or attempts the *Ruine* of the *People* committed to his care. This hath been sufficiently declared. But he concludes this from hence, that it hath been esteem'd a *Public Evil* to this Nation that a *Prince* should set his *Will* above all *Law* : Therefore *Absolute Power* is a *Public Evil*, and not at all to be submitted to in *other* places. Now 1. It is true, God knows, that generally speaking *Absolute Power* is seen to be so used as to be a *Public Evil* and *Plague* to the *Subject* : and yet it is true that where it is used, as some of the best *Princes* have used it, it ought to be submitted to. 2. Our *Form of Government* being less liable to fatal *Evils* than *that*, and being *Establish'd* amongst us, we might justly prize it, and justly defend it against those who professedly designed to alter it, not for our advantage, but our *Ruine*; and this against their *Contract*, and *solemn Assurances*. *Public Good* obliges to *Submission* in the one Case, and argues against it in the other. Besides, 3. Our Allegiance is due to the Estates of Parliament, and Prince in conjunction; and to the Prince executing the Laws made by Himself and Parliament. If his *Will* be set up against *Law*, the paying *Allegiance* to that, is the with-
drawing

drawing *Allegiance* from those who have an *Equal Right* to it; nay it is the withdrawing our *Allegiance* from this very *Prince* considered as joyned with the *Eſtates* of *Parliament* in the making our *Laws*. And is it ſo great a *Crime* with ſome Men to withdraw *Allegiance* from a *Prince* acting againſt the *Laws*; and no crime at all to withdraw it from all our *Legiſlators* at once? 4. If all that He means be, that upon my *principles* an *absolute Obedience* in all caſes is not due in *Absolute Governments*; I own it and contend for it. He knows himſelf that it muſt be ſo in *Active Obedience*: and why not in *Paſſive*, notwithstanding any thing here urged? 5. As to what He ſaith of *Nero*, and the *Obedience* required to *Him*, I have ſufficiently conſidered that matter in the *ſecond Chapter*, to which I refer the impartial *Reader*; not expecting ſome perſons ſo much as to read what is advanced againſt any *Old Topic*, or beloved *Tenet* of theirs.

7. He argues, that *it is not really for the Public Good to endeavour a Cure of the worſt Governments by caſting off Allegiance*. I answer, 1. If ſo, then my *Doctrine*, which is all founded upon *Public Good*, is as much for *absolute Allegiance* as His. 2. I would appeal to the *late Revolution*, and the happy *ſettlement* conſequent upon it, whether it be not for the *Public Good* in ſome *Caſes*, not to caſt off *Allegiance* wholly and run to *Confuſion*, but to *transfer* it from the worſt *Governours* to *better*: I ſay, I would ap-

peal to the *late Revolution* for this, had not many Men forgotten what they then feared, and that miserable prospect which the whole *Nation* had then before their Eyes. 3. I appeal to what this *Author* acknowledges under the last head but one. There he is talking of the Miseries of *Oppressive and Persecuting Governments*, and the suffering Principles of the *Gospel*. Here the greater suffering is said to lie on the side of *Resistance*. Then one would think that *they who* talk of *Suffering*, with so much pleasure, at a distance, might, more consistently with themselves, engage the *Gospel* on the side, where the greatest Sufferings lie. But *Religion acts no Triumphs* in any *Sufferings* that might be lawfully and honourably avoided. 4. The *Miseries* named here proceed from that Interest the worst of Governours sometimes may find amongst Men of *Evil Principles*; and would vanish, were the *Principles* I maintain universally embraced. 5. The same *arguing* would prove it as much against *Public Good* to War against *Foreign Invaders*, as against *Tyrants* at home: therefore is vain. 6. As to the *Opportunity*, He saith, the *Liberty of Resistance* would give to turbulent Men &c. This is not of worse consequence than the *Encouragement* his *Doctrine* accidentally gives to *Tyrants*, and Men of *Base* and mercenary *Principles* to joyn with them in enslaving, and oppressing their *Fellow-subjects*. If he saith, His *Doctrine* justifieth no such thing: no more doth

doth mine justify the *Resistance* of any, but such as act upon a *Necessity*, and upon the most generous Principles. The *Baseness* of Men on each side is not to be taken into the account, if we would judge fairly. But these things are already said in the *Book* itself, and never yet answered.

8. He argues, that I *mistake the true Ground of Allegiance, which is Authority, not Convenience*. But, 1. I have shewn that the *Ground* of this *Authority* is made by *St. Paul* himself to be *Convenience*, or *Public Good*: and consequently the *Ground of Allegiance* must be the same with the *Ground* of that *Authority* to which *Allegiance* is requir'd. 2. I have shewn that it cannot be said without *Blasphemy*, that any *Prince* hath *Authority* from *God* in any the least unjust, or oppressive *Act*: And therefore if this *Author* will have it that *Mere Authority* is the *Ground of Submission*, in all such *Acts* there can be no *Ground for Submission* left, either *Active*, or *Passive*. See in what a condition the great *Asserters of Allegiance* leave their *Princes*: whereas in such *Acts*, if they do not in a very heinous manner affect the *Public Good*, my *Doctrine* obligeth to a *Submission* for the sake of *Public Good*. So far from true it is which He adds, that *founding* it all upon *Authority* secures *Submission* in all *Cases*, and the like, that it is impossible it should secure it in any *Case*, in which there is not *Authority*; and in

which *Princes* act against the *Positive Commission* of *Almighty God*. And as ill as He thinks it would stand in an *Address* of *Loyalty* to found it upon *Public Good*, it would found full as ill in a *Speech* from the *Throne*, to require it, absolutely in all *Cases*, upon *Mere Authority*: And as some good *Subjects* have done the former, so our *Princes* do universally avoid the latter, and declare the *Public Good* to be the *Ground* on which They desire the *Allegiance* of their *Subjects*. Nay, had all *Addresses* been framed upon that Bottom, it had been happy for a *Late King*, who had not then (possibly) been so fatally misled, as to depend upon the *Allegiance* of Men so expressed; which his *Predecessor* (a *Prince* of great *Penetration*) upon occasion of the like *Addresses*, call'd by the Name of a *mad* and *hare-brain'd Loyalty*. But,

3. If *Authority* be the *Ground* of *Allegiance*, and this makes *Allegiance* unbounded, how comes it that *Active Obedience* may and ought to be denied in many *Cases*? Will you not obey *Authority*? Or are there *Cases* in which *Princes* have no *Authority*? Then what becomes of this sole *Ground* of *Allegiance*, and the *Thrones* supported by it? And why may not *Passive*, as well as *Active Submission*, claim an *Exemption*, where the sole *Ground* of *Submission* is wanting?

4. If *Public Good* be not the *Ground* of *Submission*, how can *Public Good* be the *End* of *Submission*, as this *Author* contends before? Can it be the *End*

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proposed by it, and not the *Motive* to it? And if *Authority* be the *sole Ground*, then is the *Grandeur*, and *Support* of the *Prince* the true *End* of *Submission*, and not the *Public Good*.

To his *last Argument* I answer, 1. That *Public Good* is *Public Good*, and not the *mistaken Fancy* of private Men, or the *mistaken Judgment* of *Legislators*, or *Governours*. For *Mistakes* in the application of *Moral Rules* every one must answer to that *God*, who alone can judge of the *Sincerity* of the *Heart*. No *Legislators* have any *Authority* to enact what is *Public Misery*: And if what I have said on this Head had been duly considered, this *Author* need not have added this *Observation*. 2. If the *Laws* be to determine *Public Good*, and *Public Good* be the *End* of *Allegiance*, as He saith; then must they likewise determine that *Allegiance* which aims at that *End*; And consequently, *Allegiance* to a *Prince* acting against the *Laws*, cannot be the *Voice* of the *Laws*; or, if it be, they have *different Voices*, and leave us at liberty which to obey. 3. To speak of our *State* as of an *Absolute Monarchy*, or to talk of falling from *Monarchical* into *Republican Principles*, is not to argue, but only to obscure the *Truth*. *Prejudices* must be laid aside: *Old Topics* must not be insisted on merely because they are *old*: What is advanced must be duly considered; and then we may have hope that some important *Truths* which
have

have been born down by *Words*, and *Passion*, may at last revive, and be establish'd amongst us, too firmly to be ever again shaken by Wind, or overturned by *Power* and *Interest*. Thus have I laid before the *Reader* a fair *Examination* of what this *Writer* hath advanced; who indeed deserved it the less, because, it is evident, He wrote without paying the least regard to what I had largely before discoursed upon the *Topics* He hath here urged. Whoever He be, I wish Him well, and pray God to give Him an unprejudiced Mind, and a *right Understanding in all things*. Having thus considered the only *Author* that hath seen fit to appear in *Public* against the following *Defense*, I shall now proceed,

II. To consider whatsoever *Objections* I could by any means find out to have been more *privately* entertained, and urged, against the *Doctrine* I have taught, or the *Reasoning* I have made use of in this *Defense*.

I. I understand that it is *objected* by some, that when we speak of *Public Good*, we must consider not what is the Good of one particular *Kingdom*, but what is the Good of *Humane Society*, or the *World* in general. To which I answer, 1. That whatsoever is for the Good of this *Nation* in *particular*, is for the Good of every *Nation* under the Sun, in all parallel Cases. Supposing *Resistance* for the good
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of that *Kingdom* to which we belong in any *Case*; it is certain that the like *Case*, and the same *Circumstances* being supposed, it must equally be for the *Good* of any other *Kingdom*.

2. If they who *object* this mean, that every particular *Action* of this *Nation* must be considered, not only with relation to this *Kingdom*, but at the same time to the whole *World*; at this rate we must not make *War*, or enter into any *Alliances*, tho' never so necessary for our own *Interest*, unless it be for the *Interest* of all other *Kingdoms*, and even of our *Enemies* themselves. This is to make our *Concern* equal to all *Kingdoms*; and to take off our particular *Regard* to our own; and to suppose the whole *World* not divided into distinct *Nations* and *Kingdoms*, but all united under one *Universal Monarch*; which would please some *Men* extremely. So that if it be meant by this *Objection* that *Resistance* cannot in any *Case* be for the *Public Good*, unless it be for the good of every *Kingdom* as well as this; the *Answer* is, that it is certainly equally for the good of every *Nation* in those *Cases*, and in those *Circumstances*, in which it is for the *Good* of *this*. But if it be meant, that the *Resistance* made in any particular *Nation*, cannot be *lawful*, unless at the same time this *Resistance* be equally for the interest of the whole *World*, the *Answer* is, that this is unreasonable, and absurd to expect; and that the same *Argument* will equally

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ly prove it unlawful to make *Resistance* to *Foreign Enemies*, or *Invaders*.

2. It is *objected* that the *Apostle* useth two different *Arguments*, *Rom. 13. 1.* &c. of which I consider but *one*, neglecting the *other* wholly. The *one* is taken, they say, from the *Divine Authority* of *Magistrates*; the *other* from the usefulness of their *Office* to *Humane Society*. I answer, 1. Granting this to be true, nothing can follow from hence in favour of *Absolute Non-resistance*; for I have sufficiently shewn in the following *Treatise*, that as the *Argument* taken from the usefulness of their *Office* cannot hold good, when they are the *Plagues*, and *Destroyers* of *Humane Society*; so the *Argument* drawn from their *Divine Authority* cannot hold good in those *Cases*, in which they cannot be said to act by *Divine Authority* without *Blasphemy*. Both these, it is manifest, I have considered distinctly, tho', 2. It is manifest that they are not really two *distinct Arguments*; nor doth it at all appear that *St. Paul* makes them two *distinct Arguments*, but rather that he resolves all into the *usefulness* of their *Office*: which is the only *Proof* He gives of their being *ordained* of *God*, viz. as it is his Will that an *Office* so useful to *Society* should be kept up, and submitted to, in the *World*. Nor can any of the present *Rulers* of this *World* pretend to any other *Divine Right*, or *Divine Authority*, but what results from the usefulness of

of their Office to *Humane Society*. I add now,
3. That if their acting by *Authority* from God
in *some Cases* (for that his *Commission* gives them
not *Authority* in *all*, will be owned by every
Sober Considerer;) be sufficient to establish *Ab-*
solute Non-resistance in *all Cases*; it will likewise
as effectually establish *Absolute Active Obedience*
in *all Cases*: which yet is acknowledged to be
in *many Cases* a great Sin. For this is the *Ar-*
gument upon which *Active Obedience* is founded,
as well as *Non-resistance*. And 4. If a *Prince's*
acting by *Divine Authority* in *some Cases* will,
considered by it self, establish the necessity of
Non-resistance in *all Cases*; then will it be as
unlawful to resist a *Foreign Prince* invading our
Land, as to resist a *Sovereign* of our own inva-
ding our *Rights*. It is true of them both equal-
ly, that in *other Cases* they act by a *Divine*
Commission: And no more can be said for the
latter, than that in the due *Execution* of his Of-
fice He is the *Minister* of God; which may like-
wise as justly be said of the *former*. As for any
Right in the *Cases* now supposed, they are both
truly destitute of it; and the *latter* more void of
all *Excuse* than the *former*. Much more might
be added, but that it hath been already ar-
gued at large, both in the following *Sermon*,
and *Defense*, to which I refer the *Reader*.

3. It is thought by *some*, that I have not
sufficiently distinguished the *Cases* of *Absolute*,
and *Limited Governments*. I answer, 1. If
these

these Persons allow my Reasoning to be good with respect to the *latter*, my main *End* is answered, which was to vindicate, and establish a *Doctrine*, the Practice of which hath preserved this *Nation* (for which we are all chiefly concerned) from Ruine; and the *contrary* to which must lay the Foundation of *Slavery* and *Misery* in it. 2. I have actually considered the *Case* of all the *Absolute Monarchs* we know of; such as of themselves only make *Laws*, and admit no *Coordinate Powers* in their *Legislative Authority*; and have shewn, that the sole *Authority* enjoyed by these is the *Authority* to do good, and to preserve and make happy the *People* committed to their *Care*; and that their *People* are under no Obligation to suffer themselves to be oppress'd, and ruined by *Them*; whether they arrived at their *Power* by the immediate *Designation* of God himself, or by the *Election* of the *People*, or by their own gradual *Encroachments*, or by *Succession* to others possess'd of *Power* by any of these *Methods*. If what I have said hold good with respect to *these*, I am not at all concern'd if a *Case* may possibly be supposed, which I did not think of any use expressly to consider. But, 3. When I am inform'd of any *Prince* possess'd of his *Power* by *lawful Conquest* of a *Nation* first engaged in an *unlawful and unjust* War against Him, I shall be ready distinctly to consider, 1. The *Case* of the very Persons thus conquered, at
such

such time of their being conquered. 2. Their Case after Pardon, and after the grant of their Lives, and the concession of any Privileges to them. 3. The Case of their *Posterity* after them. These three Cases are very different, and will afford differing *Considerations*. But at present I cannot call to mind any such *Conquest-Authority*; and therefore cannot think it worth while to spend time in considering what seems to be of no Importance to any *People* we know of.

4. Some *object*, that if there be not lodged, in some Persons, or other, an Absolute Power, uncontrollable, and irresistible in all Cases, the *Refractory* could not be punished, nor Peace preserv'd. 1. This is very strange indeed, that an *Authority* sufficient to punish the *Refractory*, and to preserve the *Peace*, (which is not only granted, but contended for;) should not be fully sufficient for the *Punishment* of the *Refractory*, and the *Preservation* of the *Peace*. 2. There can be no *Authority* (properly so call'd) in *Governours* beyond the good of the *Community*: God himself gives no more. The *Power* which extends to the Prejudice, or Ruine of it, is a monstrous *Power*, void of all *Authority*. 3. If all here meant be this, that Men may mistake, and under pretense of preventing Ruine, hinder *Justice*, and disturb *Peace*; I have over and over again shewn the Weakness of this way of Arguing: And I urge on the
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contrary side as great an Inconvenience, that if it be taught and inculcated that the *Power of Magistrates* is in *all Cases* not to be resisted without a *Crime*, the *Criminal* will escape *Punishment*, and the *Public Peace* and *Interest* be shaken, and ruined, thro the *Ignorance*, or *Evil Dispositions* of *Governours*, who are no more exempted from *Natural*, and *Moral Infirmities* than their *Subjects*. And therefore, if the *Inconvenience* on one side prove my *Doctrine* false, the *Inconvenience* on the *other* side must equally prove the *contrary Doctrine* false. 4. It may as well be argued, that if the *Authority* of *Governours* do not oblige in *all Cases* relating to *Active Obedience*, the *End* of *Government* cannot be answered: for the *Mistakes* of *Men* in *this* likewise may promote *Disorder* and *Confusion*. But yet it is allowed that *Active Obedience* is in many *Cases* to be withheld: Therefore neither doth this *Argument* prove the necessity of *Non-resistance* in *all Cases*.

5. It is objected that I have misrepresented and abused the *Patrons* of *Absolute Non-resistance* in the *Paraphrase* of *Rom. 13. 1.* which I have given, as upon their *Principles*, *Chap. 2.* of this *Defense*. I confess I should account this an *Imputation* of great *Importance*, were it true; and should be ready to give all *Satisfaction* imaginable, could it be prov'd so to be. But the *Accusation* seems to me to be entirely founded upon a *Mistake*. For I do not in that place

place pretend, nor was I oblig'd to it, to give the *Interpretation* which was ever actually given in so many Words by any of them; but the *Interpretation* which they must give, if they will be consistent with themselves, and with that notion of the *Apostle's* Design which they profess to entertain, and with their Zeal against the contrary *Interpretation*. For instance, They say St. Paul designed what He saith in this celebrated Passage against *Resistance*, &c. to extend equally to all *Cases*, and to *Princes* considered as well acting a *Tyrannical* and *Oppressive* Part, as acting a good and *Beneficent* one. Well then, In order to shew them the *Absurdity* of this, nothing can be more proper than to express this in the *Paraphrase*, that it may be seen how it suits with the Words, and Reasoning of the *Apostle*. This is all I have done, not pretending that the *Sober Writers* in that *Cause* have actually in so many Words said what is there expressed; but shewing them the Absurdity of their *Notion*, by doing that for them, which they must do, if they will thoroughly interpret that *Passage* according to their own *Principles*: And what is more common, or allowable, than to convince Men of the Absurdity of their *Notions* by shewing them what absurd things they are oblig'd to say and maintain, if they will adhere to them. Not but that I could produce Modern *Authors*, who have, in their Zeal, represented the *Apo-*

style as *styling Nero*, considered in his worst
 and most *Tyrannical Character*, as the *Minister*
 of *God*, and acting by his *Commission*: to whom
 I wish *Repentance* and a better Mind. To such
 as these it cannot be an Injury to prove, even
 to their *Eye-sight*, how wretched and pitiful a
Writer they make *St. Paul* at this rate to be.
 Again, If (as they declare) the great Crime
 of the contrary *Paraphrase* be this, that no
 mention of *Tyrannical Princes* is made in it;
 then I can't be blam'd if I frame a *Paraphrase*
 in which These are mentioned, that Men may
 judge on which side the *Truth* lies: as I have
 urged in the *Book* itself. But if, after all, any
 will say that they mean only to make *St. Paul*
 argue, that even the worst *Magistrates* act by
Divine Commission in some Cases, therefore they
 are not to be resisted in others, in which they
 act without *Commission*; I must say, it is equal-
 ly absurd with any thing which I have fixed
 upon their Notion; and brings no Credit at
 all either to their own Understandings, or *St.*
Paul's way of *Reasoning*. Their *Office* is the
Ordinance of *God*: i. e. their *Office* duly execu-
 ted. Can it follow from hence, that whoever
 resists them acting out of, and against, their
Office, resists the *Ordinance* of *God*? Or is it not
 rather an high *Indignity* to *Almighty God* to say
 so? They are the *Ministers* of *God* to us for
 good in the *due execution* of their *Office* only.
 Can it follow from hence, that we must be
 subject,

subject, when They are so far from duly executing it, that they are acting directly contrary to it? *They are continually attending upon this very thing*: Can it follow from hence, that we must pay all *Subjection*, and *Tribute* to them, *when they are continually attending upon the contrary*? Had I thus *paraphrased* St. Paul in my own Name, I should have thought myself incapable of ever making Him, or the *Holy Scriptures*, a sufficient *Reparation*: And had I thus *paraphrased* Him in the name of the *Patrons* of *Non-resistance*, I should have thought it as great an *Affront* to their *Understandings*, as even what I have already done. But if some of them chuse *rather* this way, than the *other* which I have before proposed, I have here sufficiently shewn the *Reader* what *Judgment* to pass upon it; and shall farther assure Him, that as I had no *Design* but what I have just now declared, so I am ready to justify what I have inserted in that *Paraphrase*, from the *Principles* and *Notions* publicly laid down by *Writers* of account in that *Cause*, and to prove that I have *not done the least Injury to the sense of those Persons* upon whose *Principles* I framed that *Paraphrase*, tho' I have expressed it as they would not perhaps express it, in order to shew them the *Inconclusiveness* of St. Paul's Reasoning upon their *Principles*. I here add, that if the *Reasoning* I have now also produced be *conclusive*, then because a *Foreign Prince* acts in *some Cases*

by a *Divine Commission*, it must be unlawful to resist Him in any *others*; then likewise, because an *Inferior Magistrate* acts by the same *Divine Commission*, must it likewise be unlawful to resist Him should He act *against* it, and become a *Common Plague*, or *Robber of the Neighbourhood*; then a *Father's* acting in some *Cases* by a *Divine Commission* makes it unlawful to resist Him, in *Cases* in which He is void of all *Commission*; even tho' He should be perfectly distracted, and attempt the Lives of his whole *Family*.

But once more, If they still recur to *Public Good*, and say it is more for *that*, that *Resistance* should not at all be allowed: I answer, this is changing the *Argument*, according to themselves, and throwing the *Authority of God*, and the *Divine Commission*, for the present, quite out of the *Question*, and representing *St. Paul* as making themselves, and other *Subjects* the Judges of *Public Good*, which they have so severely blamed in *others*. For, there can be no force in such Reasoning as this; *Magistrates* are the *Ordinance of God*, the *Ministers of God* to us for good, continually attending upon this; therefore it is for the *Public Good* that they should never be resisted, even in *Cases* in which they are not the *Ministers of God*, and when they are continually attending upon the contrary. And if they acknowledge and contend that *St. Paul* takes an *Argument* from *Public Good*, I hope they will pardon it in *others*; and remem-

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remember likewise that the *Magistrates* whom only He describes are the *Good*, and not the *Tyrannical*; that from their doing good He argues to *Obedience* and *Submission*; and that He is as far from saying any thing that infers the greater Advantage to the *Public* from *Non-resistance* to all sorts of *Magistrates* in all Cases, as one can be who useth those *Descriptions*, and those *Expressions*, which do indeed imply the contrary. For instance, If a *Magistrate's* being the *Minister* of God to his *People* for good, be the Ground He proposeth for *Submission*; I say, it is implied in this, that his being the *Minister* of the worst of *Beings* to their Destruction and Ruine, is a Ground for withdrawing their *Allegiance*; the *Foundation* he layeth for their *Obedience* being all removed. If the *Magistrate's* continually attending upon the good of his *People* be the Ground he layeth down for their *Obedience*; the contrary being supposed, the ground of *Obedience* is removed, and the contrary Practice seems to be allowed, in such Case, by the reasoning which the *Apostle* chuseth to make use of. Where therefore are we to find in *St. Paul's* Arguments the least Insinuation that the *Public Good* requires *Absolute Non-resistance* in all Cases? But enough. If the *Reader* desire more, the *Treatise* itself will furnish him.

6. It is *objected*, that I have mistaken St. Polycarp, p. 140. 1. Be it so, it is of small Importance; if so be I have not mistaken St. Paul. The Cause I have undertaken will not suffer by this: And for myself, I am sure I was not wilfully guilty of mistaking, or misapplying what He saith in the Passage referr'd to. 2. It is manifest that at a time when it was for his Interest, and for the Interest of the *Christian Religion*, that He should speak as highly as possible of the *Obedience to Magistrates*, He is far from representing St. Paul, and the *Christian Religion*, as some Persons have since done; but is content with a very general and loose Expression concerning the *Obedience* required by it. 3. It is manifest that in the Passage referr'd to He hath Rom. 13. 1. in view; and that this *Holy Martyr* thinks it sufficient to tell the *Proconsul*, that the *Obedience* taught and enjoyned in that Passage is, *κατὰ τὸ πρὸς κοινόν*, and such as *doth not hurt our selves*. Doth this look as if He thought *Absolute Obedience* of any sort required by St. Paul? Nay, Doth it not appear that it was his Opinion that the *Honour*, and *Obedience* of any sort here required by St. Paul, was only such as *doth not hurt our selves*; and that the Judgment concerning this was left to our selves? It is a very loose, and general Expression, all must own; and such an one as could never have slip'd from a Man thoroughly possess'd with the Belief of the
Duty

Duty of Absolute Non-resistance. So that I cannot retract what I have fixed upon this *Holy Man*, till I am better convinc'd I have done him an *Injury*. My *Doctrine* gives liberty of withdrawing *Honour* and *Obedience*, when the continuing them would be *Public Ruine*: This *Father* acknowledges an Obligation to no other *Honour* but what *doth not hurt our selves*; which Expression, I say, leaves the Matter in a greater Latitude than my *Doctrine* hath done. If any think otherwise, they have their Liberty. But can any one prove that this *Father*, who thus expressed *Himself*, reckoned it amongst *harmless*, or even *lawful* things, to divest our selves of our *Rights* and *Privileges*; and to give up our selves, our Families, and our Posterity after us, to *Misery* and *Slavery*, at the Command of an *Earthly Prince*? But, 4. We see that this *plain* and *positive* Text of *St. Paul* hath been *encumber'd with Glosses*, and beset with *Restrictions* from the beginning; and this even by *Christians* of the first Ages: as is plain not only from this of *St. Polycarp*, but likewise from the plain and unexceptionable Testimony of *Origen* produced together with it.

I assure the *Reader* that these are all the *Objections* which I could by any means procure from the *Adversaries* of the *Doctrine* I have taught: and these I have now seriously, and impartially considered.

If any Persons think the *Patriarchal Scheme*, espoused and with great Zeal recommended by some *Moderns*, (tho' unknown to those *Christians* of former Ages, to whom the greatest Deference is professed) sufficient of itself to uphold, and support the *Doctrine* of *Absolute, Unlimited Non-resistance*, I crave leave to offer this *one Observation*, that this being entirely founded upon the *Paternal Authority*, it cannot infer a more unlimited *Authority* in *Princes* than that on which the Foundation of it is laid. And this being so, before *Absolute Unlimited Non-resistance* can be inferr'd from hence, it must be proved that the *Power* of *Fathers* was originally *Absolute* in all Cases, just, or unjust, over the *Lives* and *Fortunes* of their *Descendants*; and that *Almighty God* designed to bring whole *Families* and *Societies* into an *Unlimited Subjection* to *Men*, whom, it is evident, He hath not always secured from the *Heighth* of *Wickedness*, or *Natural Folly*, or *Violent Distraction* and *Madness*; against the intolerable Effects of which Evils the *Laws* of all *Civiliz'd Nations* have guarded *Children*, and the inferior parts of all *Families*. How easy soever this may fit upon the Minds of some Persons in *Speculation*, they will find it very hard to prove the *Experiment* of it, in *Fact*, to be agreeable to the *Will* of *God*, or to the *Common Sense* of the wisest part of *Mankind*. And yet till this be demonstrated, *Unlimited Non-resistance* can no more be

be inferr'd from this *Scheme*, than from *that*, espoused and established by the Excellent and *Judicious* Mr. *Hooker*, which founds the *Authority* of *Governours* upon the *Voluntary Compact* of Men. But I desire the *Reader* to remark that I have not confined myself to any *one Scheme*, but have made it my business in the following *Defense*, to shew that in *all* the *Schemes* of *Government* espoused by *Thinking Men* it is equally true, that it cannot be the *Will* of *God* to forbid, and condemn *Resistance* to *Governours* in *all possible Cases*.

As for such Persons as have chosen to express their *Concern* in *general Terms*, without entring at all into the *Merits* of the *Cause*, I esteem myself the less fairly dealt with by them, because I made it a matter of *Conscience* to deal otherwise by their *Cause*, and took a great deal of pains to know, and consider the *Particulars* alleged by them in *Justification* of it. I assure one of them, who did me the *Honour* to point me out plainly enough before an *Honourable Audience*, and the *Favour* to put me in the worst *Company* He could well pick out; (by what *Law* of *Justice*, or *Charity*, I know not;) I assure Him, I say, that I am perfectly of his *Mind*, that *Rebellion*, and *Murther*, will and must be *Sins*, as long as the *World* endures: But the *Point* is, what is *Rebellion*; for as all *Killing* is not *Murther*, so all *Resistance* may not be *Rebellion*. I assure Him likewise, that it was
the

the Consideration of that *known Passage in the 13th. to the Romans, by itself, unincumber'd by all strange Glosses, and the manner after which St. Paul reasons in it, that forced me to say that it rather implied in it a License for Resistance in some Cases than the contrary: tho' of Persecuting the supreme Magistrate, even to Death, I am as far from speaking, as, I wish, for his own sake, He had been. And if He will please to turn to this Defense, He will find that the Universal Practice of the Primitive Christians, recommended to my Consideration, the constant Judgment of the Antient Fathers, the express Doctrine of our received Homilies, and the Consent of Interpreters, and Divines, as well as the Agreement of some Papists in the Doctrine I have taught, have been all seriously considered by me, and largely discours'd of: And that it hath not been my Custom to insult and triumph over a Cause in general Expressions, but to pay all due Attention to what hath been urged by others in defense of it. I have learnt indeed by Experience not to expect the like from them in their turn, having met with little besides Repetition of the same Objections at large; and this managed as if no one Word of Reply had ever been given to them. Thus likewise I find that the Old Question, *Who shall be Judge?* can be repeated without the least notice of what hath been said in answer to it, p. 165. and the old Objection, that the Doctrine taught by me makes Princes Subjects,*

and

and *Subjects Princes*, without any *Reply* to the *Answer* given to it. p. 94. as if *Truth* feared a *Scrutiny*, or it were unworthy of their *Cause*, to suppose it to stand in need of any *Vindication* besides the *Repetition* of *General Affirmations*.

For my own part, Nothing but a great *Regard* to the *Interest* of that *Kingdom* to which I belong, and to that *Revolution*, without the *Approbation* of which our *present Constitution* seems precarious, and uncertain; and a *Zeal* against the *Use* made of the contrary *Principles* for the disturbing the *Minds* of many *Christians*, and the bringing an *Odium* upon our *Establishment*, could have induc'd me either first to appear, or now to persist, in the *Defense* of so hated, and so obnoxious a *Cause*; so much misunderstood, and so generally misinterpreted. But since I have proceeded thus far, I think myself oblig'd to go on: and accordingly shall be always ready to consider every thing that shall at any time be seriously alleged, either publicly, or privately, against what I have here advanced; as, I hope, I ever shall be, to forgive all the severest *Censures*, and sharpest *Abuses* that Men of different *Sentiments* shall think fit to bestow upon me, either in their *Public Discourses*, or *Private Letters*. For the sake of such Persons, and to remove all *Prejudice*, as much as possible, out of their way, I have endeavour'd to make *this Work* as *Inoffensive* as I could;

could; and to leave nothing in it that might disturb them, besides *Argument*, and the *Best Reasoning* I was capable of: assuring them that I do not esteem myself infallible, or above the instruction of *Better Argument*, and *Better Reasoning*, whenever they shall please to offer it; and begging of *Almighty God* to grant us *all* an *Impartial Love of Truth*, and to assist us *all* in our *Searches* after it,

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Advertisement.

THIS Preface is Sold alone for the Convenience of those that Bought the former Edition.

E R R A-

ERRATA in the PREFACE.

Page vii. Line 18. for *their* read *it's*. p. xiii. l. 28. r. As it, therefore, concerns *Active Obedience*, it is a good, &c. p. xv. r. *Descent*. p. xix. l. 19. r. *Legislators*. p. xxiv. l. 13. *dele* possibly. *ibid.* l. 15. for *so* r. otherwise.

A

S E R M O N

Preach'd before the
Right Honourable
THE
LORD MAYOR, &c.

September 29. 1705.

Rom. xiii. 1.

Let every Soul be Subject to the Higher Powers.

IN the seven first Verses of this Chapter, the Duty of *Subjects* to Persons in Authority is plainly laid down; and the end of all *Government*, and the Duty of all *Governours*, plainly imply'd. And it is my Design to draw some useful and proper Observations from what the Apostle hath here deliver'd upon these two Heads.

I. *With Respect to Governours.* And,

II. *With Respect to Subjects.*

I. *With Respect to Governours.* And here,

1. The *first* Thing we observe is, That the Apostle declares that they are *ordain'd of God*, v. 1. That their Authority is the *Ordinance of God*, v. 2. That they are the *Ministers of God*, v. 4, 6. And since an *Apostle* hath so far concern'd himself with the matter of *Government*, as to say this, it cannot be amiss in Us, who are to be guided by his Directions, to examine in what Sense this must be understood. Now one would think it next to impossible that any should understand these, and the like Expressions, to signifie that God had himself appointed, for all the Kingdoms of the Earth, one particular Form of *Government*, and that all Deviations from that, or Alterations in it, are Unlawful, as they are Transgressions of the positive Institution of Almighty God. For I may, I think, venture to say, that there is not the least Footstep of this Divine Institution in all the Accounts we have of the Dealings of Providence with Mankind; nor the least Ground for such an Opinion from *History*, or the *Reason* of the Thing. And in the Words of the *Apostle* now before us, supposing He had confin'd them to the Form of *Government* then in being at *Rome*, can any one imagine that He intended to declare that the *Roman Emperors*, who at first manifestly usurp'd, and maintained their Authority by force of Arms, had their Commission immediately from God? Can any one imagine that He would not have said the same Things, had the *Republic* continu'd in all its former Rights, and antient Liberty? Or that He would not have press'd Obedience and Submission upon the Subject, from the same Topicks? Nay, that he meant this of all sorts of *Supreme Powers*, and of *Magistrates* in all Forms of *Government*, is evident from this, which he makes,

makes; as it were, the Ground of all these Forms of Expression, v. 1. That *there is no Power but of God*: Which certainly extends equally to all who are possess'd of any sort of Power, to be exercis'd for the Good of the Public, and to all Species of *Governments*, So that it cannot be meant here of any one Form, that it is of God, in any other Sense, but that in which it is true of all. And it being true of all in no other Sense but this, That no Persons are possess'd of any Governing Power for the Good of humane Society, but by the Providence of God, and by his Will either permitting or decreeing it: It can in no other Sense be here meant of any one sort of *Governours*, that they have their Authority from God. It is his Will indeed that there should be *Government* in humane Societies, for the Peace, and Happiness of Mankind: And so all Governours, of what sort soever, may be said to be *ordain'd by God*, because it is his Will that there should be Governours; they may be styl'd the *Ministers of God*, because they act his Pleasure whilst they do the Duty of good Governours; and their Authority may be said to be the *Ordinance of God*, because it is his Will that some Persons should be vested with Authority for the good of humane Society. And thus St. Peter seems to understand this Matter, in his first *Epistle* Chap. 2. 13. where He expressly calls the *King*, and *Governours* under Him, by the name of an *humane Ordinance*, because the particular *Forms of Government* are of humane Determination: And makes them no otherwise of Divine Appointment, but by saying v. 15. That it is *the Will of God* they should be obey'd. Nay, it is evident that what St. Paul saith here, is spoken of all in Power and Authority; of the lowest Degree of *Magistrates*, as well as the highest *Prince* upon Earth. They are all equally *ordain'd by God*; their Authority equally the *Ordinance of God*, and themselves equally the *Ministers of God*: And these Things cannot

be meant of them in any other Sense, but as they are by God's Providence possess'd of Power and Authority; and as it is God's Will they should be obey'd in the due Execution of their Office: And therefore cannot be meant of the greatest Prince in any other.

2. We may observe that it is declared here, That the sole End and Business of all *Governing Power*, is to consult the good of humane Society, by maintaining Peace and Virtue in it. *v. 3. Rulers*, i. e. those who faithfully perform the Office of *Rulers*, are not a Terror to good Works, but to the evil. And *v. 4. He*, that is One who is truly a *Governour*, is the *Minister of God to thee for Good*, and the *Minister of God* likewise in another Sense, viz. A *Revenger to execute Wrath upon him that doth Evil*. And *v. 6. These Rulers* are said to be continually attending upon this very Thing. In which account of *Governours* it is not to be suppos'd that the *Apostle* meant, that all of them did always perform this good Part; but that this was their great Business, and the only end of their Institution, as He makes it the Ground of the Obedience to be paid to them. You see here that He doth not give an account of the *Princes and Governours* of this World, as of Persons exalted by the immediate direction of Heaven, to a heighth above their Neighbours, to be Arbitrators, at their own Pleasures, of the Lives and Fortunes of their Fellow-Creatures, and to receive the servile Homage of whole Nations; but as of Persons call'd by the Providence of God to a difficult and laborious Task; not to live in Ease and Delicacy, but to watch Day and Night for the good of that Society in which they preside; to be distinguish'd indeed from others by the Ensigns of Greatness and Authority, but *this only* to make them more capable of serving the Public, and consulting the Interest of the whole. Their Office indeed is a glorious Office: But the *Glory* of it doth

doth not consist in the outward Majesty of the *Governour*, and the Servility of the *Subject* ; but in the Happiness, and Peace, that is deriv'd from the Cares and Labours of the *Supreme Head*, to all the Members of the *Body Politic*. And that *Governour* who contradicts the Character here laid down by *St. Paul* ; who is not a *Terror to evil Works, but to good* ; who is not the *Minister of Good* to the *Virtuous*, and of *Vengeance*, to the *Wicked* only ; and who is not continually *watching* for the Good and Happiness of humane Society, is not the *Governour* whom *St. Paul* means in this place, or to whom He here presses Obedience : And much less, if He manifestly act contrary to the only end of his Institution ; and endeavour to ruine the Happiness of that *Society* over which He is plac'd. And this may serve to explain yet farther, in what Sense these *higher Powers are from God* ; viz. As they act agreeably to his Will, which is, that they should promote the Happiness and Good of humane Society, which *St. Paul* all along supposes them to do. And consequently, when they do the contrary, they cannot be said to be from God, or to act by his Authority, any more than an inferior Magistrate may be said to act by a Prince's Authority, whilst He acts directly contrary to his Will. Having thus laid before you what the Apostle hath here deliver'd with respect to *Governours*, I come now, as I propos'd,

II. To consider what is here said, *With respect to Subjects, and their Duty*. And,

1. The Duty of *Submission*, and *Non-resistance*, is laid down in such absolute Terms, that many have been induc'd from hence to think, That the Christian Religion denies the Subject all Liberty of redressing the greatest Grievances. Thus, *v. 2. Whosoever therefore resisteth the Power, resisteth the Ordinance of God ; and they that resist*

receive to themselves Damnation: And v. 5. *Wherefore ye must needs be Subject, not only for Wrath, but also for Conscience sake; i.e. Not only for fear of Punishment; but out of a Sense of Duty.* Those who do not examine into the Foundation upon which the *Apostle* builds this Doctrine, and into the whole of what he delivers, may indeed be apt to think that in these Words there is little Relief allow'd to *Subjects*, tho' lying under the greatest Oppressions imaginable: And yet methinks, on the other hand, if the *Apostle* had done nothing but enforc'd the Duty of *Obedience* upon the Subject, it would be reasonable to judge from the Nature of the Thing, and the Absurdities of the contrary, that He meant this only as a general Rule in all ordinary Cases, rather than to imagine that He should absolutely conclude whole Nations under Misery and Slavery without hopes of Redress. But I observe,

2. That the *Apostle* doth himself so explain his own Doctrine in this very place, by Reasons He gives for this *Obedience* in *Subjects*, and the Account He gives of the Duty of *Governours*, as to leave *Subjects* all the Liberty they can reasonably desire. For though He doth at first press upon them, in unlimited Words, an *Obedience* and *Non-resistance* to the *higher Powers*; yet He manifestly afterwards limits this *Obedience* to such *Rulers*, as truly answer the end of their Institution. The Reason He gives for *Submission* is this, v. 3. *For Rulers are not a Terrour to good Works, but to the Evil*; And v. 4. Their Business is declar'd to be the *Execution of Wrath upon him that doeth Evil*; and the Necessity of *Submission* is infer'd from hence, v. 5. *Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for Wrath, but for Conscience sake*: that is, It is your Duty to obey the *Supreme Power*, because the great End of all humane *Authority* is the Good of the Public; that honest Men may be protected in their Properties, and all Violence, and Disorder, and Unhappiness

ness in humane Society, be prevented and punish'd ; and because it is your Duty to promote that good End. Now this being the Argument of the *Apostle* ; all that we can possibly collect from his Injunctions in this place is this, That it is the indispensable Duty of *Subjects* to submit themselves to such *Governours* as answer the good end of their Institution , to such *Rulers* as He here describes ; such as are *not a Terror to good Works, but to the Evil* ; such as promote the public Good, and are *continually attending upon this very Thing*. To these the profoundest Reverence, and the lowest Submission is due, as to the greatest Blessings a Society can enjoy ; and Resistance to these is a most unpardonable Sin. Thus far the *Apostle's* Reasoning holds, and it holds equally under all Forms of Government. For the End of all Government is one and the same, whether it be lodg'd in the Breast and Will of a single Person, or in the united Counsels and Decrees of many. And if the End of it, which is the public Happiness of Mankind, be truly answer'd, all Disobedience, and Resistance is inexcusable.

The Argument indeed which the *Apostle* first uses for this Obedience in *Subjects*, seems distinct from this, *viz.* That their *Governours* are of God, and ordain'd of God, and the *Ministers of God* : But having shewn that the meaning of this can only be, that it is his Will that they enjoy this Power for the public Good, it will only follow from hence, that therefore they are to be obey'd in the due Execution of his Will. As far as they deflect from his Will, so far they loose their Titles to these Declarations of the *Apostle*, and so far are they excluded out of his Argument, as He himself afterwards explains it. It is a good Argument, These Persons are the *Ministers of God* for the Good of humane Society ; therefore they must be obey'd. But it will not follow from

hence, that Obedience is due to them, if they destroy, and ruine the Happiness of humane Society.

But let us suppose that they are of *God* in the highest Sense possible ; that by his immediate Direction *They* particularly are appointed to Rule and Govern in the Kingdoms of this World. Well, let us then consider for what End and Purpose they are appointed to this Honour : And that, it is agreed on all hands, is the public Happiness of Mankind. I cannot see even upon this Supposition, that an unlimited Submission is due to 'em. For they were plac'd in Authority for this good End only ; and they had Power given them by God for this Purpose only. If therefore they use their Power to any other Purpose ; to the Hurt and Prejudice of humane Society, as they may do, unless they are immediately directed, and their Wills forc'd by God himself, they act not in any such Instances by Authority from God, but contrary to his Will : Nor can they, in such Instances, be call'd his Vice-gerents without the highest Profaneness : And therefore to oppose them, in such Cases, cannot be to oppose the Authority of God. Nay, a *Passive Non-Resistance* would appear, upon Examination, to be a much greater Opposition to the Will of God, than the contrary. For though He himself, upon the present Supposition, appointed this Person to govern ; yet his chief Design in this, being the Good, and Happiness of Society ; tamely to sit still, and see that entirely Ruin'd and Sacrific'd to the irregular Will of one Man, seems a greater Contradiction to the Will, and Design of God, than any Opposition can be : For it is a tacit Consent to the Ruine and Misery of Mankind, whose public Peace and Happiness is the sole end of Government, as well if it be appointed by God himself, as if it be purely of humane Institution. But the *Apostle* makes no such Supposition as this, but only determines, that it is the *Ordinance of God* that

that there should be *Governours*; and that as long as they act agreeably to the end of their Institution, it is a great Sin to disobey, or resist them. We may judge from what I have said, how little Ground there is from any thing here deliver'd by *St. Paul*, to argue to so unlimited a Submission as some inculcate. For we see He hath his Eye all the way upon the end of all Government; and founds his Precepts upon this Supposition, that the *Rulers* answer that good End. If they do not; or if they set themselves to contradict it by Oppression, Violence and Injustice; by Invading and Destroying the public Happiness, and by bringing on public Miseries; the *Apostle* seems not to think of recommending Submission to the Subject. For whilst he commands Submission, He puts no case of *Princes* acting contrary to the purpose of their Institution, and the sole Business of their Office; much less, of *Princes* who make an express Contract with their People, and take solemn Oaths to preserve their Rights and Liberties; and afterwards break through all these Ties to invade their Happiness. Nor doth he mention any thing of a *Passive Submission* in such Cases; but plainly leaves Nations to the Dictates of common Sense, and the powerful Law of Self-preservation: And this under all Forms of Government equally. For the most Arbitrary *Prince* in the World hath no more Right to make his Subjects Miserable, than the most *Limited*; though the one may attempt it with greater Aggravations than the other. The former is ty'd up by the Laws of Nature, and Reason, and oblig'd by the very end of his Exaltation; as truly as the latter is by written Laws, or by solemn Promise: And Submission to the one, in Instances of Violence and Oppression, is no more due than Submission to the other. For tho' his Authority, in carrying forward the *End* of his Power cannot be resisted without the highest Guilt; yet his Power in acting contrary to that *End* may be oppos'd.

pos'd without the shadow of a Crime ; nay, with Honour and Glory. He is secure no farther than Force and Power secure Him ; and what He gets by Violence may be demanded again, and can only be maintain'd by the same Violence, which first put him in the Possession of it. And as this is true of an absolute Monarch ; so is it as true, that, should all who are possess'd of Power, in any other Form of Government, Consent, and Agree, to enslave the People committed by Providence to their Care, and to make them Miserable, there is nothing in Nature, or in the Christian Religion, that can hinder that People from redressing their Grievances, and from answering the Will of Almighty God so far as to preserve and secure the Happiness of the public Society.

But some may say, where then is the great Virtue of *Submission to Governours*, if it be to be practis'd towards none but such as answer the end of their Institution? But it is easy to reply, That there is an indispensable Duty upon all, *Subjects* as well as *others*, to regard the public Interest ; and if their Submission help to destroy and ruine that, their Submission cannot be a Virtue. It is due to *Governours*, not for their own sake, but merely for the sake of *public Happiness* ; and therefore can only be Praise-worthy, when it joins to promote that ; and must degenerate into a Crime, (though it may be accompanied with many Virtues) when it forsakes the View of that, and betrays it into the Hands of Ambition and Violence.

The great Objection against this, though it be all founded upon the Will of God, who sincerely desires the Happiness of *public Societies*, is this, That it may give occasion to *Subjects* to disturb, and oppose their Superiours. But certainly, a Rule is not therefore bad, because Men may mistake in the Application of it to particular Instances ; or because evil Men may, under
the

the Umbrage of it, satisfy their own Passions, and unreasonable Humours; though these latter, as they are dispos'd to public Disturbances, would certainly find out some other Pretense for their Behaviour, if they wanted this. The contrary Doctrine to what I have been delivering, we know, by an almost fatal Experience, may be very much abus'd; and yet that is not the Reason why it ought to be rejected, but because it is not true. Every Man is to give an Account for his Sins: And the Guilt of those, who, under any Pretense whatsoever, disturb the *Government* of such as act the Part of good *Rulers*, is so great, that there cannot be a stronger Motive than this against Resistance and Opposition to such. For *They that resist shall receive to themselves Damnation*, is pronounced against such a Resistance; and if Men will not regard such a Declaration, who can help it? The Truth ought not to be conceal'd, or to suffer in the Opinions of Men, for the sake of such an accidental Inconvenience.

Thus have I endeavour'd to give a just Account of what *St. Paul* hath in this *Chapter* deliver'd concerning *Governours* and *Subjects*. And though some may perhaps be apt to call this by the name of *Politics*, and to censure it as foreign to our Office and this Place (which they are sure to do then only when their own Notions are contradicted;) yet I must declare, that I cannot think it an unbecoming, or even an unnecessary part of our Care to settle the Measures of Christian Duty in all Cases, or to endeavour to give a true Explication of what so great an *Apostle* hath deliver'd with some Vehemence, and as a Matter of great Importance. All that I have now attempted is to explain what an inspir'd Person wrote: And if this Explication be just, the Censure must light at last upon the *Apostle* himself; who, I cannot but think, knew very well what became his Office, and what belong'd to his Province.

But

But though I have finish'd, what I at first propos'd, yet I shall entreat your Patience, whilst I offer to you some farther Considerations not unsuitable to the present Occasion. And these are such as naturally flow from what hath been discours'd concerning the *End* and Purpose of all Government, whether that of *Princes*, or that of inferiour *Magistrates*; and will serve to give us a compleat Idea of a good *Governour*. As,

1. It is highly requisite that all in *Authority* should be happy in a *public Spirit*, and a true regard to the public Interest. For it being the only End for which they are cloathed with Authority, to serve the Public and promote the Happiness of that; if they be led by private Interests of their own; if they be Slaves to Covetousness, or Ambition, or Effeminacy; if there be any thing in the World which they have more in their Eye than the Advantage of humane Society, this must warp them extremely from the main Design of their Institution; and as far as they are tainted with a vicious *Self-Interest*, so far do they decline from the Dignity of their Character. But when their Breasts are thoroughly fir'd with a Love to the Public Interest, and a Resolution of prosecuting *that*; happy is the Nation that obeys such a *Prince*, and happy the Society that enjoys such a *Governour*. But,

2. There ought to be also in a *Governour* a deep Sense of Religion; of the great Importance of Virtue, and of the bad Influence, and Malignity of Vice and Immorality. For since one great end of his Office is the *Punishment of those who do Evil*, and the *Praise of them who do well*, there will be but little Heart to prosecute this, unless there be first a full Perswasion that there is an essential Difference between Good and Evil; that the Practice of all Virtue will make a Nation Happy, and the Practice of Vice derive Curses and Ruine upon a People, as well in the Nature of the Thing it self, as
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in the Decree of Almighty God. A Ruler that firmly believes this, will act his Part with some Zeal and Concern ; and it will tenderly affect his Mind, to see his Country likely to be undone by Debauchery , and He will employ his Thoughts Day and Night, how to reform the Manners of Men ; or, at least, how to put a stop to the Impudence of those who will not be Re-form'd. But particularly,

3. There must be a great Love to Justice, and a great Regard to Peace. The one engages a *Governour* to do that which is exactly right between Man and Man ; and the other influences him to reconcile the contending and quarrelling parts of Mankind ; and soften the Hearts of Men into Love and Friendship. This Justice which I here speak of, though it must not act blindfold, yet it must be blind to all outward Regards, and all Persons : And nothing of Interest, or of Party, or of personal Respect or Prejudice, ought ever to sway in the Distribution of Rewards and Punishments : Which do but little Service to the Cause of Honesty and Virtue, unless when it is apparent that they are dispens'd for the sake of Virtue it self, and not on any base and sordid Accounts. And if the strictest Justice should once be disregarded, and unjust Judgments come into use, the great end of *Magistracy* is perverted, and the Happiness of Society shaken : And every Step this way would be a Step to public Misery. And then where there is not a sacred Regard to *Peace*, there will be no Compassion for the Divisions and Heats of a Nation ; and consequently no Advances made towards an universal Love and Friendship ; the want of which alone must one time or other bring about the Ruine of a Nation.

4. To all other Qualifications there must be joyn'd a blameless Example. The Reason is, because every thing that tends to promote Religion and Happiness in a Society, is the Concern of all who have *Authority* in it.

Now

Now it is with those who are to punish Vice and protect Virtue, just as it is with those who are to teach the Practice of Virtue, and the Abhorrence of Vice. It is an Observation easy and obvious to every Body, that those who are the *Preachers* of Righteousness do no great Service to the Cause, but perhaps the contrary, if their Examples unhappily contradict their Precepts. And it is certainly the same with Respect to those whose Business it is to punish Vice. If whilst they punish it in Inferiors, they themselves are known to be guilty of it, the Correction indeed may make the Offender avoid the Light; but it will never make him in love with Virtue. He will be apt to think He is punish'd only because He is Poor, and not considerable enough to be in Office himself: And may be harden'd to Vice, whilst He sees Men making use of their Authority in punishing others, only as it were for a Screen to their own greater Indulgence.

You see from hence what a Concern there lies upon all in Authority from the Highest to the Lowest; that *Magistracy* is not a Matter of Pomp and Retinue, to attract the Eyes, and raise the Wonder of the Multitude; but a Business of Labour and Difficulty, to be undertaken with Seriousness, and to be manag'd with the greatest Prudence and Conduct.

It is the invaluable Happiness of this Kingdom, to see all these *Qualifications* united in its *Supreme Governour*; who seems to know no greater Satisfaction than what arises from the good Estate of the Publick, and who directs all her Cares, not to make her self Great, but her Subjects Happy. Such an Example, one would think, cannot but influence all who are in Authority under Her, to promote the same good End, the public Happiness. We are in many Things the Envy, as well as the Wonder, of other Nations. Our Liberties still preserv'd; Our Constitution still happily temper'd; and

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the Profession of our Religion still secure. But we want many things to make the Possession of these great Blessings certain and lasting to us; but especially an universal Practice of Virtue, and a Spirit of Peace and Love. It is your great Concern (I speak to all who bear any Office in this great City) to promote the Practice of Virtue, and of Peace. The former is discourag'd and endanger'd by every public Act of Profaneness, and Irreligion; which ought therefore to be severely Punish'd, lest the Poison should work it self insensibly from some Parts into the whole Body. And the latter is highly endanger'd by all Men of Passion and Violence; by those who vent such Principles as, in effect, call in question Her Majesty's Title to the Crown; by those who deride and expose the Principles upon which our present Establishment, and all our future Hopes are founded; and by all whose Business it is to raise mutual Jealousies and Heats amongst us. Such as these, it is too well known, discover themselves every Day in open light: And shall not others be as ready to preserve the public Happiness as these Men are to destroy it? Or is there no way of redressing such public and such destructive Evils? It is a Shame to a Nation not to have good Laws: but it is a much greater Shame to have them, and not to put them in Execution. It is a Shame to a Nation that there should any Persons belong to it, so little sensible of the Happiness it enjoys, as to Libel and Disturb such a Queen and such a Government: But it is a greater Shame that no Method should be found of annexing Punishments to what so highly deserves it. Let it, therefore, appear that You are truly sensible of the Nature and End of your Trusts, by your hearty Endeavours to promote the Happiness of the Public. Let a true Regard to *that* discover it self in all your Proceedings: Let your Examples allure to Virtue as well as your Punishments deter from Vice.

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Let your Zeal discover it self against the Enemies of Religion, and of the Public Peace. Let it be seen that you *bear not the Sword in vain*. Thus you will make *this City a Praise in the whole Earth*, and draw down Blessings from Heaven upon the whole Nation.

FINIS.

ADVERTISEMENT.

HAVING followed the common way of Speaking, which seldom makes any difference between Authority and Power, I thought fit in this Edition to change in two places (viz. p. 8. 9.) the Word Authority for Power; being sensible that it is of great importance, in a Discourse upon this Subject, to distinguish carefully between them, and being persuaded that no Governours can have Authority (properly so called) to act against the End of their Institution, though they may have Power to do it.

A Defense

A
DEFENSE
 OF THE
Foregoing Sermon.

INTRODUCTION.

HAVING thus laid before the *Reader* the *Sermon* it self, I shall now proceed to examine what ground it hath given to the severe Censures that have been past upon it. And because the *Truth* of it hath been called in question by some; and the *Caution, Prudence, and Seasonableness* of it by others, I shall endeavour to give satisfaction to all, who are willing to receive it, in the following method.

I. I shall make some Observations upon several *Propositions* in the foregoing *Sermon*, which seem to have given Offense; and so take occasion to set the principal *Doctrine* of it in so fair a light, that it may not easily be misunderstood by any *Honest* Mind.

II. Because my *Account* of the Duty of *Subjects*, hath seemed the more displeasing to some, as it is deduced, in great part, from *St. Paul's Reasoning, Rom. 13. 1, 2. &c.* I shall, therefore, lay down the *Interpretation* of that
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whole Passage, which is followed in the foregoing *Sermon*, and the *Interpretation* contrary to it ; that so they may be fairly compared together.

III. I shall impartially consider all the *Objections* I have been able to hear of, against the *Doctrine* I have taught : by which every body will be led to judge the better of the *truth* or *falsehood* of it.

IV. I shall add some Considerations about the *Seasonableness* of it ; and lay before the World the *Reasons* which induced me to think it proper, at this time, publicly to teach this *Doctrine*. And if what I have to offer, upon these several Heads, should not be sufficient to vindicate me, in the Opinion of all *Understanding* and *Candid* Men ; it will, at least, shew how ready I am to give an account of my self to such Persons, and how willing I should be to receive better information from them.

C H A P. I.

A Review of the Doctrine deliver'd in the foregoing Sermon.

I. **T**HE first thing I propose to do, is to make some *Observations upon several Propositions in the foregoing Sermon which seem to have given most offense : and so take occasion to set the Principal Doctrine of it in so fair a light, that it may not be easily misunderstood.*

The first *Passage* I shall mention is this, p. 2. That the *Apostle meant this of all sorts of Supreme Powers is evident from this which He makes, as it were, the ground of all these Forms of Expression, v. 1. That there is no Power but of God, which certainly extends equally to all who are possess'd of any sort of Power, to be exercised for the good*
of

of the Public. Subjection to *Princes* in possession was, I think truly, the Practice and Doctrine of our *Saviour*, and his *Apostles*, without obliging themselves, or their Followers, to examine nicely into the titles of *Princes*, and the legality of their Accession to their Thrones. A task, one would think, too hard for all Subjects, who are all equally concerned; and very unfit to be imposed upon them, especially by those who think them unable to judge when they themselves are oppressed, and their own Rights invaded. But a late *Author* tells me,

Enquiry into the Nature of the Liberty of the Subject. p. 1.

God cannot be the Patron of Usurpation. And certainly, it is very true that God can have no active part in any thing that is evil; tho' what

is called by some *Usurpation*, is not always evil. But methinks this *Author* might obtain satisfaction in this difficulty from his own Notions, and find it as easy to believe that God may be the *Patron of Usurpation* so far as to require subjection to all *Princes* in possession, acting for the good of the Public, as He finds it to believe that God can be the *Patron* of the greatest *Tyranny* and *Oppression* so far as to make it a necessary Duty, passively to submit to the Will of *Tyrants* and *Oppressors*. Besides, in his own *Paraphrase* He makes God the fountain of Power only as He is the fountain of *Being*; and consequently the fountain of Power to *Usurpers*, as well as *Legal Governours*. He adds, p. 2. That the Word used by *St. Paul* signifies only *Lawful Powers*, or *Rulers who have a Legal Right*. He uses two Words, *Κυρία*, v. 1. and *ἀρχαί*, v. 3. and can any one shew that either, or both of these were intended by *St. Paul*, to signify only such *Rulers as have a Legal Right*? Had this been his intention, He would rather have told them, by inspiration, how they should judge of the *Right of Princes*, than have said nothing but what must, upon this Supposition, have set the *Christians* upon Nice Enquiries,

into the *Right* by which the present Possessor reigned. And I am sure it would be hard to say what *Legal Right* the first *Emperors* had, whom the best, and wisest of the *Romans* took for *Usurpers*; and as hard to prove that the *Christians* to whom *St. Paul* wrote, were so critical as to know that by these two Words, without any farther explication, He meant those *Governours* only who had a *legal Title*. But it is apparent at last, to what purpose this *Author* is for submission to those Rulers only who have a *legal Title*: and this in the ordinary way. For p. 9. He tells us, *It is a fundamental Point in our Constitution; and such as can never be dispensed with, That no Law can be enacted or repealed but by the Sovereign in Parliament, which Parliament must be assembled by his Writs, and by these only.* From whence, and from some other of his reflexions, p. 20. as upon Princes that are *Foreigners*, who will be found (He saith) *to manage their Power as unjustly as they have obtained it*: and upon a certain deliverance, which He saith, *is applauded as a Deliverance from Misery and Slavery*, but upon consideration, may appear to be in truth nothing else but a *Deliverance*, as this means a setting us loose from all restraints of *Conscience*, and *Honour*. From these Passages, I say, We may judge, his intention was to prove the late *Reign*, and all that is, or is likely to be built upon it, *Usurpation*, and all *Subjection* to that, and to whatever is founded upon it, a crying Sin. And this, it seems, He thinks very consistent with *honouring the Queen in the simplicity of the Gospel*; and with that *Unlimited Passive Obedience*, which was practised by the *Primitive Christians*. But, in one Word, till I see better reason for it than any I have yet met with, I must declare that though I cannot believe that any who are in possession of *Power*, have *Authority* to do the least unjust, or illegal Action; yet I can easily believe, that all who are in possession of *Power*, have *Authority* sufficient to act, and make *Laws* for the good of the *Common-wealth*.
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The reason of the thing gives them *Authority* enough for this ; and God never contradicts what is built upon that Foundation. But if from what I have here said, any shall collect, that I am for encouraging, or assisting any, who are fond of innovations, and endeavour to throw off the ordinary, established methods, without a great and apparent necessity, they will shew themselves very willing to mistake and misrepresent me : though I shall not much wonder at it, having met with so much of the like usage already.

The *Second Passage* which seems to have offended is this, *p. 5. That Governour who contradicts the Character here laid down by St. Paul, who is not a Terror to evil Works, but to good ; who is not a Minister of Good to the Virtuous, and of Vengeance to the Wicked only ; and who is not continually watching for the good and happiness of humane Society, is not the Governour whom St. Paul means in this place, or to whom He here presseth Obedience.*

I thought I might safely say this, because it is nothing but a recapitulation of *St. Paul's* own Words without any interpretation of them. The *Higher Powers*, v. 1. are the *Rulers*, v. 3. and the *Power*, v. 3. is the *Minister of God for good to them that do good ;* and the *Minister of God to execute Wrath upon Him that doth evil*, v. 4. who is declared to be continually attending upon this very thing, v. 6. Can any one deny that *Governours* are thus described in this Place ? or that those *Governours* which are here described, are the *Governours* whom *St. Paul* here means ? or that this description of his is the argument from whence He presseth subjection in point of *Conscience* ? and doth it not follow manifestly from hence that the *Governour* who contradicts all this description, is not the *Governour* here described, and consequently not the *Governour* to whom He here presseth obedience ? Had it been *St. Paul's* design, to press obedience to the *greatest Tyrants, and Oppressors ;* or had He had in his Eye any particular *Emperour*, who

was a Monster not only of Villany, but of *Public Oppression*, (as some represent his Sense;) nothing can be imagined more unaccountable than that He should give such a description of *Governours* as to exclude those whom there was most occasion to mention, and that He should reason *Christians* into a Conscientious Subjection in such a manner, as cannot conclude for *Subjection* to any but such *Governours* as He describes in the foregoing Words, and as come up to that Sense of them, in which He meant they should be understood. And if any one can prove that it is possible He should intend by *Governours* who are continually attending the good of their Subjects, not only such, but also *Governours* who are continually attending, and watching to make their Subjects miserable: and if any one can shew me the conclusiveness of this Argument, *Rulers are by their Office obliged to be a terrour to evil Works, and not to the good; therefore you are obliged in Conscience to submit to them, when they are a terrour to good Works*; then I will retract this Sentence.

But at present I cannot help thinking this, and also what I have said, p. 7. to be just and reasonable, when I was explaining this particular Passage of Scripture. And I shall here repeat it. *This being the Argument of the Apostle, all that we can possibly collect from his injunctions in this place is this, That it is the indispensable Duty of Subjects to submit themselves to such Governours as answer the good end of their Institution; to such Rulers as He here describes; such as are not a Terrour to good Works but to the evil; such as promote the public good, and are continually attending upon this very thing.* Let it be remembered that it was my design to examine into the utmost of what could be concluded from this celebrated Passage. And whatever may be concluded from any other Topic, if no more can be concluded from this reasoning of the *Apostle*, I think it is very fit it should be said; that *Christians* may be led to examine into the true meaning

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of this, as well as of other Passages of *Scripture*, in which their duty is concerned. And agreeable to this is what I say, p. 9. in which I speak only of the extent of the *Apostle's* reasoning in this Chapter.

But I am told by a late *Author*, That as it was not decent, so the time in which *St. Paul* wrote made it altogether unnecessary to put the Case of a Wicked Prince. (I suppose He means of a Prince acting against the End of his Institution, for of such only I have spoken.) For this Epistle was written in the Reign, either of *Claudius*, or *Nero*: and therefore, to be sure this passage was supposed by all to extend to them. To this I shall largely answer in the following Chapter: and at present shall only observe, that if *St. Paul* had designed this as a Rule for all Subjects, and had intended in it to press upon them *Subjection*, and a *Passive Submission*, even when their *Governour* was endeavouring to ruine them, He could not have done a more grateful Office to a bad Prince, than to have put this Case in so many Words, and still to have pressed *Subjection* upon them; nor could He have passed a greater Complement upon the Prince himself, than to have declared openly (as some have since done for him) that He acted by God's Authority in all the instances of *Oppression*, *Barbarity*, and *Violence*, He could possibly be guilty of; and that whoever resisted Him in those instances, resisted the Commission of God, and consequently God himself. And the time was so far from making it altogether unnecessary, that it made it extremely necessary and fitting that He should speak plainly; or at least, it made it absolutely necessary for Him not to put the Case of *Good Governours*, as He manifestly doth; which might easily lead the *Christians* into so fatal a mistake, as some represent it to be, that He did not here design to press upon them a *Passive Submission* to *Governours* who contradict the Character He

here lays down. And we see that this is so natural, and so reasonable, that all modern *Divines* who have carried the *Doctrine* of *Non-resistance* to the greatest height, have thought it necessary expressly to put the Case of *Princes* acting against the End of their *Institution*, and to speak particularly of *Tyrants* in order to press *Subjection* to *Tyrants*: not thinking it enough to do as (some say) *St. Paul* did; first to put the Case of good *Governours*, and from thence infer the necessity of an *Unlimited Submission* to the greatest *Tyrants*; and this without mentioning them either in the *Conclusion*, or the *Premises*. But indeed, none who understand any thing of *Argument* will wonder that the *Apostle* should not mention any thing in his *Conclusion* that was not in his *Premises*; but rather will wonder at those who have undertaken to supply this *Defect* in the *Apostle's* reasoning.

The next Passage I shall take notice of, is this, p. 5. *This may serve to explain yet farther, in what sense these Higher Powers are from God, viz. as they act agreeably to his Will, which is that they should promote the happiness and good of Humane Society, which St. Paul all along supposeth them to do. And consequently when they do the contrary, they cannot be said to be from God, or to act by his Authority, any more than an inferiour Magistrate may be said to act by a Prince's Authority, whilst He acts directly contrary to his Will. And to the same purpose, p. 7. As far as they deflect from God's Will, which is declared in the Sentence before to be, the promoting the Public good, so far they lose their Title to these Declarations of the Apostle. And to the same purpose, p. 8. in which the supposition is made of their being placed in Authority by the immediate Hand of God. And I argue thus, they had Power given them by God for this purpose only, viz. the Public Happiness of Mankind. If, therefore, They use their Power to any other purpose, to the hurt and prejudice of humane Society, they act not in any such instances by Authority*

thority from God: Nor can they, in such instances, be called his Vicegerents without the highest Profaneness; and therefore, to oppose them in such Cases, cannot be to oppose the Authority of God.

The whole of what is contained in the *first* of these Sentences seemed to me not only implied, but affirmed by the *Apostle* himself, who proves what He saith in the Two first Verses, that the *Higher Powers are of God*, or from God; and that to resist them, is to resist the *Ordinance of God*, by their usefulness to Humane Society, *v. 3. For Rulers are not a Terrour to good Works, but to the evil*; which is manifestly a Reason of what went before. So that this is one Sense in which they are *of, or from, God*, viz. as they are the Promoters of what is good, and the Discouragers of what is evil, in Humane Society. It is plain likewise from the Supposition, that they have their *Commission from God*. For if they be *of God*, because they have their *Commission* from Him, they are no farther from Him than their *Commission* reacheth, and no farther than as they are commissioned to execute his Will. And there being nothing in his *Commission* to them as *Magistrates*, or in his positive Will, but that they should promote the good and happiness of *Humane Society*; in acting against this they cannot act by his *Commission*, and consequently *when they do the contrary*, (which are the Words I use) they cannot in this be said to be *from God*, because in this they act not only *without*, but even *against* his *Commission*. It follows necessarily from hence, that as far as they *deflect from his Will*, or act against his *Commission*, the end of which was the promoting the good and happiness of the Public, *so far they lose their Title to these Declarations of the Apostle*, that they are *of God*, and *ordained of God*. For the *Apostle* himself proving them to be *of God* by their usefulness to the World, excludes necessarily all such as are destructive to Mankind out of his Argument. And if it be their

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Commission from God that gives them a Title to these Declarations, it cannot give them *Commission* to act against it self, and therefore in doing that, they act without *Commission*, and therefore, in doing that, cannot be of God. From hence it evidently follows, that they not acting, in any such instances, by Authority from God, cannot be called, in such instances, his *Vicegerents*, without Profaneness, because in such instances they act *without*, and *against* his *Commission*, and are indeed *Rebels* to Him, and his positive Will. No Prince surely will own Him for his *Viceroy*, who being sent into a *Province* to do Justice, sets himself to do all the Injustice possible. But if it be supposed that his *Commission* to do Justice gave him *Authority* as well as *Power* to do Injustice, then cannot the *Prince* possibly be displeased with Him, or call Him to account, because He gave Him *Authority* to do what He did. And why is it thus in a continued course of Injustice, but because every single instance of it is *beyond*, and *against* his *Commission*, and therefore, without the *Prince's* Authority? And therefore, as He who acts farther than his *Commission* bears him out, is not in those Actions his *Prince's* *Viceroy*, because it is the *Commission* only that makes Him so, and in these Actions He is without *Commission*; so a *Prince* who acts farther than his *Commission*, as He doth who is guilty of *Violence*, *Oppression* and *Injustice*, cannot in them be God's *Vicegerent*, because it is his *Commission* which makes Him so; and in these Actions He is as much without *Commission*, as the meanest *Subject* He hath. But some say, that St. Paul calls Nero, who was a *Monster of Wickedness*, and exercised the greatest Cruelty, and Barbarities, the *Minister of God*, even in the execution of all his Villanies; for so it must be meant, if it be designed against me. But I pray God forgive those who say so; unless they mean the *Minister of God*, as Judas was in betraying our Saviour,

Enquiry, p. 13.

or

or as evil Spirits are in tempting Men to Sin, because He permits this, and makes his own uses of Wicked Agents, whilst He abhors their Wickedness, and punisheth themselves. But if they mean by the *Minister of God*, one who acts by his Authority, or performs his positive Will, as they must, if they oppose me; the direct contrary is expressly contained in this Passage of his *Writings*, where He himself in so many Words gives the Character of the *Governours* He speaks of. And as for his *Practice*; his appealing to the *Courts of Judicature at Rome*, which He did out of choice, and not as a point of duty, can prove nothing but that He was always ready to insist upon his *Rights and Liberty*, as He was a *Roman* born, and thought himself more likely to have justice done Him *there*, than at *Jerusalem*, whither He was invited for the Trial of his Cause. And this is as far from owning the *Divine Authority* of the *Roman Emperor*, in all his monstrous *Acts of Injustice*, as any thing can be. Nay let any one judge from his Behaviour, *Acts* 16. 37. whether He thought the *Magistrates of Philippi* had any *Authority*, though they had *Power*, to *Imprison* and *beat* Him and *Silas*, or that any *Magistrate* can have *Authority* to act beyond his *Commission*. And let any one judge from his own Words, *2 Tim.* 4. 17. whether He did not think it more agreeable to Reason and Truth, to call a *Magistrate*, and perhaps the very *Emperor* to whom He is said to have appealed in instances of *Oppression* and *Persecution*, by the Name of a *Lion* rather than by that of God's *Vicegerent*. But in this, in truth He followed his great *Master*, who was so far from thinking that *Herod*, or any other *Ruler*, had *Authority* to do all that He had *Power* to do, that when He considered *Herod* as unjustly seeking after his Life, He called Him by the hard Name of a *Cruel*, and *Cunning Beast*. *Luke* 13. 32. *Go ye, and tell that Fox*. It seems our *Saviour*, and *St. Paul*, did not

not only not think that *Oppressive*, and *Persecuting Governours* act by God's *Authority* in their Wickedness, but also look'd upon them as degenerated into the most *Ravenous*, and worst of *Wild Beasts*. And one would think that it was their Opinion, that the *Lion*, and *Fox*, had as much real *Authority* to commit their depredations, as a *Cunning* and *Powerful Prince* hath to act his *Violences*. From all which it follows, that *Rulers* having no *Authority* from God in instances of *Injustice*, and *Violence*, *to oppose them in such Cases, cannot be to oppose the Authority of God*. Let it be observed that I use here, and elsewhere, the word *oppose*, which contains many degrees in it, and may be practised many ways without hurt to the Person of the *Ruler*, or without throwing off his Government entirely. Let it be observed, that this *Sentence* gives no express allowance to opposition in any Case. For notwithstanding any thing here said, it may be contrary to reason and duty, on other accounts, though it be not an opposition to *God's Authority*, or *Commission* to the *Prince*. There may be other Arguments sufficient to determine Men to submit to private, and single acts of *Injustice* and *Oppression*, though there can be none taken from the *Authority of God* in such Cases, because there is none: which is all that is here affirmed. I must observe indeed, that it is not for the sake of the *Prince*, but of the *Public*, that a Man is under the least obligation to submit to any signal instance of *Oppression*. And were the *Public* as much affected, as He is in his private Circumstances, by such *Oppression*, it could not be his Duty entirely to submit to it. Nay, in the Case where his single Life is unjustly sought after, if He should fly about with a Body of armed Men, and defend Himself from all who should attack Him, I cannot say but that He hath *David's* example to bear Him out, who opposed *Saul* in a single instance of *Injustice*, at the hazard

zard of the *Public Peace*, and yet is produced and urged by our *Homilies* as the greatest instance of a true Submission. And as for condemning *David*, and contradicting the *Homilies* in this Point ; I must leave that to others, who I find think it very allowable when the Cause of absolute *Non-resistance* cannot be defended without it. I must observe farther, that it will not follow from what I have here said, that any *People* may take such advantage of any oppressive or unjust *Act* of their *Rulers*, though of a *Public Nature*, as not to be willing still to obey them, if their obedience can be consistent with the *Public Good* ; and there be no good reason to apprehend their resolution to persist in, or return to, a Course of such Actions : therefore, this part of my *Doctrine* is wholly unconcerned in this Case ; or in any *opposition* that goes any farther than the rectifying these single instances of *Public Injustice*, and settling a greater security for the future. Thus far it goes indeed, that the *Rulers* have no *Authority* from *God* in these Actions, and that they may be *opposed* without the guilt of *opposing* the *Authority* of *God*. But the *Public Good*, upon which alone I have founded all that I have taught about *Resistance*, may guide wise and good Men to acquiesce, and continue their obedience, if, upon their first *opposition*, their future fears be removed : and if so, my Opinion and Practice may be as much against *Resistance* by Arms as any Man's. I say not any thing of this, because I find reason to retract, or alter these *Sentences*, but merely to explain them, and to vindicate them from the unaccountable, and groundless misrepresentation, and abuse of those, who would fix it upon these *Sentences*, as my Opinion, that the *Government* of *Princes* may be thrown off entirely, for any single instances of mismanagement, tho' committed merely thro' mistake, directly contrary to my judgment and Expressions. But one cannot but wonder to find some Men maintain-

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ing that *God*, by giving *Princes* Authority to promote Virtue and Happiness in *Public Societies*, gives them *Authority* likewise to promote Vice, and Unhappiness; and that *Princes*, by giving *Authority* to their inferiour *Officers* to promote Peace and Justice, give them *Authority* likewise to commit what Injustice, and Oppressions, and Violences they see fit: as if because a *Commission* puts it into the *Power* of a *Magistrate* to do unjustly, therefore it gives him *Authority* to do it. They may as well say, That *God*, by giving to the *Ministers* of the *Gospel* Authority to Preach his Will, gives *Authority* to all they say, tho' never so expressly and evidently contrary to his Will. They may as well say, That because *God* puts Men into a capacity of Sinning, therefore he gives them *Authority* to do it. Nay, they do say this, when they maintain that a *Ruler* acts by *God's* Commission in all his most outrageous and violent Actions. For *God* hath done nothing towards these, unless it be that he has put it into his *Power* to be guilty of them, by raising *Him* to that Post he is in. But if their Cause cannot be defended, without fixing such palpable absurdities upon *Almighty God* himself, and giving to *Him* an active part in the *Wickedness* of *Tyrants*, I should think it hardly worth their while to appear with so much zeal in it, any more than it is worth mine to argue with Men that can swallow such monstrous Doctrines. And one would wonder that what I have said on this Head should displease any, who throw off all Obligation to subjection to *Usurpers*, merely because they had no *Authority* in the first steps of their *Usurpation*. For if *Usurpers* may be opposed, certainly *Tyrants*, who are *Usurpers* in every act of Injustice, may in such Acts be opposed, without opposing the Authority of *God*. But if *Tyrants*, in such Acts, may not be opposed without opposing the *Authority* of *God*, then *Usurpers* likewise may not be opposed: Because the latter have as much *Authority*, even from

from the very beginning, as the former have in these particular Actions.

Another Sentence which is said to displease many, and to be wonder'd at, as if there had never any thing yet been said like it, is this; p. 9. *Though the Authority of a Prince, in carrying forward the End of his Power, cannot be resisted without the highest guilt; yet his Power, in acting contrary to that End may be opposed without the shadow of a Crime; nay with Honour and Glory.* And to the same effect I speak with respect to *Governours* in a mixt form of *Government*. But where is the great Crime of saying this, when if this be not literally true, the *Doctrine of Absolute Non-resistance*, in all possible Cases, must gain very great Advantages? The *End of a Prince's Power* is the Universal Happiness of his Subjects. To act contrary to this *End*, is to act against the Universal Happiness of his Subjects; and so to be the Instrument of Universal Misery and Oppression; as I had in five or six several Sentences before this, expressly and in the plainest Words delivered my Opinion. Now to oppose him so as to hinder this *Universal Misery and Oppression*, must be allowed by all, who allow Resistance in any Case, not to have *the shadow of a Crime*. For if it have, it is not plainly lawful, or eligible: And if it be not plainly lawful, or eligible, no *Christian* ought, in Conscience, to venture upon it. But if it be, it must be also *Honourable and Glorious*, because it helps to rescue numbers of Families, and numbers of Generations, from *Misery and Oppression*. And if this be not *Glorious*, the greatest act of *Charity* that can be practised in this World with respect to the Bodies, and outward Estates of Men, is not *Glorious*. But one would think that some Men would willingly have *Opposition* practised in some Cases, and yet would have it neither *Honourable*, nor so much as *Lawful*: So that it must be practised by *Christians* upon great occasions, but against their Principles,

ciples, and with remorse of *Conscience*. They must do it in a *Passion*; and when it is done, they must be left wholly void of all other excuse: and He must be accounted no better than a very bold, or a very imprudent Man, who pleads their *Cause*. Such are the *Notions* of some Men, that they do indeed (though they desire not to appear to do so) leave no room for opposing the greatest *Tyranny*, and *Oppression*, in *Governours*, without breaking through the *Ties* of *Conscience* and *Honour*. For if this be not both *Lawful* and *Glorious*, (which is the most that I have said) it cannot be done without a blot upon our *Conscience*, and our *Honour*, as we are *Men* and *Christians*.

I shall only transcribe two more *Passages* from the *Sermon*, which I cannot but wonder should appear strange to any who can read it. The one is, p. 8. *The public Peace and Happiness of Mankind is the Sole end of Government, as well if it be appointed by God Himself, as if it be purely of Humane Institution*. The other is agreeable to this, p. 10. *Submission is due to Governours, not for their own sake, but merely for the sake of Public Happiness*. As for St. Paul, whom I was to follow, He useth no other Argument to prove, either that *Governours* are of *God*, or that *Submission* is due to them in point of *Conscience*, but the *usefulness* of their Office to *Humane Societies*. From this He proves, v. 3. the truth of what He had said of them, v. 1, 2. and from this He infers the Duty of *Submission* to them, v. 5: So that in this I have all the *Authority* I can desire. And as for *Reason*, the only thing I find that can be urged against it, is that God appointed them to rule in the Kingdoms of the Earth; made them his Vicegerents: and upon this account *Submission* is due to them. To which the Answer is evident, and will help to establish what I have said. For, supposing all this; the *Sole* end for which He appointed them to govern, being the *Public Happiness*; it follows

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follows unavoidably from hence, that the *Sole End* for which He appointed that they should be obeyed, and submitted to, was the *Public Happiness*. For the *End* for which *Submission* is appointed by God to be paid to them, must be *that* only for which He hath appointed them to govern; the appointing them to govern, being nothing else but his appointing that *Submission* shall be paid to them. Nor can any thing be urged against this, without running into that *horrible Blasphemy* of making it part of *God's* positive *Commission* to *Rulers* to transgress their own Duty, and to ruine the *People* committed to their Charge. Nor is this *speaking evil of Dignities*, or vilifying the *Lord's Anointed* (as some love to speak, when they would hide their Zeal under the cover of Scripture Expressions;) but is in Truth the most Noble and Excellent thing that can be said of them; as it implies in it that their Office is God-like, and that they are appointed, by the Providence of God, to represent Him in this World by doing all possible Service to *Humane Society*.

Having thus given an Account of such particular *Sentences* in the foregoing *Sermon* as seem to have given Offense, and laid down the Reasons upon which the *Truth* of them is founded; I will beg leave once more to review the *Sermon*, and to shew that the *Principal Doctrine* of it, *viz.* The Lawfulness of Subjects resisting their Governours in some Cases, is not delivered with that great imprudence, and extreme want of Caution, which some would make the World believe. Nay, I will venture to add, that they would find it hard themselves to express it in any such form of Words, as would be a greater guard upon it than my Words are, or exclude any *Case*, which the very Expressions used by me do not as effectually exclude. In order to this, I observe,

1. That the Nature of my Design oblig'd me to examine to the utmost what is contained in this Passage of *St. Paul*, and what can fairly be inferr'd from it; which

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indeed I could not but think proper to do, because the chief Scripture-Argument for the most absolute *Non-resistance*, is taken from hence. So that if I have been but as cautious, and prudent, in laying down the true Doctrine of *Non-resistance*, as the *Apostle* himself hath been, I might hope, one would think, to escape free from all very severe Censures. And this I did not doubt would have been very evident to all who heard or read the *Sermon*. For as *He* saith, that Governours are of God, and the Ordinance of God, and proves this only from the excellent usefulness of their Office to Humane Society; so do I: nor was I obliged to go one step farther. As *He* founds the necessity of Submission, and paying Tribute, upon the useful and good End of their Office only; so do I. And if his reasoning cannot possibly conclude for *Submission*, and *Tribute* to any other *Governours*, in Point of *Conscience*, I cannot help it: but I was obliged to say so, when I had undertaken to explain his Sense. I press *Submission* just as far as his Reasoning will admit of it; and as that leaves it, so my Business was to declare it ought to be left, for any thing that *St. Paul* hath here said. As *He* describes only such *Governours*, as answer the end of their Institution, in order to shew that *Resistance* to them, is *Resistance to the Ordinance of God*, and to press Subjection in point of *Conscience*; so I cannot justly deserve Censure for doing exactly the same. And as *He* left it to those to whom *He* wrote, to judge whether their *Magistrates* were the *Magistrates* *He* meant or no, according to his Account of their Office; so I am not at all concerned, should it be proved, that I have followed his Example, and left it to a *Christian* People to judge whether they be Universally oppressed, and enslaved by their *Governours* or no. And last of all, As *He* could think of no better way of guarding, and securing his *Doctrine*, than to pronounce *Damnation* upon those who should wilfully mistake it, and resist their *Governours* in their Office, according

cording to his Description of it ; so neither could I imagine anything necessary beyond this : and accordingly have expressly, and plainly threatned the same *Damnation*. And if any Person can shew, or make it so much as probable, that *St. Paul's* reasoning, or threatening ought, or can be extended any farther than I have extended it, I am perfectly ready to make all the Reparation possible for the injury I have done to this great *Apostle*. But till that be shewn, which never yet was done, I hope I may be excused. And in the mean while, methinks they who have Sense enough to see that the *Apostle's* Expressions and Reasoning cannot be extended farther than I have extended them ; and that it is fit the full intent of them should be examined into, and plainly laid open ; should not blame me for laying no more upon *St. Paul* than He can bear, especially since the *Exposition* of this Passage espoused, and recommended by many others, hath made it much more necessary than otherwise it would have been, to be very plain and particular in this Matter. I shall only add, that if it be counted a Crime in me that I have given a Description of the Office of *Princes*, and given an Account of *their* Duty at the same time that I give an Account of the Duty of *their Subjects* ; *St. Paul* himself, whom I was to follow, led me inevitably into this Method.

2. I confess there is this difference between this Passage of *St. Paul*, and the foregoing *Sermon*, that there is no *Case* put by *St. Paul* in express Words, in which *Opposition* to *Governours* is allowed. But it is easie, I think, to give a good Account of this single and only Difference. For there were none even amongst the *Roman Heathens* themselves, who could bear with such a Notion as this, That *Subjects* ought to suffer themselves to be oppressed, and made miserable, without reluctance, at the Will of their *Emperors*. Nor was it the *Apostle's* business to give an express Allowance for *Resistance* in such a *Case*, because none of those to whom He

wrote denied it, and all their Neighbours allowed it. But He was to oppose another Extreme, which was the Opinion of those who thought no Subjection due, in point of Conscience, to *Heathen Magistrates*, even in the Execution of their Office. And the Resistance founded upon this Opinion, or any like to it, is the only Resistance which He here condemns, or which His Argument can conclude against. But the Case is vastly different now, and especially in this *Church*. For there are no Members of this Church who hold that Submission is not due, in point of Conscience, to *Magistrates* in the Execution of their Office: and therefore there was no great occasion to confute this Opinion. But there are too many who have run to a contrary extreme, and have concluded even from this very Passage in *St. Paul*, that because *Non-resistance* and *Subjection* is due to *Magistrates* in the Execution of their Office here described, therefore it is due to them, in the acting contrary to their Office, and destroying the People committed to their Care: an inference which I believe *St. Paul* little thought could ever have been drawn from this Place. Nay, for my own part, (leaving others always to judge for themselves) I cannot but think, had there been any such Opinion as this amongst those to whom He wrote, that He, of all Men, would have set himself to oppose it, and with the greatest Zeal have condemned it: such a Notion have I of his great Regard to the *Rights* and *Liberties* of the Inferiour part of Mankind. *St. Peter* tells us of some things *hard to be understood* in *St. Paul's* Writings, which the *Ignorant*, and *Unlearned*, in those Days, *wrested to their own Destruction*. But I believe He little thought that this Passage was so hard to be understood, that even many of the *Knowing*, and *Learned*, should wrest it, not to their own Destruction indeed, but to the *Destruction of whole Nations*. For I cannot but think it manifestly wrested, when such Conclusions are drawn from it as the reasoning cannot possibly

possibly admit of. These Considerations made me think it necessary to shew, in as plain a manner as I could, that absolute *Non-resistance* could not be built upon this Place of *Scripture*; but that *Resistance* in some Cases might rather be inferr'd from it. The Ground, therefore, of the difference between *St. Paul* and me, is this: *St. Paul* had not the least occasion to say expressly that *Resistance* is lawful in some Cases, because there was no one in those Days who denied it, either of the Friends, or Adversaries, to *Christianity*: but there is too much occasion to say, and prove it now, because there are too many who deny it, and make even *Christianity* it self the great hindrance to the Universal Happiness of a *Nation*. And that this Accusation is not groundless, is evident from hence, that they represent the *Christian Religion* as absolutely condemning all Resistance, were it never so certain, that *without* it a Nation must be miserable, and may be made Safe and Happy by it. Nay, one cannot but observe it in some Men, that they hardly ever run their *Panegyrics* so high, or press Subjection so far, as in the Case of those *Princes* who have the least Title to them; but with respect to such as truly study, and regard the Public Good, and dedicate their Lives to it, they can be as cold, and indifferent, and uneasy, as any Men, in their Words, and Behaviour. Having thus given an Account of the difference between the *Text*, and the foregoing *Sermon*, I shall now,

3. Lay before the *Reader* the Words in which I have expressed my own Sense upon the Subject of *Resistance*, that he may judge himself, how great a want of *Cautian* there is in the choice of them. Of the *Sentences* already transcribed, (which yet seem to have given as great Disturbance as any thing in the whole *Sermon*) there is but *one* in which this Point is concerned. For all the others only examine and declare how far the *Apostle's* Words, and Reasoning can fairly be extended, and how far *Princes* can be said, on any supposition, to act by *God's* Au-

thority ; and what is the true ground of that *Submission* which is due to them : all which Points were highly necessary to be *Established*. And as for that one *Sentence*, it is already fully accounted for, p. 31. Let us now see how this Matter is expressed in all the other Passages in which I speak my own Sense, without a peculiar regard to this Passage of *St. Paul*. P. 8. I use these Words, *Tamely to sit still, and see the happiness of Society entirely ruined, and sacrificed to the irregular Will of one Man, seems a greater contradiction to the Will and Design of God, than any Opposition can be. For it is a tacit Consent to the Ruine and Misery of Mankind.* So that I blame not here a *Passive Non-resistance*, unless it be when a Society is *entirely ruined* without *Resistance* : which I hope are as well guarded Words, as can well be thought of. Again, I speak thus, *Should all who are possessed of Power, in any other Form of Government, consent, and agree, to enslave the People committed by Providence to their Care, and to make them miserable ; there is nothing in Nature, or in the Christian Religion, that can hinder that People from redressing their Grievances, and from answering the Will of Almighty God, so far as to preserve, and secure the happiness of the Public Society.* The People, and the *Public Society* are the most Universal Words that could be chosen : and this *Sentence* is so Worded, that it allows not the lawfulness of redressing Grievances, even in the whole Body of *Subjects*, before it be certainly true that their *Governours* have consented and agreed to *enslave them, and make them miserable* ; and that the *Happiness of the Public Society* cannot be preserved, or secured without it. And surely they who allow *Opposition* in any Case, cannot complain of any great want of *Caution* in these Expressions. For I think verily, had I studied till this time, I should have chosen the very same as the properest I could think of. There is one more Passage yet behind, which seems more loose and unguarded than any of these, and that is the ob-
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jection started p. 10. in which it is implied, that Subjects are not obliged to *Submission*, in point of Conscience, to those *Governours who answer not the End of their Institution*. But having many times before, and in the most express Words, declared the *End* of their Institution to be the Universal Happiness of Societies ; and having, in answer to the *Objection* here made, plainly declared that their Submission to such *Governours*, helps to destroy and ruine the Public Interest, and to betray the Public Happiness ; it is manifest that this Sentence frees Subjects from *Submission*, in Point of Conscience, to no *Governours* but those only, under whom the Universal Happiness of the Society is not secured ; and to whom, if they should pay *Submission*, they would help forward the Destruction, and Ruine of the Public Interest and Happiness, which they are bound to Regard above their own private Interest, or that of any Mortal upon Earth.

Two things, therefore, ought in Justice to be distinguished in the foregoing *Sermon*, which I have reason to think few have regarded ; viz. What I fix upon *St. Paul*, and his Reasoning : and what I speak, without any express Regard to him, as my own Sense, and Opinion. Now as for what relates to *St. Paul* ; my business was to explain his Argument as exactly and fully as possible : and if I have done him no injustice in what I have fixed upon Him, I am not answerable for any want of Caution in speaking the truth about the full meaning of so important a Passage. And as for what relates to the Declaration of my own Sense upon the Subject of *Submission*, and *Resistance* ; the Sentences here referr'd to, are all that I can find which touch this Point. And upon the Review of them, let any one judge concerning the manner of Expression used in them.

From what hath been here produced out of the foregoing *Sermon*, it appears that the Principal Doctrine contained in it is this. Supposing it true, that Governours act contrary to the end of their Institution ; invade

the Rights of their Subjects ; and attempt the ruine of that Society over which they are placed ; it is Lawful, and Glorious for these Subjects to consult the Happiness of the Public, and of their Posterity after them, by opposing and resisting such Governours.

Thus having produced and vindicated some particular Sentences of the foregoing *Sermon*, and plainly laid down the *principal Doctrine* contained in it ; I shall only observe from hence, before I conclude this *Chapter*, how unjustly, and groundlessly some Men have charged it upon me, as if I had taught in this *Sermon*, that the Personal Vices of a *Prince* are sufficient Reasons for dethroning Him, when I have not once spoken of them ; or that He forfeits his Governing Power upon every single mismanagement, which cannot be forfeited, according to my *Doctrine*, unless when the retaining it is inconsistent with the *Public Happiness* ; or that *Subjects* may rise up in Arms against their *Governours* upon every fancy, or humour of their own, or in order to make Alterations in what is good and tolerable already, or out of any wild jealousy of future imagined Dangers, or on any Account but what is plainly expressed in the foregoing Sentence. All these *Doctrines*, and much worse, if possible, have been kindly fixed upon me by Persons who pretend a great unwillingness that such Notions should be taught, or embraced by any. But methinks it had been more agreeable to this pretense, to have shewn People that no such *Doctrines* can be built upon this *Sermon*, or receive any Encouragement from it, than to be zealous to assert the contrary without the least shadow of Proof. This might have been some Service to that Cause they profess to espouse, as well as Justice to me. But the Zeal of some Men will not suffer them to see what is due in common Justice to their Neighbour, or so much as what is most for their own
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purpose. I leave them to answer for such Behaviour to God, and their own Consciences, and so go on to what I farther proposed in my own necessary Vindication.

C H A P. II.

The Interpretation of Rom. 13. v. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; 6, 7. which is followed in the foregoing Sermon, proposed; and compared with the contrary Interpretation.

II. **T**HE second thing I have undertaken to do, in vindication of the foregoing Sermon, is to lay before the Reader, that Interpretation of the first Seven Verses of Rom. 13. which I have followed; and the Interpretation contrary to it; that so they may be fairly compared together. The Paraphrase, therefore, of this Passage, which alone I can think Just, and Reasonable, is as follows.

V. 1. Let every Soul be Subject to the Higher Powers; for there is no Power but of God: the Powers that be are ordained of God.

*Verse 1. Whereas there hath been a Notion among the * Jews, and still remains even amongst those of them who are converted to the Christian Religion, that no Subjection is due to Heathen Magistrates in the Execution of their Office: to put a*

* The Modern Jews have received this same Notion from their Fathers: and some of them have used the very Phrase here pointed at by St. Paul, that they obey only for Terrour, not for Conscience; for fear of Man, not for fear of God's Anger: But whether this, or any false Notions about the Liberty procured by Christ to his Disciples, (which we find embraced by some of the first Christians) gave occasion to this Passage in this Epistle; it is of small importance to this Interpretation, which must be the same, whatever were the occasion of it.

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stop to this pernicious Opinion, and to remove the Scandal it may fix upon the *Christian Religion*; I give it in charge to you, and to all *Christians*, that you shew a ready Subjection to all who are possessed of any Governing Power in Humane Societies: For it is by the Providence of God that they are Possessed of this Power. And not only this, but I do not doubt to affirm that all *Magistrates*, whether Heathen or not, considered as *Magistrates*, may justly be said to be ordain'd of God Himself.

Verse 2. *Whosoever therefore resisteth the Power, resisteth the Ordinance of God: and they that resist, shall receive to themselves Damnation.*

* The Word *Κεῖμα* in this Verse must refer to Punishment

from God only, because the Apostle is here pressing Subjection in point of Conscience: and there needed no pressing of Subjection in order to avoid the Punishment of the Magistrate; for all allow'd this to be necessary in Prudence.

Verse 3. *For Rulers are not a Terrour to good Works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the Power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have Praise of the same.*

you very much mistake the Business, even of Heathen *Magistrates*, if you look upon them as Enemies by their Office to what is truly Good and Praiseworthy. On the contrary I assure you, it is their great Business as they are

Verse 2. And all *Magistrates* being ordain'd by God himself, it follows from hence, that whosoever hinders, or opposes them in the execution of their Office, opposes the Ordinance of God: and opposing the Ordinance of God, must expect Judgment, and due Punishment * from God himself, for such a Crime.

Verses 3, 4. And that what I have said is true, viz. that *Magistrates* are the Ordinance of God, and that to resist and oppose them in the Execution of their Office is a great Sin, is evident from the good end, and useful nature of their Office. For

are *Magistrates* to Punish and Discourage only what is Evil, and of pernicious Consequence to the Happiness of Humane Society.

But if you desire to have no dread upon your Mind from these *Magistrates*, about whom at present some of you seem to be in great Concern; I will shew you a Method which, generally speaking, will be most effectual to that purpose. Do that which is good. Exercise your selves constantly in all that is truly Praiseworthy: and the nature of their Office is such, that this is a likely way not only to avoid their Anger, but to obtain their Favour and Encouragement. For

Verse 4. For He is the Minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil be afraid, for He beareth not the Sword in vain: for He is the Minister of God, a Revenger to execute Wrath upon Him that doth evil.

while you behave your selves well, They are, by their Office, the Ministers of God, to protect and encourage you; and vested with Power for this very purpose.

On the contrary, If you be guilty of Practices truly Evil, and such as deserve the Censure of the *Magistrate*; you have indeed reason to dread his Power. For it is not for nothing that He is entrusted with the Power of Punishment: He is appointed under God, and is by his Office obliged, to discourage, and punish all whose Practices deserve his Anger.

Verse 5. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for Wrath, but also for Conscience sake.

Verse 5. Since, therefore, the Office of *Magistrates* is the Ordinance of God, as it carries forward his Designs in the World; and since their Work is so good, and beneficial to Humane Society, as they are the Punishers of all that is Evil, and the Encouragers of all that is Good; it is manifest from hence, that it is not only a Point of Interest to shew a ready Subjection to them, for fear of their Anger, and their Punishments, if you did not; but

but a Point of Duty and Conscience, for fear of God's Displeasure, whose Will they execute, and whose Work they carry forward in the World.

Verse 6. For for this Cause pay you Tribute also: for they are God's Ministers, attending continually upon this very thing.

Verse 6. And because there hath been a Notion amongst the *Jews*; and this still retain'd amongst those of them who profess Christianity, that it is not necessary, or fitting, to pay Tribute to *Heathen Governours*; I add, that for this same Cause which I have now laid down for your Subjection to them, you are obliged in Conscience to pay *Tribute* to them also, because they are, as I have shewn you already, God's Ministers, oblig'd by their Office continually to pursue the good Ends before-mention'd, and enjoying Power to that purpose.

Verse 7. Render therefore to all their dues: Tribute to whom Tribute is due, Custom to whom Custom, Fear to whom Fear, Honour to whom Honour.

Verse 7. Be ready, therefore, to render to all your *Superiours*, what they may justly, and on account of their Office, require of you. Be willing to pay *Tribute*, and *Custom* to those of your *Governours* to whom they are due: and towards all who are cloathed with Power for the good of Humane Society, behave your selves with all Fear, and Honour and Respect.

Having thus propos'd the most just Interpretation of this Passage of Scripture I can at present think of, in which I have judg'd it reasonable to make the Apostle condemn only a Resistance to *Magistrates* in the due Execution of their Office, which seems most agreeable to any Design he could have in view, and to be the only Resistance that can be condemned upon the Reasoning He himself here makes use of: I shall now propose another Interpretation contrary to this; that so all Men, upon the consideration of it, may presently determine which must be the true Account of the *Apostle's* mean-

meaning. The fault of the foregoing Explication is declared to be this, that it leaves Subjects at liberty to make Resistance in some Cases: so that this Objection supposes that it was the *Apostle's* Design, in this Place, to forbid, and condemn all manner of Resistance in all Cases whatever. Let us, therefore, frame a *Paraphrase* according to this Opinion, and try how agreeable it is (I will not say to Reason and Common Sense, but) to the *Apostle's* own Discourse, and the Principles He himself here makes use of.

Verse 1. Let every Soul be subject to the Higher Powers; for there is no Power but of God: the Powers that be are ordained of God.

Verse 1. Whereas some Men of Turbulent, and Seditious Spirits, may be apt to imagine that there is no Subjection due to *Magistrates*, but only when they answer the end of their Institution, and promote the Publick Happiness; I give it in charge to you all who are Christians, to pay an entire and hearty Subjection to *Magistrates*, though acting never so contrary to the end of their Office, and manifestly destroying the Publick Happiness. For they received their Power from God, and were ordain'd of Him, on purpose to consult and promote the Public Happiness.

Verse 2. Whosoever therefore resisteth the Power, resisteth the Ordinance of God: and they that resist, shall receive to themselves Damnation.

Verse 2. From whence it is plain, that whosoever opposeth, and resisteth the *Magistrate*, (though opposing the Will of God, and acting contrary to the End for which He was ordain'd of Him) opposeth the Ordinance, and Will of God. For it is by God's Authority that He acts contrary to God's Will: and when God ordained Him to His Office, He gave Him a Divine Commission to bear Him out in the destruction of Public Happiness, and in bringing about the Public Misery. And they that resist and oppose him, though in the most manifest Instances of Violence and

and Oppression, must expect God's Anger, as acting contrary to the Ordinance of God, even whilst they oppose one who acts contrary to his Will.

V. 3, 4. *For Rulers are not a Terrour to good Works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the Power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have Praise of the same: for He is the Minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid: for He beareth not the Sword in vain: for He is the Minister of God, a Revenger to execute Wrath upon Him that doth evil.*

is an effectual way of doing it. Behave your selves well; and you may be sure of his Encouragement, whether He act agreeably to his Office or no: for He is appointed under God for your Protection and Advantage. But if you do that which is Evil, you will certainly feel his Anger, even though He be one who encourageth all that is Evil: For He is appointed under God to punish such as do Evil.

Verse 5. *Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for Wrath, but also for Conscience sake.*

Verse 5. This being a true Account of *Magistrates*, that they act by God's Authority, even in those Instances in which they oppose his Will, and that they have his Commission to shew, even whilst they are destroying the Happiness of the People committed to their Care, for which Happiness only they were appointed of God; it manifestly follows, that you are in Conscience bound patiently

Verses 3, 4. For in confirmation of what I have been saying, I must tell you, that these *Rulers*, to whom I am pressing an unlimited Submission, as well when they oppress the best of their Subjects, and encourage the worst, as when they do the contrary; as well when they lay waste the Public Happiness, as when they consult and promote it, are not a Terrour to Good Works, but to the Evil; and are executing an useful Office in the World. And if you have a Mind to rid your selves of all Dread of the *Magistrate*, in all Cases whatever, here

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patiently to submit to their Will in all things, though to the Ruine, and Misery of your selves, and of the Generations which are yet unborn. *Or thus,*

Verse 5. Since, therefore, *Magistrates* are appointed by God for so good a Work ; to promote the Welfare, and Happiness of Humane Society ; it follows from hence, that even when they destroy the Public Happiness, you are obliged in Conscience patiently to submit your selves to their Will.

Verse 6. For for this Cause pay you Tribute also ; for they are God's Ministers attending upon this very thing.

Verse 6. For it is for this very same Cause that you are obliged in Conscience to pay Tribute, and Taxes to them, whether they destroy the Public Happiness, or not ; because they are the Ministers of God, whose business it is continually to attend upon, and consult the Public Happiness.

Verse 7. Render therefore to all their dues : Tribute to whom Tribute is due, Custom to whom Custom, Fear to whom Fear, Honour to whom Honour.

Verse 7. It being, therefore, evident that *Magistrates* are appointed by God to so good a Work ; to be a Terrour to the Evil, and an Encouragement to the Good ; and to be continually attending to promote the Public Happiness ; it appears from hence to be your Duty to pay them that Tribute, and Honour, which is due to them on the account of their Office, whether they execute their Office or no ; nay, though they act contrary to the end of their Institution, and turn the greatest Tyrants and Enemies to the Peace, and Happiness of their People.

I am not sensible that I have, in this *Paraphrase*, done the least injury to the Sense of those Persons, who condemn the *former*, because it leaves Subjects a Liberty of opposing the *Power* of their *Governours* in some Cases. For if it be false, that in this Place no Restriction is to be used, and no Resistance, in any case, allowed ; then it

it must be true that *Resistance* and *Opposition* in all cases, though never so palpable and plain, is here condemned. And if it be false, that the *Apostle* speaks here of *Magistrates*, as performing the Office of *Magistrates*, or of the Excellence of their Office in general, then it must be true that He speaks here, throughout this Place, of *Magistrates* acting either agreeably to their Office, or contrary to it, as they themselves think fit.

If any should say, that He speaks particularly of the *Roman Emperour*, who at this time was a very bad Man. I answer, 1. His Personal Vices will not affect this Matter, unless they were such as rendred him a settled Enemy to the Public Happiness. 2. If He were such a *Magistrate* as did set himself to destroy the Happiness of the People under Him, and to act contrary to the end of his Office, it is impossible that St. *Paul* should mean Him particularly in this Place. For the *Higher Powers*, v. 1. are the same with the *Rulers*, v. 3. and whomsoever St. *Paul* intended, He declares to be not a *Terrour to Good Works*, but to the *Evil*. So that if the *Roman Emperour* were a *Terrour to Good Works*, and not to the *Evil*; either St. *Paul* was grossly mistaken in his Opinion of Him, or He could not be particularly meant here. If St. *Paul* intended to press Obedience to Him particularly, He manifestly doth it upon this Supposition, that He was not a *Terrour to Good Works*, but to *Evil*. And if this Supposition be destroyed, the Reasoning built upon it must fall, and all the obligation to Subjection that is deduced from it. But if St. *Paul* may be supposed to have known his true *Character*, and if his Design was to press *Non-resistance* to Him, when He was the worst of *Princes*; his Argument must have stood thus: The *Magistrate* hath God's Authority to ruine, as well as to make happy Humane Society; therefore to resist Him, when He attempts to ruine it, is to resist the Ordinance of God. So likewise again, He must have expressed

pressed himself thus, *Though the Magistrate be a Terrour to Good Works, and not to the Evil*; and act in express Contradiction to the Design of his Office; yet you are in Conscience bound to submit your selves to his Will. Nothing less than this could have served his purpose, if He had had *Nero* in his Eye, in the worst part of his *Character*: and nothing less than this can bear out the Doctrine which some have fixed upon this Place of Scripture. But as the Apostle's Words stand at present, and have ever stood, it is impossible to prove that He had in view any particular *Magistrate* acting against the end of his Institution. 3. If the *Roman Emperor* were guilty at this time of any particular Instances of *Tyranny* and *Oppression*, and did in his general Behaviour consult the *Public Happiness*, St. Paul's reasoning here will not so much as make it a necessary part of Duty to submit to Him in those Instances of *Tyranny* and *Oppression*. For St. Paul's Reasoning supposes Him to act by the *Ordinance* of God, and to act agreeably to the end of his Institution; and therefore cannot conclude in his Favour in those Cases in which it is impossible He should act by the *Ordinance* of God, and in which it is manifest He acts contrary to the end of his Office. 4. It is the Note of a Learned Man upon this Place, that there was now no Persecution of the Christians: and perhaps, how bad soever this *Emperour* was afterwards, He had not as yet shewn himself so as to disturb, and allarm his Subjects by any Public Violation of Right and Justice. The time of Writing this *Epistle*, Bishop *Pearson* (who was an excellent Judge in this Case) fixes to the *Third Year of Nero*: and we know from *History*, that He acted such a Part in most things, upon his first coming to the *Empire*, as obtained Him a very great Reputation for Virtue, and Good Nature, and Generosity. 5. It doth not appear that the Form of Government was as yet so altered, that the *Roman Emperour* was truly absolute

solute, and without control even by the Laws then in force ; but that the *Senate* still retained an Authority (which shewed it self often, and particularly afterwards in their *Acts* against *Nero* himself, in which they declared Him an *Enemy* to the *Public*, and ordered Him to be sought after for Public Punishment;) and that the Affairs of the Public, as far as the Inferior Subjects were ordinarily concerned, might be managed very much in the old Forms. So that there will be very little reason to apply what the *Apostle* saith in this Place to the *Emperour* particularly; and much less to extend it to such *Acts* as He alone was concerned in, without, or against, the Judgment of those who had a share in the Government as well as Himself. 6. Supposing the *Emperour* at the head of Affairs, never so bad in himself; yet if *Public Happiness*, and *Justice* were maintained, and likely to be so by the *Magistrates*, who acted under Him, (which *St. Paul* evidently supposes) this is a sufficient ground for *St. Paul's* setting himself against such a Notion as some had embraced, that no Subjection was due to *Magistrates*, merely because they were uncircumcised; and for his pressing a Peaceable Submission to those inferior *Magistrates*, which inferior *Subjects* have chiefly to do with. 7. Here is nothing to make it probable that *St. Paul* had any *Governours* particularly in his Eye, who were a *Terrour to good Works*, and not to *Evil*; or that He had any other Design in this place but to press Submission to *Magistrates*, upon those who acknowledged none to be due in Point of Conscience, from the end of their Institution, and the usefulness of their Office. And in whatever Instances *Submission* can be proved to be due from this Argument, I am ready to acknowledge that *St. Paul* extended it to all such *Instances*. But as for Submission in other Instances, the *Apostle's* Reasoning here cannot defend, or justify it; but rather implies the contrary. For if Sub-

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mission be a Duty because *Magistrates* are carrying forward a good Work, the Peace and Happiness of Humane Society, which is the Argument *St. Paul* useth; it is implied in this, that *Resistance* is rather a Duty, than *Submission*, when they manifestly destroy the Public Peace and Happiness. 8. Considering how ready Men were to represent the *Christian Religion* as an Enemy to the Government of *Humane Societies*; and how great an handle was given to such a *Representation*, by the Practices and Principles of some *Jews* who were ever Pleading an *Exemption* from Obedience to *Heathen Governours*; I say, considering these Things, *St. Paul* could not well say less upon this Subject, than He here doth; nor his Injunctions, upon this Head, be better contrived than they are, at once to remove the Scandal of that Objection from the *Christian Institution*, and to prevent as great a Scandal on the other hand, that the *Gospel* leaves whole Nations entirely at the Mercy of their *Governours*, and allows them no redress, though their *Governours* set themselves to ruine *Public Happiness*. 9. If we consider the Notions about this Matter, which were entertained by the *Heathens*, and especially the People of *Rome*, we may easily judge what *St. Paul* must mean in this Place, in which his Design was to remove from the *Christian Religion*, the Scandal of *Sedition*, and *Rebellion*. The *Romans* were the greatest Friends to *Liberty*, and to their own *Rights*, even at this time, as appears from *St. Paul's* insisting upon his Privileges, as a *Roman*, in opposition to the injustice of *Magistrates*, and from many other Instances. There is not the least ground for thinking that any of them could so much as bear such a Notion as that they were left entirely at the Mercy of their *Emperors*. The contrary is manifest from their general Abhorrence of *Nero*, and their defection from Him, and from the *Senate's* declaring Him a *Public Enemy*. They might justly indeed be of-

fended at *Christianity*, if it permitted Men to throw off all Submission under *Heathen Governours*, and to disturb them in the Execution of their Office, as the *Judaizing Christians* thought it did : But if to remove this Offense, *St. Paul* had told the *Christians*, that the *Roman Emperour* acted in all his wicked Contrivances, and in his very ruining the Public, by Authority from God ; and was not to be resisted in his most outrageous Actions upon Pain of Damnation, (as some make Him speak) this must have cast an insuperable Scandal upon the *Christian Religion* : and a Scandal much worse in the Eyes of the *Romans*, than that which it was design'd to remove. The *Senate* could have no Authority to have Decreed any thing against *Nero* for the Public Good. The *Christians* had been obliged, and all others, to stand by Him in all his Villanies, so far as to defend Him against the *Senate*, and all that should pretend to call Him to Account, or to seek Him out to Punishment. And the *Christians* might well, upon this Supposition, have expected to be hated at *Rome*, of all Places, and to be Persecuted, not as *Seditious*, and *Rebellious* indeed ; but as *Friends* to *Tyranny* and *Oppression*, and *Enemies* to the *Public Happiness* of *Humane Society*. Let it therefore, be consider'd, what was sufficient, in the opinion of the *Heathens*, and especially the *Romans*, to vindicate any *Religion* from the imputation of *Sedition* : and how earnestly soever the *Apostles* command *Submission*, in order to put to silence the calumnies of Men, it cannot well be understood to extend any farther than I have made it. For they generally thought it *Glorious*, and not blame-worthy in any Persons to oppose and resist *Tyrants* and *Oppressors* : and therefore, in their Opinion, the *Christian Religion* might be fairly vindicated from the Charge of *Sedition*, by teaching *Submission* to *Magistrates* only in the due Execution of their Office. And therefore, there is no necessity that *St. Paul* should intend

tend any more in this Place ; or that, in order to wipe off the Scandal of *Sedition*, He should become the Patron of *Tyranny* and *Oppression*, as He must have appeared to the *Romans*, had He taught an *Unlimited Subjection* to *Tyrants*.

If it be thought unjustifiable to add any restrictions to this Doctrine of *Non-resistance*, because it is deliver'd in general Terms by the *Apostle* ; I answer, 1. It is a Rule generally allowed of, that in interpreting any Passage of the *New Testament*, we ought so to explain it as to free it from all absurdities : and surely to make the Christian Religion an Enemy to the happiness of Humane Societies, (which it must be, if *Resistance* be a Damnable Sin even where it is manifest the Happiness of the *Public* is ruined without it) is as great an absurdity as can well be imagined, and will as effectually affright the considering part of Mankind from entertaining it. 2. The reasoning of *St. Paul* himself, in this Place, doth happily prevent this Objection. For He not only commands *Submission*, but lays open the grounds upon which it is due : and these Grounds, as I have already observed, are such as cannot infer the necessity of *Non-resistance* in all Cases, but rather imply the contrary. But to shew the weakness of this Objection, 3. The very Persons who blame all restriction in this Place, where the Discourse of *St. Paul* himself makes it necessary, are obliged to allow restrictions in many other Points, where there is no such express reasoning to make it necessary. As in the Case of the Obedience of *Children* to *Parents* ; and of *Servants* to *Masters* ; in the explication of these Rules, *Swear not at all* ; *Speak evil of no Man* ; *Pray without ceasing* ; *Rejoyce evermore* ; *Give to everyone that asketh* ; and particularly in the Case of *Private Injurious Persons*, in which our *Saviour* himself hath laid down *Non-resistance* in more express and more absolute Words, than either *He*, or any of His *Apostles* ever did with Re-

spect to Princes. Notwithstanding which, the Words of our Saviour himself, as well as of his *Apostles*, must be restrained so as not to extend to all Cases, for the avoiding of such Absurdities as would otherwise follow. And yet, though much greater Absurdities, and of more public Concern, must necessarily follow from the not allowing any restrictions in the Case now before us; nay, though *St. Paul* by his own reasoning so far directs us to them, that it cannot possibly conclude without them; it is an high Crime to Allow, or Plead for any. And what must People judge from hence, but that the *Christian Religion* leaves whole Nations in a much worse, and more desperate Condition, than it leaves private Persons? Let who will have an hand in fixing such a Scandal upon the Christian Religion; and laying such a stumbling-block in the way of the Gospel; for my part, I will have nothing to do with it, but to endeavour to remove it. *Non-resistance* in the Case of *Private Persons*, is more absolutely laid down in the *New Testament* than in the Case of *Princes*. It is as much the Doctrine of the *Cross* as the other. It is as Glorious, and as becoming the Peaceable Temper of *Christianity* as the other. The injurious Person is as much sent by the Providence of God for your Punishment, as the injurious *Prince* is placed upon the Throne for that purpose. It is not of so ill Consequence to recede from your own Right, and Liberty, and to let your self be ruined, as it is to give up the Rights and Liberties of your self, and Neighbours, and your whole Posterity. Notwithstanding all this, *Resistance* is allowed to be often necessary, and commendable in the former Case, and denied to be so much as lawful in this latter. It is declared to be commendable, and reasonable, to resist a private Person, rather than to permit ones Self and Family to be ruined, or murdered; and yet it is declared to be a Damnable Sin to resist a *Magistrate* (whose Sole Business it is to Protect

Protect and Defend his Subjects) though it be to hinder the Slavery and Misery of Thousands of Families, and Multitudes of Generations to come. As far as I can yet see, I may venture to affirm, that there is not one Reason which can be brought against *Resistance to Public Injuries*, but what holds more strongly against *Resistance to Private Injuries*: But that many Reasons may be brought against *Resistance to Private Injuries* which cannot hold in the other. And, therefore, since *Restrictions* must necessarily be allowed in the Case of *Private Injuries*, much more ought they to be allowed in the Case of *Public Injuries*. And if they be found so necessary, even in those Rules of the Gospel, where there is no express Reasoning in which they are implied; much more ought they to be allowed in this Passage of the *New Testament*, where the Reasoning of the *Apostle* is such, that with all the *Art of Logic*, an *Absolute Non-resistance* in all Cases cannot be concluded from it. 4. It is very observable, that they who blame all *Restrictions*, and *Limitations* in this Place, when applied to the *Non-resistance*, and *Passive Obedience* here taught, are forced themselves to apply *Limitations* to this very Place of *Scripture*, with respect to the *Active Obedience* here taught. It is acknowledged, that it is at least as much the Design of this Passage to enjoin *Active Obedience*, as a *Passive Non-resistance*. And it must be acknowledged, that the *Doctrine of Active Obedience* here laid down, is delivered in as *absolute Expressions*, as those in which *Resistance* is condemned. Yet it is found necessary to except all those *Cases* from any Concern in the *Active Obedience* here required, in which we are under greater Obligations to God, and our own Conscience. So that here is an acknowledgment that the bare use of *Absolute*, and *Unlimited Expressions*, doth not infer the unreasonableness of adding any *Limitations* to the *Apostle's Words* in the Matter

of *Active Obedience*. If therefore, it be allowed not to do so in one *Case*, it can never be shewn to do so in another. Especially the same Persons who allow the necessity of adding *Limitations* in one part of this *Passage of Scripture*, cannot with any Grace Plead against an Interpretation of another part of this same *Passage*, merely because a *Limitation* is added to the Words of the *Apostle*. The Office of *Magistrates* being the *Ordinance of God*, as much infers the necessity of *Active Obedience* in all *Cases*, as the necessity of *Non-resistance* in all *Cases*. He that refuseth to obey in any *Case*, as much refuseth to obey the *Ordinance of God*, as He who resists in any *Case*, resists the *Ordinance of God*. St. Paul's mentioning no *Case* in which *Resistance* is lawful, is no more an Argument against it in all *Cases*, than his not mentioning any *Case* in which it is lawful to deny *Active Obedience* is allowed to be a good Argument that there are no such *Cases*. His Precepts concerning *Subjects* extend to all *Forms of Government*; but the Question is, whether they imply an Obligation to *Unlimited Passive Obedience* under any *Form*. And what I here Plead for is this, that his using *Unlimited Expressions*, no more concludes for the necessity of *Passive Obedience* in all *Cases*, than it doth for the necessity of *Active Obedience* in all *Cases*.

This may serve for a full Answer to one *Objection* commonly urged against this *Interpretation*, and the *Doctrine* I have Taught, viz. that St. Paul speaks in absolute Terms without *Restriction*, and therefore no *Restriction* is allowable. For, 1. It is manifest that St. Paul himself doth not here speak without *Restriction*, but that his Reasoning unavoidably implies it, and cannot be of any force without it. And, 2. Supposing He had delivered his *Doctrine* in this Place never so absolutely, it is evident from numberless other Places of the *New Testament*, that *Restrictions* are allowable and necessary, where the
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like *absolute* Expressions are made use of : and consequently, that the mere using of *Restrictions* [in this *Interpretation*, is not the least Argument that it is false. But whether it be or no, must be judged from the Reason of the Thing itself, and the Nature of the Subject.

Upon this Head I desire it may also be considered, that this Passage of *St. Paul* relating as well to the *Inferior*, as the *Superior* Degree of *Magistrates*, if it follow from this Place that *Resistance* in any Case to the *Supreme Magistrate* is a damnable Sin, it will also follow that *Resistance* in any Case to the lowest *Magistrate* is a Damnable Sin. And consequently that it is unlawful to resist, or oppose any *Inferior Officer*, who shall, under the Pretext of his *Commission*, and because He hath the Power to do it, offer the greatest Violences, and Injustice to a *Subject*, even to the ruine of his Family, and the loss of his own Life, if He be not resisted. But we may argue, if the *Apostle* taught no such absurd Doctrin as this, with respect to *Inferior Magistrates*, neither did He teach any such Doctrin about the *Supreme Magistrate* ; because what He here taught concerning one, He taught likewise concerning the other, without any Additions, or any difference expressed in this Passage.

I shall here add an Observation or two concerning *St. Paul*, who wrote this *Epistle*. Let any one look upon his Behaviour to the *Magistrates* of *Philippi*, *Act. 16.37.* and they will find reason to think that He had no very strong Notion of a tame and submissive Patience, due to *Magistrates* acting against their *Commission* ; but that if He had had Power enough, He would not have endured their Injuries, or given them leave to inflict their illegal Punishment upon Him ; and yet his Doctrin, *Rom. 13.* extends equally to all sorts, and all Degrees of
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Magistrates. Another Observation is, That if He had intended, or plainly laid down such an absolute Subjection and *Non-resistance* to *Governors*, as some have built upon the 13th Chapter of his *Epistle* to the *Romans*, and this, before He was accused as a *Pestilent Fellow*, and a *mover of Sedition*, *Act. 24. 5.* He could not possibly have done more for his own Defense, than to have appealed to this Chapter, and to have Pleaded, that He was so far from *Sedition*, that He had instructed his Followers, and laid it as an indispensable Duty upon their Consciences, never, in any Case whatever, to oppose or resist their *Governours*, even though they should be such as carried forward the ruine of Public Happiness, and acted constantly against the apparent good of the People committed to their Care. But could this have been to his purpose upon the present Accusation, yet He knew very well, that He had expressed himself so in this Passage, that if they should have examin'd it, they might have turn'd it against Him, as it manifestly supposes that *Magistrates* act agreeably to their Office, and leaves Subjects, as far as appears, to judge whether they do or no. But the truth of the Matter is, The whole ground of the Accusation was nothing in relation to any Doctrine He had taught about *Magistrates*, nor did his Accusers probably know what He had written in an *Epistle* to *Christians* at *Rome*: but all was grounded upon his Preaching *Christianity*, and making void the Obligation of Men to observe the *Mosaical* Law, and converting Persons to a new Sect of Religion, as appears from the Accusation it self, in which He is said to be a *mover of Sedition among all the Jews throughout the World*, and a *Ringleader of the Sect of the Nazarenes*; that is, He was one, who endeavoured to draw them off from the Observation of the Ceremonial Law. And that this was all the *Sedition* or *Disturbance* intended in this *Accusation*, is manifest from the following Words of *Tertullus*, v. 6, 7. in which He tells

tells *Felix*, that they had taken *Paul*, and would have judged Him according to their *Laws*, but that *Lysias* had taken Him by force out of their Hands. Now their *Law* could take Cognizance of no other *Sedition* than what concerned itself; and they would sooner have pretended to judge Him by their *Law*, for teaching Obedience to *Heathen Magistrates*, than for releasing them from all obligation to such Obedience, could they have laid any such thing as this to his Charge; and the same is evident from the Account *Festus* gives to King *Agrippa*, Act. 25. 18. of his Accusers, *That they brought none Accusation of such things as He supposed; But had certain Questions against Him, of their own Superstition, and of one Jesus who was dead, whom Paul affirmed to be alive.* And, by the way, He seems, by his Appealing to *Rome* for Judgment in his Case, to have been pretty well satisfied that the Course of *Public Justice* was not yet so interrupted and disturbed, but that He might probably have all the Right allowed Him that a *Roman* could Claim, notwithstanding that He differed in Religion, the great Occasion of Injury, and Oppression throughout the World. For it is manifest that He was sent by *Festus*, with an expectation of his being tried at *Rome*; and it is manifest from the Reason He gives for his appealing to *Cæsar*, Act 25. 8, 10, 11. that He went with a good degree of Assurance, that His Cause would have a fair hearing, and that his Innocence would acquit Him.

And thus much may serve for an account of the *Reasons* which induced me to prefer the former *Interpretation* of this Passage of Scripture before the latter of those Two, which I have now laid down. I shall only observe farther, that what *St. Paul* hath deliver'd in this Chapter concerning the *Duty of Subjects*, is not barely by way of *Precept*, or *Command* only, as He hath done

done in many other Cases ; but by way of Reasoning, or inferring one thing from another, which will help mightily to secure the true Sense of the Place. So that in order to prove that I have mistaken or misrepresented *St. Paul*, it will not be sufficient to say that He condemns *Resistance*, and presseth *Subjection*, (for so do I likewise ;) but it must be shewn, that His Reasoning concludes against the *Resistance* which I have taught to be lawful ; and necessarily infers such a *Passive Submission*, as I have denied to follow from it : and that this Passage is of that peculiar Nature, that it can admit of no Restrictions ; tho' numberless other Passages of the *New Testament* necessarily require them.

C H A P.

C H A P. III.

The Objections against the Doctrine of the foregoing Sermon considered.

AS there is hardly any *Doctrine*, even concerning the Fundamental Points of *Reason* and *Revelation*, but what is found to have such *Objections* against it, as, at first hearing, seem plausible, and well founded; so I never imagin'd the *Doctrine* I have laid down in the foregoing *Sermon* to be free from all *Objections*, or all seeming inconveniences. And as nothing can give more light to any *Doctrine*, than a fair and impartial Consideration of the *Objections* made against it, and a Comparison of them with the *Objections* which lie against the contrary *Doctrine*; so I hope to add some light and evidence to this, by giving a fair and open reply to the main *Objections* against it, and by mentioning, as Occasion offers, the *Objections* against the contrary *Doctrine*, which must be true, if this be false. This is what I propos'd to do, in the *Third Place*, towards the Vindication of the foregoing *Sermon*. In order to this, I shall *First* set down the *Doctrine* I have taught, and then the *Doctrine* contrary to it. The *Doctrine* I have taught may be compris'd in one *Proposition*, as follows,

Supposing it true that Governours act contrary to the end of their Institution, and invade the Rights of their Subjects, and attempt the ruine of that Society over which they are placed; it is Lawful, and Glorious for

for these Subjects to consult the Happiness of the Publick, and of their Posterity after them, by opposing and resisting such Governours. If this Proposition be false, which is the utmost of what I have said, the contrary must be true, which therefore I shall here set down.

Supposing it true, that Governours act contrary to the end of their Institution, and invade the Rights of their Subjects, and attempt the ruine of that Society, over which they are placed; it is not Lawful for these Subjects to consult the Happiness of the Publick, and of their Posterity, by opposing and resisting such Governours: But it is their Duty, and Glorious for them, to suffer patiently all their Oppressions, and to let the Happiness of Humane Society be entirely ruined at their Will and Pleasure.

It methinks the former Proposition should be so far from appearing strange, and surprizing, that the latter should seem so absurd to all Persons of understanding, as to be rejected, if any thing ought to be so, without farther Examination. But since the former hath given offense to so many, who pretend they can entertain the latter, (for one of the two they must entertain;) I have taken all the Pains I can to learn the *Objections* that are made to it; and shall now do what I can to examine them fairly and impartially. And if, upon examination, it be found that they are not unanswerable, and that the same, or greater *Objections* lie evidently against the contrary Doctrine, and against other Doctrines embraced by those who make these *Objections*. I hope they will help rather to confirm, than invalidate, the Proposition now before us.

Obj.

Obj. 1. The first *Objection* I shall mention, is a very terrible Charge indeed against this Doctrine, that *No Governours can be safe if this be taught; that it disposeth Men of turbulent Spirits to oppose the best Governours, and encourageth all Publick Disturbances, and all Revolutions whatsoever.*

Thus do some Persons love to express themselves, when they are resolved to run down with Heat and Violence, what they think not fit to understand, or consider seriously. But,

1. Supposing all this to be just, let us see what we shall get by forsaking this Doctrine, and entertaining that which is opposed to it. If it be true that no *Governours* can be safe, if *this* be taught; it must be true that no *Nation* can be safe, if the *other* be taught. If it be true, that *this* disposeth Men of turbulent Spirits to oppose the best *Governours*; it is as true, that the *other* disposeth *Princes* of evil Dispositions to enslave, and ruine, the best and most submissive Subjects. If it be true, that this encourageth all publick Disturbances, and all *Revolutions* whatsoever; it is as true, that the other encourageth all Tyranny, and all the most intolerable Persecutions and Oppressions imaginable. And on which side then will the advantage lie? Or which of the two shall we chuse for the sake of the happy Effects and Consequences of it?

2. Let us consider the natural Consequences of each Doctrine, supposing it universally embraced, and heartily believ'd by a whole Nation; and I could be content, that a Judgment should be made from hence, concerning the truth of what I have taught.

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Supposing it universally received as true, that if *Governours* be contriving and attempting the ruine of the Publick, it is the Duty of *Subjects* to consult the common Happiness, and to oppose them in such a design; I cannot see but that all ground of *Publick Unhappiness* would probably be removed, and all those *Inconveniences*, which are by mistake represented as the consequences of this Doctrine, prevented. For, upon this Supposition, the worst of *Princes* would do that out of Interest, which the best constantly do out of a good Principle, and true love to their *Subjects*. No Prince would have any Persons about Him, to advise or incite Him to illegal or unjust Actions. And if He had at any time been guilty, He would upon the first Representation, and without being forced to it, readily acknowledge his Error, and set all things right again. And let who will say it, the Dispositions of *Subjects* are not so bad, nor their Love to Publick Disturbances so great, but that a *Prince* of such conduct may be sure of Reigning in their Affections, and of being obeyed out of Love and Gratitude; which is the securest Foundation any Throne can possibly be fixed upon. So far is it from being true, that the Universal reception of this Doctrine, would be the ground of *Publick Confusion* and *Misery*; that it would entirely prevent the very beginnings of evil, and take away the first Occasions of all Discontent: And in Truth it must be acknowledged, that it is because this Doctrine hath not been Universally receiv'd, that any *Governours* have been misled, and encouraged, to take such Measures, as in the end have proved fatal to themselves. With respect therefore to *Governours* of evil Dispositions, nothing is more necessary than that they should believe Resistance to be lawful and allowable in some Cases. Such *Governours*, indeed, cannot perhaps bear this Doctrine: And why is it, but

but because it may hinder their pernicious designs? Which is an argument that it is the more necessary. And as for *Good Governours*, I cannot see but that they may wish, and promote the propagation and reception of this *Doctrine*, without acting the least even against their own particular Interest. For it is the chief Interest of *Princes* to reign in the Affections of their *Subjects*, free from all suspicion, and jealousy of any bad designs. And nothing can give a Nation greater satisfaction, that a *Governour* sincerely endeavours to promote their Interest, or gain him more hearty Love and Esteem, than this would do; because nothing could look more open, and more removed from all base and unworthy Designs. Whereas a zeal for the contrary *Doctrine* cannot but look suspicious: and as it tends in its own Nature, so it has been seen in Experience, to create strong jealousies in *Subjects*; to take off their Affections from a *Prince*; and to lay the foundation of their withdrawing their Allegiance from Him.

But now, supposing it universally received as true, that it is the indispensable Duty of *Subjects* patiently to submit, and not to oppose their *Governours*, tho' manifestly carrying forward the ruine of the *Publick*; nothing can be imagined to follow, but what is of the worst consequence to *Humane Societies*, unless we suppose all *Princes*, as *Angels of God*, or rather as God Himself; incapable of being mistaken themselves, or misled by others. This Supposition leaves no restraint upon such *Princes*, as have Designs of their own distinct from the *Publick Good*: And without doubt had it not been for the persuasion that this *Doctrine* had been so inculcated upon the People, as to be deeply riveted in their Minds; a late unhappy *Prince* could not have been so weak, as openly to set up himself above the Laws, and to attempt the ruine of that Constitution, he had obliged himself in

the most solemn manner to preserve. So that it is so far from being true, that this Doctrine would prevent *Publick Misery*; that it is most evident that the Universal reception of it could end in nothing but *Slavery*, and *Misery* upon the present Age, and upon the Generations to come; unless it can be proved that it is the Custom of *Providence* miraculously to interpose in the defense of a *Nation* which will not defend it self; or to save a People by any other means but those of Humane Resistance and Opposition. We were once all sensible, by an instance which ought still to be fresh in our Memories, that it is not reasonable for *Nations* to expect Miracles from Heaven for their relief; but that it is their business to seek Redress for their Calamities in the paths of humane Prudence, under the Blessing of Almighty God. Without this Method the *Late Revolution*, which (as every-body at that time acknowledged) saved us from utter Ruine, and the *Protestant Settlement*, which (as every-body ought to acknowledge) can only for the future preserve us from the same ruine, had been both impossible. So that it is by this Method that we were freed from what we all with one consent, at the time of Danger, own'd to be *Publick Misery*. And if the *Late Revolution* should in its consequences, and in any length of time, prove the occasion of *Publick Unhappiness*; this can signify nothing against the truth of that Doctrine which supports it. For whenever this happens, we must acknowledge that we have by our abuse of this Mercy, by our Ingratitude to the best *Princes*, by our Murmurings and Repinings at our good Fortune, and by a long Scene of our own Folly, forfeited all Title to future Blessings, and made it just in *God* to plague us with that *Tyranny* and *Oppression*, which too many seem to prefer before *Liberty*. But at worst, we cannot probably suffer greater Miseries, than we should have suffered without this
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Revolution. And the Doctrine which supports it, still leaves the Nation a Right of Relieving themselves, whenever they have the Power of doing it. And in the mean while, methinks it should not offend any, who do not desire such future Misery, that some Persons think it worth their while to endeavour to reconcile the Affections of Men to those Principles which are the most effectual Bar to all *Publick Oppression* and *Tyranny*. A pardonable Fault one would think: and yet I may say this is the whole Crime of the foregoing *Sermon*, which hath raised the Indignation of some Men to such an height. But to return to the Point before us.

3. It is easy to observe, how void of all ground this *Objection* is. For when I say, It is lawful to resist a *Governour*, who is ruining the *Publick Happiness*, did I add nothing farther, yet this implies that it is a great Sin to resist those *Governours*, who promote it: and the Saying of this is so far from encouraging or justifying all Resistance, that it absolutely condemns all but such as is made to *Governours* acting contrary to the end of their Institution, and attempting the Ruine of their People. Besides, they who teach this *Doctrine* never fail to warn People of the Anger of Almighty God, and of the *Wrath to come* upon all such as oppose *Magistrates* in the due Execution of their Office. How unreasonable, therefore, is it for Men to argue thus, This *Doctrine* encourageth Men to resist *Magistrates*, in attempting the Ruine of their People; therefore, it encourageth Men to resist them, when they are promoting their *Happiness*: This *Doctrine* justifieth the *Late Revolution*, which was an *Opposition* to a Prince acting contrary to the end of his Institution; therefore it justifieth all *Revolutions*, though brought to pass in *Opposition* to *Princes*, acting agreeably to the design of their Office.: This *Doctrine* is against *Magistrates* who are a *Ter-*

ror to Good Works, and not to the Evil: Therefore it is against *Magistrates* who are not a Terror to Good Works, but to the Evil: This Doctrine teacheth *Subjects* to oppose their *Governours*, when they are illegally and unjustly oppressed; therefore it teacheth them to oppose, when they are not oppressed: I say, how unjust is it to fix these things upon a Doctrine, which implies the direct contrary, and condemns all unreasonable and groundless Opposition to Magistrates, as much as any other *Doctrine* whatsoever? and how unreasonable to argue against it, as if it incited Men to fly in the face of their *Governours*, whenever the Humour or Fancy takes them, and made *Publick Commotions* a small and trivial matter? Such representations as these will only confirm considering Persons in the Belief of this *Doctrine*, which so many know not how to run down, but by laying things to its charge, of which it is wholly innocent. But,

4. If all that is meant by such a terrible *Objection* be this, That Men under pretense of this *Doctrine*, may oppose the best *Governours*, and make *Publick Disturbances* without any ground at all; let it be fairly so exprest, and then let it be as fairly considered, what this signifies to the truth or falshood of it. It would be sufficient here to say, as I have already observed, That the accidental mischievous Consequences following from *this*, cannot be greater than those following from the *other* contrary to it. Nor are frequent *Publick Disturbances*, supposing them probable upon this bottom, at all worse than *continual Slavery* and *Misery*, which are unavoidable upon the other: So that the *Doctrines* may be (as to this) at least upon equal Terms. But I shall proceed to give farther satisfaction to this *Objection*, as it is thus stated. And,

1. It must be acknowledged, that there are on all hands Men of evil Dispositions, who assume to themselves

selves some pretenses, in order to carry on their own private Designs: And it is possible that such Persons may, if they have Opportunity, oppose a good *Governour*, under a pretense that it is lawful to oppose a bad one. And when it can be shewn that there are not bad Men, who pretend to embrace the contrary Doctrine, and that, under the pretext of that, very bad Ends have not been served, and wicked Designs carried forward; I may venture to say, that then I will acknowledge this an Argument against the Truth of what I am now defending. But as things appear at present, it can conclude no more against the truth of *one*, than of the *other*.

2. I deny that it is at all probable, that the Designs of these evil Men should take effect to disturb the *Publick* whenever they have a mind to it, or work any thing but their own Destruction. For the Happiness of good *Governours*, and the Blessings of Publick *Justice* and *Liberty*, do so sensibly affect *Subjects*, and are so universally felt, that the generality of a Nation must needs know when they enjoy them, and when they enjoy them not; and must needs love their own Happiness too well, to destroy and ruine it by opposing those from whom they know it is derived to them. It is not with the majority of a People, as it is with some particular Men of desperate Fortunes, and ungovernable Tempers. It is an easy matter for such to threaten *Resistance* to the best of *Governments*, and the most just Administration of Affairs: But they would with all their Endeavours, find it an hard and impossible Point, to raise the Minds of any number of Men to their own pitch; who have Families to maintain, and Business to manage, and honest Designs carrying forward, and feel in their own Concerns the influence, and blessing of a good *Administration*. And to shew that such Men are not moved by any such Principles

as I have espoused, it is manifest from Experience that they have no need of any, and that they can talk of *Resistance*, even whilst they disown all Principles of Resistance, and pretend to embrace the contrary. But,

3. Supposing some should apply this Doctrine, which only concerns the worst of *Governours*, to the best; and oppose good Princes, under pretense that it is lawful to oppose *Tyrants* and *Oppressors*; this cannot affect the truth of the Doctrine; nor doth the Doctrine, in the least, excuse or justify them, but rather condemns them. And this will appear very plain from some parallel Instances. Our Blessed Lord hath laid down a very reasonable Permission in his *Gospel*, That Husbands may put away their Wives in case of Adultery, and marry others: And is this ever the less reasonable because wicked Men, under the cover of this, may put away the most virtuous Wives, and take others merely for the gratification of their present Inclinations? Or doth this Permission of our Lord's justify all pieces of Wickedness that may be acted under the pretext of it? It is certainly true, that *Magistrates* may and ought to punish, and discourage evil Men, and disturbers of Humane Society: And is this ever the less true, because some *Magistrates* may under the pretense of this, punish and afflict the best and most peaceable Subjects? It is certainly true that a Child may resist a Father, if he should attempt to take away his Life; and is this ever the less true, because a Child may through mistake pretend against a good Father, that he hath designs against his Life, and under that pretense dishonour and resist him? It is agreed upon, on all hands, as a good general Rule, that Men ought to follow the Dictates of their Consciences: But surely this Rule is not made false, nor can it be supposed to justify a Man, if he should be so void of Understanding, as to be directed by his Conscience

ence to murder his Parent or his Prince, as a point of indispensable Duty. I might give many more Instances, but shall add but two, which seem very much to the purpose. There are *Cases* in which the greatest *Patrons* of *Non-resistance*, do expressly teach that it is not only lawful, but necessary in point of Conscience, for *Subjects* to with-hold all active Obedience, and all Assistance from their *Governours*. How easy is it upon this to cry out, No *Governours* can bear such Doctrine; no Government can be secure if this be taught. For *Subjects* may mistake in this Point: and here is a Foundation laid for an universal Defection from a *Prince*, and for the denying that Assistance, without which his *Government* will be but a Shadow and a Name. What then must we do in this Point? Must we deny that *Subjects* may in any Case with-hold their active Obedience, and Assistance from their *Prince*, because many may possibly mistake through Ignorance; and many pretend to exempt themselves through a perverseness of Temper? By no means. This is true, they say, notwithstanding this Inconvenience; and why then may it not be true, that in some Cases *Subjects* may oppose their *Governours*, notwithstanding that many may possibly mistake the Case, and misapply the Doctrine?

Again, It is certainly true, and taught without Scruple by all our Divines, that Separation from a Church which imposeth sinful Terms of Communion is lawful, and praise-worthy: And yet it is an easy matter to cry out upon this, That no Church is safe, if this Doctrine be taught; that it justifies all Separations; for when ever any one hath a Fancy to separate, it is but pretending that somewhat unlawful is required, which they themselves are Judges of, and so we are laid open to perpetual *Schisms* and *Divisions*. The Answer is, That the *Rule* is certainly good, notwithstanding

withstanding all this ; that the Actions of ill-disposed Men, under the Pretense of that *Rule*, are no Argument against the truth of it ; that the best things are the most capable of being abused to ill purposes ; that it is a Matter of great moment, and therefore of high importance to all to consider the Ground upon which they *Separate* ; that this *Rule* will not justify any *Separation* from a sound and good *Church* ; and that if any, through mistake, do separate from such a *Church*, this *Rule* will rather condemn them ; and if they be acquitted before God, it must be on another Account, because He sees the Integrity of their Hearts, that they have taken all care to inform their Consciences, and have not acted amiss through any evil Design of their own. Let all this be applied to the *Case* before us, and it will appear that it may be true, That *Subjects* may resist their *Governours*, when they act against the End of their Institution, and are attempting the Ruine of the *Publick*, notwithstanding that some may be so mistaken, as under this pretense to resist the best of *Governours* ; that this Doctrine will justify no Resistance to such, nor any Persons who practise it ; that if they ever be acquitted before God, it must be on another account, because He sees the perfect Integrity of their Hearts, in the midst of so fatal a Mistake.

But who would not wonder to hear and read the greatest Advocates for an unlimited Non-resistance arguing, That if we allow one *Case* in which we may resist, we must allow all *Cases*, that the People may fancy ; and the like. They themselves, we see, are obliged to allow some *Cases* in which *Subjects* may deny to afford their Assistance, and active Obedience : Must they therefore allow all the *Cases*, to which this Doctrine may be thought to belong through Ignorance or Passion ? They allow particular *Cases* in which
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Children may oppose their *Parents*; must they therefore allow all *Cases* that perverse and wicked Children may fancy to themselves? They allow some *Cases* in which it is lawful and necessary to separate from an *Establish'd Church*: Must they therefore allow all *Cases*, which mistaken *Christians* may fancy to be the same? or must they, therefore, be accounted the *Patrons* of all the *Separations* in the World? All these things, they would think very hard and unjust, when applied to themselves. Let them, therefore, think with what Justice and Candour they fix the like upon their Brethren, and with what Equity they argue against them from such *Topics*.

And this, I hope, may suffice for the *first Objection* against the *Doctrine* of the foregoing *Sermon*: which I have the more distinctly considered, because it is one of the most common, and urged by many with Vehemence; and a great shew of Demonstration. And I beg leave to observe, that nothing can be a sufficient Reply to what I have here said in answer to this *Objection*, unless it be shewn that other *Doctrines* are accounted false, merely because Men may mistake in the application of them; or that there is some peculiar Reason why this *Doctrine* should be denied the privilege allowed to others. Neither of these, I am perswaded, can be shewn: And therefore, I may reasonably conclude, that this *Doctrine* may be *true* notwithstanding an *Objection*, which never yet was thought, even by its Adversaries, to prove any other *Doctrine False*.

Obj. 2. *This Doctrine encourageth any Person who imagines himself Injured, or any Party which is under any little Discouragement, to raise Disturbances in the State, by opposing their Prince : And therefore cannot be true.*

This will require but few Words, being very like the former *Objection*, and founded entirely upon not considering, or not understanding, what the Doctrine is which I have delivered. For I am sure I have taught nothing in the foregoing Sermon, that can Patronize any such Causes as these : Nay, having founded all that I have taught upon the *Public Good*, it is certain it will follow from what I have said, that all Personal and Party Injuries should be forgotten, and passed over, for the sake of the Publick and Universal good, and not that they should be refented in a Publick manner. I have not indeed made any Submission, in any private Instances of Oppression, to be due merely for the sake of the *Prince*, or for the sake of any *Right* in him to act unjustly. But for the sake of the *Publick*, I can argue for *Submission* in such Instances, as zealously as any one : And I am sure, I have hitherto pleaded for no Opposition, but that without which the Happiness of the Society cannot be preserved and secured. The *People*, the *Society*, the *Nation*, are the Words which I use ; and these cannot agree to single Persons, or to a particular Party. So that if any Party of Men, in this Nation, should think or speak of *Resistance* and *Opposition*, whilst all things, at Home and Abroad, are managed with sufficient regard to the *Constitution*, and *Interest* of this *Nation*, merely because they have not all the Favour they could desire, they act in manifest Contradiction to

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to the very Foundation of that Doctrine I have delivered, and are so far from being justified, that they are condemned by it. But if the meaning of this *Objection* be only this, that turbulent Men may so far mistake this *Doctrine*, as to think it justifieth them in disturbing their *Prince* and the *Publick*; this can be no *Objection*, as I have already shewn, against the truth of it: nor is it indeed my *Doctrine* which encourageth such Persons; for when it is so mistaken it is not the same *Doctrine*, but another of their own framing. And I shall only add, that we may, by the same sort of *Objection*, prove some *Doctrines* in the *Christian Religion* false, because many Men have so far mistaken and misunderstood them, as to take Occasion, and encouragement from them, to continue in their Sins, tho' they were designed, and do in truth tend in their *Natures*, to quite another purpose. Nothing therefore can be more manifest, than that a *Doctrine* may be both true and of the highest Importance, which yet may be mistaken, and abused to very bad Purposes.

Obj. 3. *The Government of the worst of Tyrants is better then Anarchy, and Confusion, and the violence of a lawless Multitude: and therefore it is better to bear all Oppression than to oppose them.*

There would be some Colour in this *Objection*, were there no middle Condition between *Tyranny* and *Anarchy*; or were it impossible to oppose *Princes*, without running into a lawless and ungoverned Condition. But I see no necessity of any such thing. We have had an Instance of a *King of England*, openly endeavouring to break through the *Constitution*: And the Nation, being at that time sensible that our Ruine was other-

otherwise inevitable, withdrew its Allegiance from Him, and not only not assisted Him, but joined with those who came to oppose Him. This Opposition hath been so far from bringing us from a bad Condition into a worse, or from under the Arbitrary Power of one, into the Hands of an ungoverned Multitude, that it hath indeed secured to us the happiness of a just and legal Government, and settled us on a much better Foundation than we stood upon before this happy *Revolution*. This is sufficient to shew that it is possible, in this Nation, to ward against *Arbitrary Power*, without running into a State of *Confusion*. And supposing that sometimes a People had (through the bad Designs and evil Dispositions of some Men,) thrown off *Tyranny*, and run to *Confusion*, or to a *Tyranny* as bad as the former, this is no Reason why any People should endure a present *Tyranny*. For this unhappiness doth not necessarily follow, in the Nature of the thing, but is purely accidental, and may with Prudence be prevented; And they must answer for it who are the Causes of it. This is just as the Church of *Rome* would affrighten *Christians* from the most just Separation, by telling them that any *Church-Tyranny* is better than Infinite *Confusions*, and numberless *Separations*, which are seen to follow without stop, when *Separation* on any account is allowed of. If it be said here, as it may be by some, that any *Church-Tyranny* is indeed better than *Separation* which brings *Confusion* with it: But we are not here left at Liberty. For sinful Terms are imposed upon us, and we cannot enjoy the means of Publick Worship without complying actually in Sin; and therefore there is a necessity of separating, which cannot be said in the Case of *Resistance*. If this, I say, be replied, I answer, *First*, that we see from hence that a Practice may be lawful, notwithstanding that the

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Consequence of it may be *Confusion* and *Anarchy*: And then what doth this *Objection*, taken by it self, signifie towards the proving my Doctrine false? And in the next place our Separation, or Reformation, with all its Consequences, is better than a passive Submission to the Exorbitant Power and *Tyranny* of the Church of Rome, even supposing no *Terms* of External *Communion* absolutely sinful imposed upon us. For as it is exercised in manifold, notorious and scandalous Instances, who can prove submission to it to be so much as lawful? And therefore, *Thirdly*, Who can prove it so much as lawful to pay such a Submission to any Mortal upon Earth, as helps to ruine and destroy the *Rights* of others which we cannot honourably give up, tho' we may our own; the Rights and Happiness of our Neighbours, of all our Countrymen, and of all Posterity to come? This must be done by other Arguments. But the making this *Objection* is only just, as if one should say to a Man dying of a Fever, You may indeed be cured of this Disease by some particular Remedies: but you had better let it take its Course; for sometimes it hath been seen that when they have removed that Distemper, they have thrown the Patient into another as bad or worse, by pure Accident, and through want of due Care and Prudence. In fine, It doth not in the least follow, That because the guarding against one evil hath sometimes accidentally, and without any necessity, brought on another, therefore we may not, in Prudence, defend our selves against it; when we may likewise, if we be not wanting to our-selves, keep off the other also. But were the *Doctrine* I have taught universally and publicly embraced, I am persuaded the ground of all such Objections would be removed, because the whole Foundation of *Tyranny* would be destroyed, unless where there is supposed a force sufficient to bear it out.

Obj.

Object. 4. Resistance and Opposition to Tyrants destroys, and ruins more Lives and more Persons, than the greatest Tyrannies possible: And therefore is not lawful, or eligible.

One would think from some other *Objections* to the *Doctrine* I have taught, that the more bitter Persecutions and Oppressions a Prince is guilty of, so much the better for *Christians*, and so much the more delighted ought they to be with the *Doctrine* of *Absolute Non-resistance*. But I find rather than the *Doctrine* shall suffer, it shall be urged by the same Persons, that it doth not tend to so much outward and temporal Misery, as the contrary. So that if the *Christian Religion* had interposed so much in these Matters, as to have recommended expressly *Resistance* to *Subjects*, it had, according to this Objection, been the *Doctrine* of the *Cross* much more than it is, if it be supposed to forbid it. And what then will become of those *Arguments* for *Passive Obedience*, taken from the Spiritual advantages of enduring Misery in this World; from *Christianity's* being a suffering Religion, and a *Doctrine* of the *Cross*? for it seems absurd to urge against the Lawfulness of all *Resistance*, that *Christianity* is a suffering Religion, and a *Doctrine* of the *Cross*; and at the same time to urge another *Objection*, which supposes that it would be much more a *Doctrine* of the *Cross*, did it allow of any *Resistance*. But I am willing to pass over no *Objection* to this *Doctrine*, tho' never so inconsistent with others. And therefore, as to this, I observe,

1. This Inconvenience fixed upon *Resistance*, is not the necessary Consequence of it: nor doth it arise from hence that this *Doctrine* is universally received; but from

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from the contrary because it is not : because there are Men in the World, who for their own Ends will assist and maintain *Tyrants* and *Oppressors*, in their extravagant and unreasonable Pretenses.

2. The Evils indeed of *Resistance* to *Tyrants*, as well as of *Resistance* to *Foreign Invaders*, may be many upon the present Generation : But if the Cause be well prosecuted, they are the Foundation of Happiness and Quiet to succeeding Generations, and great steps towards the utter Extirpation of *Tyranny*, and *Oppression* out of the World : And upon this account to be chosen, and preferred before a tame *Submission*, by all who know what true Honour and Glory are. For the whole Guilt must be fixed upon the *Tyrants* and *Oppressors*, who are the first and unjust cause of all.

3. As for our late *Revolution*, begun upon the Foundation of this *Doctrine*; whatever some Men's thoughts may be, now the Danger is removed, the whole Nation was once thoroughly satisfied, That it was much better to suffer some Evils by contending for our *Rights* and *Liberties*, than to have nothing left worth contending for. And what true *Englishman* is there, who doth not think that the Security we enjoy at Home, the *Settlement* of the *Crown* in the *Protestant Line*, and the Prospect of being free from the insupportable Evils of *Popery* and *Tyranny*, are well purchased by this War which hath followed. Though in truth, this *War* cannot be accounted the Consequence of *Resistance* only : Since it would have been in all respects as necessary as it is at present, unless We could have been contented to have seen our *Neighbours*, and Our-selves swallowed up by *France*, and all *Europe* brought under the Dominion of one *Monarch*. But surely it must be owned, that Death itself is truly more eligible than Life joyned with those Miseries that have been felt by vast numbers of the *Protestants* of
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France, and the oppressed in other Countries; though Nature know not how to chuse it before them: as it hath been ever accounted better to fall in a just and necessary *Self-defense*, than to live oppressed, and miserable.

4. The Mischiefs and Miseries of *Tyranny* unresisted are boundless, and unknown. Of what have been, and are now owing to *Tyrants*, even while they are not free from all apprehension of *Resistance*, some Judgment may be framed. They are many we know with respect to the Lives of Thousands; with respect to all that is Good and Commendable, and Pleasant to Humane Society, and to whatever distinguishes it most from an herd of Beasts. They are felt often to the exquisite Misery of many, and always to the uneasiness, and disquiet of the whole Body; and the same continued to Posterity. But what greater might be seen, and felt, were they certain of being uncontrouled, and were the Doctrine of Absolute Non-resistance universally embraced, no Humane Heart can conceive.

5. I need not indeed have said any thing to this *Objection*, but this which is sufficient wholly to put an end to it; viz. That by the same Argument it may be proved unlawful, or imprudent to resist a Foreign *Prince* invading our *Country*; and more eligible to submit Our-selves to such an one, than to enter into a defensive War against him. For this *Argument* concerning itself only with the Miseries consequent both upon *Resistance* and *Submission*, is as conclusive against Resistance to *Foreign Invaders*, as against Opposition to *Tyrants* at Home. For the same Evils follow upon *that* which do upon the *other*: and there would be the same Good Consequences upon Submission to Foreign *Invaders*, as upon Submission to *Tyrants* at Home. Multitudes of Lives would be saved; numberless Outrages

rages and Violences would be prevented: And if you let this *Foreign Tyrant* come in, He may indeed murder a few Men, and make a few Families miserable, and alter your present Constitution a little: But what are these Trifles, when compared with the Miseries consequent upon making War against Him; which cannot probably be equalled by his *Tyranny* through his whole Life, though he should Massacre an Hundred-thousand in one Night? *One Tyrant's Lust* cannot rifle all *Virgins*; nor his *Avarice* devour all *Estates*; nor his *Revenge* reach all *Persons*; nor his *Cruelty* cut off the *Common-wealth*. I see such false and poor Arguing as this, can be used by the greatest Patrons of *Absolute Non-resistance*; and be greedily swallowed by many, when it is applied to the *Tyranny* of *Lawful Governours*: And yet this same Reasoning (if it may be called by that Name,) concludes as strongly against *Resistance* to *Foreign Invaders*. Let this Doctrine, therefore, be preached first to *States* and *Kingdoms* threatned by *Foreign Enemies*; and let them be told how much better *Submission* is than *Resistance*: And then it may be urged with some grace in the Case now before us. But why is it that *Resistance* is allowed to be lawful and commendable, in the Case of *Foreign Invaders*, if the *Miseries* consequent upon it be thought an Argument against *Resistance* to *Tyrants* at Home? Is it because they have no *right* to enslave us? Our own *Princes* have less *right*, if possible; as a Shepherd who is entrusted with a Flock, and hath sworn to take Care of it, seems to have less *right* to make havock of it, than a Stranger, who never undertook the Care of it; or a *Wolf* who is a professed Enemy to it. Is it because it is dishonourable and unlawful in us, merely for the fear of our own Temporal Misery, to give up the Rights and Happiness of our *Neighbours*, and our Po-

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sterity after us? The same may be said in the other Case. But whatever be the Reason, it is manifest that it is not merely the Consideration of greater Miseries consequent upon *Resistance*, than upon *Submission*, that can make it ever the less eligible or lawful in one Case, than in another, in which the Evils are the same; and consequently, that it is not a sufficient Reply to what is here said, to say, That a *Foreign Enemy*, and a *Tyrant at Home*, stand upon very different Foundations: For that is not the *Question* here, but only whether this *Argument* drawn from the Temporal Miseries of *Resistance* can conclude in *one* Case, when it is allowed it cannot in *another*?

Object. 5. *The worst of Princes, and the greatest of Tyrants, do more good than hurt to Humane Society*: And therefore this Doctrine of *Resistance* cannot be true, and reasonable: But,

1. It is impossible to shew that *Nero, Caligula*, and many other the like Princes recorded in History, could have made amends any ways for the Miseries they themselves brought upon their People; and the bad Influence of their Government upon *Humane Society*, even whilst they were alive: Besides that their Example, if they have been unresisted and uncountrouled, must be the greatest Encouragement possible to other *Princes*, and to their *Successors*, to pursue the same Methods; and the strongest Foundation of *Tyranny* and *Oppression*, to be continued to all Generations.

2. Let us turn our Eyes upon our own *Country*; and let us consider what amends could have been made to this Nation, by never so many Instances of good *Government* in other Respects, if a late *Prince* had been per-

permitted to proceed so far as to have placed the Will of a *King* above all our Laws, and to have fixed the *Usurpation* of the *Church* of *Rome* in this *Kingdom*. I say, Is it possible that a *Prince* who acts thus by this Nation, can be said to do more good than hurt? Or, if it be, is it not manifestly for the Interest of this Nation to have opposed a *Prince*, who may be said to do more good than hurt? Which way soever the answer be made, it appears from this single Instance, That this *Objection* cannot conclude against the Lawfulness or Reasonableness of *Resistance*. But indeed it is most evident from this, and the foregoing Head, That the whole Ground of this *Objection*, as it is expressed, is absolutely false; it being impossible that such *Princes*, as I have now instanced in, can make any Amends, by all their good Actions, for the Injury they do to *Humane Society*; or can with any Justice be said to do more good than hurt. The only thing, therefore, that can justly be intended in an *Objection* of this Nature, is this, That the worst *Princes* do some Good and Service to *Humane Society*; and upon that account ought not to be resisted. And in answer to this, I desire it may be considered,

1. That their Subjects may reap the same, and infinitely more Benefits from *others* placed in their room, who have better Dispositions, without any of the Evils they feel from them. And what necessity there is to suffer great Miseries from any Person, merely because some Good is done by Him, must be shewn from other Arguments. If any one indeed can make it appear, that *Subjects* receive more Good from *Submission* to the worst of *Tyrants*, than from *Opposition* to them, and transferring their Allegiance to other, and better Persons, which is the true State of the *Case*, this would be some *Service* to the Cause of *Unlimited Submission*.

mission. But it can signify nothing to say that the greatest *Tyrants* do some good to their Subjects, unless it can be shewn from other Arguments, That there is an obligation upon their *Subjects* to submit to all their Injuries, and that it is impossible for them to remedy the Evils they suffer, or to enjoy the Happiness of better Princes.

3. The same Objection will prove it as unlawful, and unreasonable to oppose a *Foreign Invader*, as a Tyrant at Home. For this *Foreign Invader*, if you permit him quietly to possess himself of the *Government*, will as probably do some good in it, as the *Tyrant*, who came lawfully to the Throne. And therefore it is unreasonable to oppose him. Nor is it sufficient here to say that the one is an *Usurper*, and the other a *Lawful Prince*; (though indeed an *Usurper* in every act of *Tyranny*;) for this is not to the present purpose. It is manifest from hence, That a *Person* may be opposed honourably, notwithstanding it may be said, that if He be let alone, He will do some good to Humane Society, which is sufficient to take away all force from the present *Objection*, which is wholly founded upon this Consideration, and nothing else. And again,

3. An inferior *Magistrate*, though a very indifferent one, may be said to do some Good in his Office. But doth it follow from hence, if He act beyond, or against his Commission, so far as to endeavour by force to murder his Neighbours, and ruine whole Families, that He must be let alone, or cannot lawfully be resisted in these Attempts? No certainly. No more therefore can it follow, that a *Superior Magistrate* may not lawfully in some Cases be resisted, merely because he may be said to do some Service to Humane Society.

Object. 6. *But the worst Princes are to be accounted God's Judgments:* And therefore patiently to be submitted to, and not resisted.

I answer, So are *Fevers, Plagues, Fires, Inundations, Tempests*, and the like: And yet Almighty God not only permits, but requires us to use all prudent Methods of Resisting and Stopping their Fury; but is far from expecting that we should lie down, and do nothing to save ourselves from perishing in such Calamities. So likewise are *Robbers, and Cut-throats*, God's Judgments: But this doth not prove that you must submit your Selves and Families to be ruined at their pleasures. So again are inferior *Magistrates*, if they make use of their Power to fall with Violence upon their *Neighbours*, and attempt their Lives, or the Ruine of their Families; and yet they may be resisted, and their illegal Violence repelled by Violence. And so, Lastly, are *Foreign Enemies, and Invaders*, always reckoned amongst God's Judgments, and amongst the most remarkable of them: And yet there is no necessity, I hope, from hence of tamely Submitting Our-selves to them; and no Argument from hence against the Lawfulness or Honourableness of resisting them. Either, therefore, let it be shewn, That this *Objection* holds good in other of God's Judgments; or that there is something peculiar in this to exempt it from the Common Rule; or let it be acknowledged, That it signifies nothing in the present Case.

Obj. 7. *The Supposition of a Prince destroying, and ruining the Happiness of his People, is absurd and impossible: And therefore it is very unreasonable to put such a Case, and to teach the lawfulness of Resistance upon such a Supposition. But,*

1. How very unreasonable is it to make such an *Objection* as this, when the very Foundation of *Passive Obedience* it self, as it hath been taught, is wholly taken away without this Supposition; when the greatest Writers in that Cause have seemed chiefly delighted to put this Case, in order to teach Submission to the highest Degree; when they themselves constantly make the supposition of *Princes* acting against the Interest of the *Publick*; when they absolve *Subjects* from all Obligation to have any part in such Actions, or to pay their *Princes* any active Obedience in such Cases? And is it such a Crime to argue with them upon a Supposition, which is so frequently made by themselves? But,

2. Why should it be thought by those who know any thing of Humane Nature, and the Corruptions of Mankind, an unaccountable thing to suppose that Men may act contrary to their Duty, in all Stations, and all Circumstances? Do we not see every Day that *Creatures* can forget their *Creator*, and disregard their Conscience, and their Duty? Hath it not been seen, that *Children* can be brutish, and unnatural to their *Parents* who gave them Life, and have acted a just, and kind part towards them? And hath it not been seen that *Parents* can sometimes be void of all Natural Affection, and even design the ruine and Misery of their *Children*, notwithstanding that tie of Nature which is wanting in the
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Case before us? And that they can often on both sides, through mistake, and Ignorance, and Fondness, contribute to the Unhappiness, and Destruction of one another? And yet can any Supposition be stranger than these two? Or is it not allowable to lay down Rules upon these Suppositions, because no one perhaps could have imagined this if it had not been seen? And what is there in Nature to exempt the Fathers of larger Families from the same Madness, and the same Unhappiness that is seen in others? Or why is the Supposition more absurd in one Case than in the other? Is it not allowed by those who make this Objection, that Multitudes of Men can even without just Reason rise up, and fight against their lawful Governours? And is not this as great an Instance of unnatural Behaviour, and as strange a thing as that a single Person, or a few Men in Power should act against their own Duty, and the Happiness of their Subjects? How often is it that Men seek even their own Deaths, and pursue their own Ruine? and must it be reckon'd so unjustifiable a thing to suppose it possible for them to seek the ruine of others? What Imaginable Wickedness, and what degree of wilful Barbarity is there, which Humane Nature hath not shewn it self capable of; and which, therefore, it may not be supposed capable of? Lastly, Is it not possible that an *Inferior Magistrate* may so far forget his Obligations, or be ignorant of his Duty, as either through design or mistake, to make use of his Commission to the injury and prejudice of all about him? And why may it not be as possible for the Supreme Migistrate, either through design or mistake, to act as much to the injury, and prejudice of the People committed to his care? Nay,

3. This Supposition is not only possible in the *Theory*, but hath too often been demonstrated to be so in *Practice*. All the Heathen Writers who have written of

Political Affairs, or of *Humane Society*, particularly those two great Men, *Aristotle*, and *Tully*, have constantly spoken of *Tyrants* and *Oppressors*, not only as possible, but as what have been very often seen, and felt, in the World. And numberless instances might be given of such *Governours* as have attempted to destroy the *Publick Interest*, for the sake of their own particular Pleasure, or Profit. There have been *Princes* who have sported themselves with the Miseries of their *Subjects*, and lamented that they have not had it in their Power to display before the Eyes of the World stranger Scenes of *Barbarity* and *Cruelty* than ever had been heard of before. The *Senate* and *People* of *Rome* were frequently Satisfied by experience, that their *Emperours* ought to be accounted their greatest Enemies. And for our own Nation, it hath been universally sensible, by no very distant Trial, that a *Prince* may either through design, or mistake, enter into such Methods as must end in the entire Destruction of its Constitution, and Happiness. And, therefore, I cannot but think it not only allowable but necessary sometimes for us to make this Supposition to our selves, and to keep alive the remembrance of what we have actually experienced. But indeed I do not so much wonder that others do not think so, who imagine the *State* we are in now, no better than what we should have been in, had there been no Opposition made to the late designs of subverting our *Religion* and *Liberties*, and changing our mix'd Constitution to *Arbitrary Power*: to whom I confess I know not what to answer, because I cannot think them capable of Satisfaction. Agreeably to this I find it objected, by some,

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Obj. 8. *Misery and Slavery are but Words to amuse the Multitude:* And why, therefore, should the pretenses of them be made use of to plead for the Lawfulness of Resistance? I answer.

1. A Cause must run very low, when Men can talk as if it were no matter in what condition a Nation is; and as if all States, and Circumstances were so alike, that it were a hard matter to chuse, or to say which is best. And I think we may as well go about to persuade Men, that *Pleasure* and *Pain* are the same thing: which they will never believe till they have lost their Senses.

2. The same may be said against *Resistance* to *Robbers*, and *Cutthroats*: and particularly to a *Foreign Invader*; that it is not worth while; that the *Misery* and *Slavery* we so much fear from him are but Words, and it will be no considerable advantage to us to repell his attempts. For we must be ruled by some Body, and that is *Slavery*: And therefore had e'en as good not put our selves to the Charge, and Trouble, and Danger of a War. But,

3. If *Misery*, and *Slavery* be but Words, what becomes of the very Foundation of the contrary Doctrine of *Patience*, and *Submission*? And if they can be supposed to be more than Words, in order to teach *Passive Obedience* under them, why may they not be supposed somewhat more than Words in order to teach the lawfulness of *Resistance*, and *Opposition*? If it be asked, therefore, what I mean by *Misery* and *Slavery*; It is answer enough

enough to some that I mean the same that they do who have so often inculcated a patient Submission under the greatest *Misery* and *Slavery*; and to all, that I mean particularly such *Misery* and *Slavery*, as this Nation was it self sensible it must have experienced, had a late King established *Popery*, and *Arbitrary Power* amongst us.

Obj. 9. *It is very unreasonable to lay down this Doctrine of the lawfulness of Resistance, unless it be shewn so evidently what our Rights, Liberties, and Properties are, that none may be at a loss to know when they are actually invaded and ready to be ruin'd.* I answer,

1. This will prove it very unreasonable for any one to have told the old *Romans* that they had *Rights*, and might insist upon them, (as *St. Paul* certainly thought) unless it were first evident, that they all knew exactly what their *Rights* and *Privileges* were; and also that they could not mistake about the invasion of them. It will prove it very unreasonable likewise to allow *Resistance* to any the greatest *Private Violences*, because no *Rules* can be laid down so effectually as to satisfy all *Judgments*, or so plainly as that many may not mistake in the application of them to particular *Cases*, or in carrying their *Resentments* too far.

2. This will prove it very unreasonable to teach Subjects that they ought in some *Cases* to withdraw their *Active Obedience*, and to refuse to bear any part in the illegal *Oppression*, and *Invasion* of the *Rights*, and *Liberties* of their Brethren. This is of dangerous consequence to *Governments*, some may think, as well as the *Doctrine of Resistance*: yet this is constantly allowed, and taught by the greatest *Defenders of Passive Obedience*.

ence. When they, therefore, settle exactly, and particularly, the *Rights* of *Subjects*, and of *Englishmen*, it will remove this Objection from my *Doctrine* as well as their own. But till then, I cannot think why I may not have the Liberty of speaking in the same general expressions, which they themselves have so often made use of.

3. This Objection will not hold, when it is applied to the *Doctrine* about the lawfulness of Separation from a Church, with which we cannot Communicate without sinning. For it can never be so clearly settled what *Terms* of *Communion* are Lawful, and what *Sinful*, but that there will be more various Opinions, and Judgments about these, than can be imagined about *Civil Rights*, and *Liberties*. What must we do, therefore? Must we allow no Separation lawful, because we cannot state the matter so as to satisfy all *Mens Consciences*, about lawful and unlawful *Terms* of *Communion*? The contrary is constantly taught by the greatest Enemies to *Schism*, and *unnecessary Separation*: And it is laid down in general words that when sinful *Terms* are imposed, a Separation is lawful. Why therefore, may it not be taught, notwithstanding the same Objection, that *Resistance* is allowable under the invasion of the *Rights*, and *Liberties* of a whole Nation? But,

4. If we consider the matter seriously, it will not appear so difficult a point for *Subjects*, to be sensible when their *Rights* are invaded, and the ruine of their *Liberties* attempted. Let any one look back upon a late Reign, and then judge whether it required a nice Head, and a great degree of Sagacity to know that the ruine of our Constitution, and the Subversion of our Liberties, and of the *Established Protestant Church* were heartily designed and attempted? The truth of it is, the influence of *Government* is of that universal Nature that it cannot but be sensibly felt by all, or a vast Majority

Majority of *Subjects*, when it is their *Rights* and *Pro-
perties* are invaded; and when it is they are secured,
and defended by their *Governours*.

Obj. 10. *The Crimes of one Relation do not dis-
solve the obligations of the other: And though a
Prince may act, thro' the Course of his Reign, in
express contradiction to the End of his Office,
yet Subjects are not absolv'd from their Allegi-
ance, and Submission. I answer,*

1. If Almighty God hath in so many Words plainly
declared this, let them be produc'd: But then the Ob-
jection must be founded upon those Words, and not
upon the indissoluble relation between *Princes*, and their
Subjects.

2. It would be very unaccountable to find it so in
this *Case*, when there is no other Relation within the
knowledge of Man, in which the Behaviour of the *Infe-
rior* part of it may not justly vary according to the
Behaviour of the *Superior*, in great and remarkable In-
stances. What relation can be stricter than that be-
tween *Parents*, and *Children*? And yet if a *Father* should
attempt the Life of his Child, it is allowed that He
may be resisted by Force: as it must be in some other
Cases also. There cannot be stronger Obligations to
Subjection upon any, than there are upon *Children*: and
yet these are granted not to contradict the powerful
Law of *Self-Preservation*, and *Self-Defense*, in *Cases*
in which *Life*, or any thing dearer than *Life*, is con-
cerned. Can any one, therefore, imagine that when
the ruine of the *Publick Happiness*, which is as it were
the *Life* of the *Community*, is attempted, the same Law

of *Self-Defense* is of no Force, and ought not to be regarded? Can any one imagine that all, even the strictest Relations in *Nature*, and *Society*, may be broken and dissolved by the misbehaviour of the *Superior* Party in them, so far that the *Inferior* may defend himself; and that this Relation only should be excepted?

3. I cannot see any reason for this, supposing the Right of *Kings* founded upon God's immediate appointment; much less if it be founded, as Mr. *Hooker*, and our *Legislators* teach, upon mutual contract, either *tacit*, or express, between *them* and their *People*. Upon the former Supposition the Obligation to *Non-Resistance* in all possible Cases cannot be stronger, than in the Case of *Children* towards their *Parents*: And yet it is possible not only to frame Suppositions, but to produce Cases in Fact, in which they may be not only allowed, but required to resist and oppose their *Parents*, to whom in other Cases they owe the most profound Honour, and Submission. Much more is this allowance reasonable in those Relations, which are purely voluntary, and entred into upon mutual contract; not founded upon the appointment of God, and the necessary order of *Nature*.

Obj. II.

Obj. 11. But how can it be justifiable in any Case, for Subjects to resist their Princes, since they are not accountable to them, and since they have no Equals, much less Superiors, in their Kingdoms? I answer.

1. States, and Princes, are not accountable to one another: Yet I presume they have a right to defend themselves against one another's Invasions, and Violences. Nor is a Robber, properly speaking, accountable to the honest Man, whose Life or Estate He attempts: Yet surely the honest Man owes so much to himself, and his Family, as to keep off Ruine, and Death, if it be in his Power.

2. As to Kings having no Equals, or Superiors in their Kingdoms; Self-Defense, and Self-Preservation are, in many Cases, allowed to justify the Resistance of Inferiors to Superiors. A Father hath no equal, or Superior amongst his Children; yet this doth not make it their Duty to submit their Lives to Him, or not to resist him, if he should be so unnatural as to attempt to destroy them. A Master hath no equal in his Family; yet hath his Family a right to defend themselves against Him, should He endeavour to Ruine, or Murther them. So that it is manifest, as might be shewn from more Instances without number, that Self-Defense, and Self-Preservation, even where there are the strongest Obligations to Submission, stand not in need of the pretense of equality or superiority to bear them out. But,

3. If the Power of Governours came from the Consent of the People, as Mr. Hooker judges, and they cannot be supposed to give to any one an absolute Right to Ruine and Destroy themselves, what He holds to be true with respect to our Kings, *Rex est singulis major,*

major, universis minor, must likewise hold of other *Governours*, so far that the whole Body from which the Power originally came must have a Right to defend themselves from being ruined by that Power, which they gave to their *Governours* only for their own greater Happiness, and more secure Preservation. But the Truth of this doth not depend upon this Supposition, but is the same, on what Foundation soever the Power of *Governours* stands. For if God himself immediately appointed them to Rule for the good of the Society; it will not follow from hence, that he by this takes away from that *Society*, a Right to defend themselves from Ruine; any more than his appointing a *Father* to rule and govern his *Children*, takes away from them the Right of defending their Lives, should this *Father* be so inhumane as to make any attempt upon them.

4. In a word, the true state of the *Case* seems to be this, that in all *Relations* between *Superiors*, and *Inferiors*, there is still an equality left in all those *Cases* in which the *Superior* Party acts without *Commission*, or *Authority*: And it being no part of a *Prince's* Commission, (whether He have received it immediately from God, or from the *People*) to Destroy and Ruine the Happiness of his *Subjects*; they are, in Truth, in such a *Case*, upon an equality with Him, notwithstanding that in all *Cases* to which his *Commission* extends, He is their *Superior*. Nor can they in any single Instance, in which He acts without Authority, be oblig'd to submit to Him as to their Superior; though they may be obliged in Conscience, to submit in many such Instances, for the sake of the *Publick* good. And this destroys the whole Foundation of this *Objection*.

Ob. 12. *But the People can have no right to Resistance left, in any Case, even supposing the original of Government proceeding from their Consent, or voluntary Choice: For they have by this means given themselves up entirely and absolutely to the will of their Legislators and Governours; and Almighty God hath upon this made them absolute, and uncontrolable.*

I confess if I had not found this to be said by Persons worthy of regard, I should never have thought it worth while to have mentioned it, For,

1. I cannot but think it an impossible Supposition, that any Persons, by a voluntary Choice, and Contract, as this is here supposed to be, should give up themselves so absolutely to any Governours, as not to leave themselves a right of preserving themselves from Ruine. Can any one think that the Majority of them, if they were asked, at the time of such Choice, or Contract, whether they consented that their Governours should have a Power unjustly to Ruine or Murther them, would answer, that they perfectly consented to this? And yet, if it cannot be shewn that they would expressly answer to that effect, it cannot be proved that any such thing is implied in their Choice, or Contract: Which can have nothing in it, on their Part, but what they design should be in it, or what they would explicitly consent to, were it fairly put to them. Nor would any Prince or Legislator at the time of such Choice, or Contract, pretend that they expect to receive from them so unlimited, and uncontrolable Powers. It remains, therefore, to be examined,

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2. Whether in the Reason of the thing it can be supposed that Almighty God, upon such *Choice*, or *Contract*, imparts to *Governours* more unlimited, and more uncontrollable Powers, than either they themselves expected to receive, or the People designed to give. And I never yet heard a Reason why this should be supposed. On the contrary, *Two* or *Three* good Reasons come at present into my Mind against this Supposition. The *First* is, That it is very unaccountable in it self, to imagine that it should be God's will that any thing more should be contained in, or be consequent upon, any voluntary, and deliberate Contract, than what is designed by the Parties concerned to be in it, or to result from it. This seems to be such a Supposition as must occasion great absurdities and difficulties in the matter of Contracts, and voluntary Agreements. For if it be once supposed that as soon as they are made, the very Terms of them may be altered by the Will of *Almighty God*, they must be very insignificant and useless things. Nay, they must, I think, lose the Nature of voluntary Compacts, as soon as they are so altered as to have something added to them, which was not design'd by the Parties concerned to be in them. The *Second* Reason against this Supposition is, because *God* hath in no other Relation, (not even in that of *Parents* and *Children*, which is Natural, and not founded upon voluntary Contract,) made the *Superior* Party so uncontrollable, and irresistible, as to take away from the *Inferior* the right of *Self-Defense*, and *Self-Preservation*. And why it should be otherwise in Relations founded upon the voluntary contract, and Choice of the *Inferior* Party, it would be hard to discover. A *Third* Reason is, because it cannot be shewn that there is any thing peculiar in the Relation, and Contract between *Governours* and *Subjects*, to determine Almighty God to add to this what He hath never

ver done to others. Should any one say, that it is necessary for the Publick Good it should be so, this quite runs off to another Argument: Though it cannot but appear very unintelligible how it is possible it should be for the *Publick Good*, that *Governours* should be irresistible even when they are destroying, and ruining the *Publick Good*. Whether *Submission* be better for the *Publick* than *Resistance*, when a Nation is sure of present Ruine without it, I have before examined. But as to the point we are upon at present; if *Government* be founded upon voluntary Contract, and if the People never designed any thing by this Contract, but to bind themselves to such a *Submission* as carries forward, and is consistent with, the *Publick Good*; it is impossible to shew from Reason and the light of Nature that it is *God Almighty's* Will to bring them under greater Obligations on this account, than what are implied in such a *Contract*. Nay, should it be proved that they ought, in Reason, to have brought themselves under stricter and harder Obligations, in many respects, than they have done, yet this will not prove that *Almighty God* supplies this defect: For since he hath not interposed so far in this Case, but that this is a matter of *voluntary Compact*; it must follow that He leaves it in the state of all other *voluntary Agreements*, which are not supposed to have in them all which, in Reason, they ought to have had, but only what was designed to be in them by the Parties concerned. The only thing, therefore, that can be urged here is this, that though it may not appear from the Nature of the thing, yet God hath declared it in his *Reveled Will*, that *Princes* are in all Cases irresistible, as well when they seek the Destruction, as when they consult the Happiness of the People committed to their care. Whether this be true or not, I shall examine when I come to the *Objections* taken from *Reveled Religion*. In the mean while,

while, I cannot but observe, that it would be strangely unaccountable to suppose, that *God* should give to *Governours* not only those *Powers* which are sufficient for the carrying forward the *End* of their Office, but those which will bear them out in the acting contrary to it. The only *End* of their Office is to promote the Happiness of Humane Society. It is fully sufficient to this *End*, that they should be uncontrollable in all those Actions which carry forward, and are consistent with, the *Publick Good*. It is not only not necessary, but tends to the destruction of this *End*, that they should be uncontrollable in a Behaviour inconsistent with the *Publick Happiness*. And therefore, it seems a great absurdity to suppose that it is the Will of *God* they should be so: For this is to suppose that He first intends a good *End*, and then provides such means, as are not only needless towards the accomplishment of it, but seem indeed to be the most likely means of frustrating that very *End*, and of destroying *Publick Happiness*.

From what hath been here said I think it is evident that there can be no *Right*, or *Authority*, in those who are concerned in the *Government* of these *Kingdoms*, by any solemn Act to alter the Essentials of our present *Constitution*, or to change this mixed Form of Government either into an *Absolute Monarchy*, or a *Republick*. For no such solemn Act can be valid without the concurrence of the Majority of the *Representatives* of the People. And whatever may be said as to some *Governours*, these continue to this Day to receive all their right to act as *Legislators* from the free choice of the People; and therefore can have no Powers but what are designed and intended, in that free Choice, and Contract of the People. And it being absurd to suppose that the People entrust them with a Power to destroy, and ruine the Nation; or that any thing more is implied in this *Choice*, but that they shall act for the

good of the *Publick*, and with regard to the present excellent *Constitution* of this *Government*, it is impossible to say whence they should receive Authority to Decree any thing destructive of the *Publick Happiness*, or to make any such Change in the essential parts of our *Constitution*; or whence any necessity should arise, that can oblige the People to acquiesce in any such Decree, or in any such *Change*, which they never authorized any Persons to make in their Names, and which they judge to be the Foundation of Unhappiness to themselves, and their Posterity after them.

Obj. 13. *But the Power of Governours cannot be founded upon Humane Contract, and voluntary Agreement, but is of Divine appointment; and therefore, in all Cases, to be submitted to by Subjects, and in no case to be resisted. In answer to this,*

1. I grant indeed that the Power of *Governours* is of *Divine appointment*, as it is the Will of God, sufficiently manifest from Reason and the light of Nature, that there should be *Governours* in *Humane Society*, and that they should have Authority sufficient to promote the Good and Welfare of it. But this will never prove that they are in no Case to be resisted.

2. Let us put the highest Supposition possible in favour of *Governours*; that the *Form* of their *Government* is ordered by God; their *Persons* appointed by Him; and their *Commissions* immediately, and solely from Him: And then let us examine whether upon this Supposition it can be proved that they are in all Cases irresistible. I have spoken to this Point both in the foregoing *Sermon*, and in the *First Chapter* of this *Defense*, and so there will be the less need of many Words here.

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The appointment of one particular *Form* of Government, can never prove that He who appointed it, designed to make the *Governour* in all *Cases* irresistible. The appointment of such particular Persons to govern, can never prove that he who appointed them, designed, by such appointment, to take away from the whole Body of their *Subjects* all right to *Self-Defense*, and *Self-Preservation*. God hath appointed, in the order of Nature, *Paternal Government*, and the *Persons* of *Fathers* who are to exercise this *Government*: But it doth not follow from hence, that He hath taken away from *Children* all right to *Self-Defense*, in all possible *Cases*. Neither, therefore, will any thing like this follow from his appointment of any particular *Form* of *Civil Government*; or of the *Persons* of those who are *Civil Governours*. It remains, therefore, that this point can be judged of from nothing, but from the *Commission* which, upon the present Supposition, *Governours* receive from *Almighty God*. And it being the highest absurdity (not to say *Blasphemy*,) to suppose that there can be any thing in the *Commission* they receive from God, to authorize them to transgress their own Duty and to act unjustly and wickedly; it is impossible to shew, that their *Commission* can make them irresistible in those Instances, to which it is impossible their *Commission* can extend. It follows from what hath been said that, granting what is so eagerly contended for by some, that *Governours* receive their *Commission* and *Authority* immediately, and solely from God, yet this will not prove them in all *Cases* irresistible. But in order to prove this, (even after we have granted what hath been esteemed the strongest Foundation of *Absolute Non-Resistance*,) it must be shewn either that this is more for the *Publick Good* in any possible Case than *Resistance*, (which I have before examined;) or that God hath expressly declared his Will, (which in this

Case I doubt not is always founded upon the *Publick Good*,) that though *Governours* do transgress their *Commission*, and ruine the Happiness of *Humane Society*, yet their *Subjects* shall not defend themselves, and their *Rights*, in opposition to them. And whether this be so, or not, I shall presently consider.

Before I leave this *Objection*, I must take notice of one Argument commonly used to prove that the Power of *Governours* cannot come originally from the voluntary agreement of Men, and that is this, that *Magistrates* have certainly the Power of *Life*, and *Death*, in many Cases, intrusted to them; and this is a Power which they could not receive from the *People*, because the *People* have not a right to dispose of their own Lives. In answer to this, I have two things to offer.

1. That all Men are allowed to have a Right to dispose of their own Lives, upon Publick considerations, is evident from hence, that they are universally applauded for their willingness to hazard their Lives for the sake of the *Publick Good*: And this in many Cases, in which they are certain of present Death without a Miracle. Nay, if Men have not such a Power over their own Lives, as to esteem them of less account than the *Publick Good*, I see not how it can be lawful for any Man to run the ordinary hazards of War; in which He ventures, and in effect voluntarily offers his *Life* to the Service of that Society He belongs to. This is allowed of; and why, therefore, may it not be allowed that Men may enter into such *Terms* with one another for the sake of *Publick Happiness*, as voluntarily to give up their own Lives, whenever it is necessary for the good of the *Publick*, that they should be taken away? But,

2. The Power of *Life*, and *Death*, which the *Magistrate* hath, may come rightfully from the *People*, though it come not from those very Persons over whose Lives
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He hath Power; Nay though it be granted that those Persons themselves have not a right to dispose of their own after any manner whatsoever. For I suppose it will be granted that Men may voluntarily, and of their own accord, enter into *Society*; and that they have a Right to defend themselves, as a *Society*, from all the Enemies of their *Society*, and to do all things necessary for the Support and Happiness of it: And I suppose it will be granted that they may transfer this *Right* to another, and for the better accomplishing the good Ends of *Civil Society*, may chuse and appoint some particular Person, or Persons, to do for them what they have a Right to do for themselves; whose Office from this time, it will be to do all things necessary for the defense of this *Society* against the Enemies of it. Now if after this any Members of this *Society* should revolt from it, and become *Enemies* to it; the Power which the *Magistrate* hath receiv'd from the others still remaining in the *Society*, is fully sufficient to give him a Right to take away their Lives, if it become necessary for the good of that *Society* so to do. And it is over the Lives of such only that the *Magistrate* hath Power, who are Enemies to *Humane Society*, and whose Lives the *Publick Good* requires should be taken away. And the Society can give Him *Right* enough to such a Power, as the Members of it have a Right in themselves, to defend their whole Body from all Enemies, and to do whatever is necessary for the Support and Happiness of it. As in the Case of a free, and independent Town, the Inhabitants may appoint a Person, whom they think fit, to order and to do every thing necessary for the Defense of it against the assaults of an *Enemy*: And should any of the Inhabitants themselves, after this, revolt to the *Enemy*, the Powers which He received from the rest give him Authority to defend them against these, as well as against the others. Now

let it be remembered, that *Murderers, Traitors*, and the like, from the Moment they become such, are not of the *Society*, but *Enemies* to it; and that it is necessary for the *Publick Good*, that the *Magistrate* should have a Power over their Lives; and I believe what I have now said, will appear sufficient to remove the present difficulty, and so to take away the great Foundation upon which the *Objection* now before us is built.

Obj. 14. *But the Right to Rule is of that Nature, that it can never be forfeited by any Person who once hath it.* I answer.

1. This *Objection* toucheth no sort, or degree of *Opposition* to *Governours*, but what wholly dispossesteth them of their Power for the time to come. So that though this should be acknowledged to be true, it may be very lawful to oppose, and resist *Governours*, provided the *Opposition* go not so far as to divest them wholly of their Power for the future. And so far it can never go without an high Crime; unless when the *Publick Security* necessarily requires it. But upon Supposition that the *Case* so happens, I must, in answer to what is here alleged, observe,

2. That though every Prince may have a Right to Rule, as long as his Ruling is consistent with the *Publick Good*; yet no Prince ever had any Right to Rule to the misery, and destruction of his *Subjects*. He cannot *forfeit*, indeed, what He never had: but certainly He is, and ever was without such a Right. For all the *Right* given Him, whether it came from *God*, or the *People*, being positively designed with this sole view, that he should act the part of a good *Governour*, and promote the *Publick Happiness*; it is manifest from hence, that he is void of all *Right* to Rule, when his

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Government is inconsistent with the *Publick Happiness*. For He hath no *Right* to Rule at all, but from his *Commission*; and he can have no *Right* from *that* to Rule to the destruction of his *Subjects*, whether it be supposed to come immediately from *God*, or the *People*; and consequently the whole ground of this *Objection* is removed. But,

3. No Person, that I know of, hath such a *Right* to any thing in this World, as takes away from others the *Right* of *Self-Defense*, unless it be forfeited by some former Act. A *Father* hath a *Right* to govern in his *Family*: but not such a *Right* as that he may govern to the Death, and destruction of his *Inferiors* in it; not such a *Right*, but that his *Inferiors* may have a *Right* to something also, and may lawfully defend themselves from *Death*, and *Misery*. The same may be said with respect to the *Prince*, and the *Society* under his Government. A Man hath a *Right* to his own House; but it doth not follow from hence, that He may not be hindred by force from burning it, if that endanger the Neighbourhood. A Man hath a right to his own Life, (as great a *Right* as any one can have to any thing in this World;) and yet it doth not follow from hence that it may not justly be taken from him, if He assault his Neighbour, and there be no other way of keeping off his Violence. And the Reason is plain, His Neighbour hath as good a *Right* to *Life* and *Self-Preservation* as He: and therefore may justly take away his *Life*, if he force him to it in the necessary Defense of his own. So likewise the *Body Politick* hath as good a *Right* to *Life*, and *Self-Preservation*, as any *Governour* can have to the Post he possesseth: And if the *Governour* by his Invasions, and Oppressions, make it necessary in point of *Self-Defense*, his being removed from the place He once possessed, will be owing intirely to this, that the *Society* hath a *Right* to *Life* and *Self-Preservation*.

Preservation, which they may as lawfully plead against all *Publick Invaders*, as any *Private Man* may against *Private Robbers*, and *Affassinators*. Why are *Idiots* and *Madmen* excluded from succeeding in the Government of some *Kingdoms*, but because the *Publick* cannot be secure from ruine under such *Governours*; whereas on all other accounts they have the same Right that others have? And doth not the Reason of the thing hold equally against those whose administration hath been found, upon Trial, to be equally inconsistent with the *Publick Good*? There is only this difference, that the former are deprived of their Right for what is not their *Crime*, but their *Unhappiness*; and the latter for what is their wilful blindness, or inexcusable design. Why are *Lunaticks* dispossessed, by the *Laws*, of their Estates, and of that *Government* in their Families, which they may be said to have a Right to; but because it is highly unreasonable that a whole Family should suffer in its present and future Generations, for the sake of a single Person? and how much more unreasonable is it that numberless Families and Generations should suffer for the sake of the outward Grandeur of one Person? It is manifest from Instances without number, that all private *Rights* are allowed on all Hands to be of lesser value than *Publick Good*, and that they ought in Reason to yield to it. And when the particular Interest of a *Governour* becomes inconsistent with the *Publick Interest*, it is but a private concern; and to whatsoever it is that He hath a *Right* in such a Case, it can be but a private *Right*: and it will be hard to prove that his private *Right* must be exempt from the fate of all other private *Rights*; and that it is of that peculiar Nature as to be above the consideration of the *Publick Security*, and *Happiness*.

4. The same Argument will equally prove it to be unlawful, for any *People* to resist a *Foreign Prince*, unjustly

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justly making War upon them, so far as to dispossess Him of any part of his Dominions, though it should be never so necessary for their own Preservation to do so. For their own *Sovereign* cannot have more Right to his *Kingdom*, than the *Foreign Prince* hath to the Dominions He is possessed of: And indeed hath less Right, if possible, to attempt their ruine than the *Foreign Prince* hath. If therefore, they may not consult the *Publick Security* at the hazard, or loss, of his Possessions; neither will it be lawful for them to consult their own Security at the hazard, and loss of the Possessions of any *Foreign Prince*, who should unjustly attempt their ruine. But,

5. It is acknowledged by the greatest Patrons of *Passive Obedience*, that *Princes* lose all *Right* to the *Active Obedience* of their Subjects, in their designs of *Publick Tyranny* and *Oppression*; even in many Cases in which the *Matter* of their Commands is not directly, and in it self *Sinful*: And if all Men would understand and practise their Duty, this would be, in effect, to lose the Right they once had to govern. But why is this allowed? Is it because it is a Crime in any Man to bear a part in the illegal and unjust *Oppression* of his Countrymen? And is not *Passive Obedience* upon the same account a Crime, when it contributes visibly and immediately to the ruine of the *Publick Society* to which we belong? Is it because a Superior Law is to take place against the private Interest of a *Governour*? And ought not the Superior Law concerning *Publick Good* to be of as much force against *Passive*, as it is allowed to be against *Active Obedience*? However, here is a plain Concession that the consideration of the *Publick Good* is sufficient to take away from *Princes* a *Right*, which otherwise they enjoy; and that it is of greater moment than *Obedience* to their Commands.

Obj. 15. *But the Doctrine of the foregoing Sermon is contrary to the Law of the Land: And therefore to be rejected.* In answer to this,

1. I desire it may be considered that I was to act the part of a *Divine*, and not of a *Lawyer*; that my business was to shew from *Reason*, and *Religion*, the Duty of *Men* and *Christians*. And if there should be any thing in Humane Laws contrary to what I have taught, this will not prove the *Falshood* of it: But *that* must be judged of from other Arguments. If I have not contradicted *Natural*, or *Reveled* Religion, it will be a great satisfaction to me.

2. It is absurd to expect that there should be express provision made in the *Law*, for all great and extraordinary Occasions; or that the *Law* can be so contrived, as that the *Rules* laid down in it for all ordinary Cases, shall not contradict those measures of Action, which are necessary on extraordinary, and unexpected Occasions. It is much more absurd to imagine that the *Law* can consent to its own ruine, and destruction; as it must do upon some possible Suppositions, if it be ordered in it that the *Prince* shall be irresistible in all his attempts to destroy, and ruine the *Law* it self.

3. It is, I think, agreed on by all *Casuits*, that no Humane Law can oblige the *Conscience* which manifestly contradicts the *Publick Good*: much less can any Law be of force, which takes away from a whole Nation of Men the Right of *Self-Defense*, and *Self-Preservation*; and imposeth upon them the necessity of seeing themselves ruined and destroyed. I pretend not to an exact Knowledge of the *Laws*. But surely I may venture to say, that it will be hard to produce

duce any passage out of them, which takes away from this Nation all liberty of *Self-Defense*, in Cases in which it may be sure of Ruine without it; and nothing less than this, expressly declared, will signifie any thing against what I have taught. But if such a passage could be produced, I appeal to all reasonable Persons, whether it ought to be of such force upon the Conscience, as to hinder a Nation from saving it self from imminent ruine. For whence had any who bear a part in our *Government*, any Authority to make such a *Law* as this? It must be either from *God*, or the *People*. Almighty God never can be supposed to give a *Commission* to any *Governours*, to enact any thing against the *Universal Interest* of the Society committed to their care; because this would be to authorize them to transgress their own Duty, and contradict his own will. And it is absurd to suppose that the *People* can give to their *Governours* any *Power*, to enact any thing for the hindrance of their own *Preservation*, and the overthrow of their own *Happiness*: Because this is to suppose their consent to their own Ruine. And whence then can arise the Obligation upon them to be bound up to such a *Law*? Besides, the *Laws* of this particular *Nation* are, with respect to the great and universal Law of Nature and Reason, just as the *By-Laws* of particular *Corporations* are, with respect to the *Law* of this *Land*. And as these are never valid when they contradict the universal *Law* of the *Nation*; so the *Laws* of the *Nation* cannot be valid, when they contradict the Universal *Law* of Reason, which is the *Law* of the whole World. Upon which account no *Law* can be supposed of any *Force*, which would oblige whole Nations to acquiesce in the misery, and ruine of themselves, and their Posterity after them. But,

4. It is the Opinion of many who are more versed in our *Law* than I can pretend to be, that there are many things in it in favour of what I have advanced. I am told that in it the King is declared to be the *Minister of God*, only as he performs the positive Will of God, by doing all manner of Good Services to his People; and that when He attempts their Ruine, and declines to Injustice and Oppression, He becomes the *Minister of the Devil*. So that I find I have the old *Law* on my side, in what I perceive hath given as much offense as any part of the foregoing *Sermon*: For this doth as expressly take from *Princes* all *Divine Authority*, in all Instances of *Injustice*, and *Oppression*, as any thing I have said can do. I am told likewise that our *Legislators* have publickly appealed to the *original Contract* between *King*, and *People*, and from the violation of that *Contract* on the part of a late *King* have argued for the transferring the Allegiance of the Nation to other Persons. And whereas there was a *Clause* in an *Act of Parliament*, which had been interpreted by some to take away from the Nation, in all possible Cases, all Liberty of *Resistance*, and *Self-Defense*, they have repealed the said *Clause*; and by this means given a Publick *Intimation* of their Sense in this matter. Nay, it is manifest that in all their late Proceedings with respect to the *Succession* to our *Crown*, they have followed this Maxim, that *the Publick Security is the Supreme Law*. This is all I contend for: And since our *Legislators* themselves have thought fit to act upon this Principle, and judge this sufficient to justify them in those extraordinary Methods they have taken to settle the Happiness of these Nations; I need not be ashamed of the same Principle. Our *Laws* themselves are founded upon it: and therefore, it must be supposed before all *Laws*, and Superior to them. And accordingly

ingly we find that many of those who are perfectly skilled in the Knowledge of our *Law*, have upon all Occasions espoused this *Principle*; nay, and that many of them bore an active part in the first motions of the *Late Revolution*: From whence one cannot but conclude, either that they knew nothing, in our *Law* against it; or that they thought nothing in the *Law* of a particular *Nation*, ought to take place against a Superior and Universal *Law*. And I need not desire to understand, or regard the *Law* more than many of those who approved of, and joyned in, that glorious undertaking.

Obj. 16. It is objected by some, that *the Ruine of our Constitution, in the late times; the Civil War and the Murther of King Charles the First, where owing to the Principles taught in the foregoing Sermon*. In answer to this, I desire it may be considered.

1. That it is the most unaccountable thing possible, to lay this imputation upon the *Principles* I have espoused: It being impossible that any thing should be more exactly calculated for the preservation of our *Constitution*, than the *Doctrine* I have taught. It tends in its Nature to save it from Ruine, whenever, and by whatsoever Hand, its Ruine be attempted; and it hath actually contributed to the Defense and Security of it. Whereas the *Doctrine* contrary to it, leaves it entirely at the Mercy of those in Power to destroy it without Opposition; and hath actually encouraged them to attempt it. I might appeal to the most ordinary Capacities to judge which of the two, tends most naturally to the preservation of an House; to teach that it is lawful to hinder any Person by all necessary

necessary Methods, from setting it on Fire; or to teach that it is the Duty of all to sit still, and patiently see it burnt to the ground.

2: As for the *Civil War* against King *Charles* the First, nothing can be a greater Scandal upon the Memory of that *King*, than to suppose that the *Doctrine* delivered in the foregoing *Sermon* can justify, or excuse his Enemies. For I am sure *that* neither teacheth, nor allows of, Opposition to any *Princes*, but such as act against the *End* of their *Institution*, and attempt the Ruine and Misery of the *People* committed to their Charge. So that to say, or insinuate, that this justifieth *His* Enemies, is to say, and insinuate, that *He* was a *Tyrant*, and an *Oppressor*; that *He* attempted the ruine of his *Subjects*, and that the *Resistance* made to *Him* was necessary for the *Publick Good*, and the preservation of this Nation. It is the artifice of some Men frequently to make use of his Memory, to cast reflections upon their Neighbours, and to make their Brethren odious. But let it be judged who are the greatest *Friends* to his *Name*; they who fix such imputations as these upon *Him*, or they who have never given themselves the liberty of making such unhand-some, and indecent Suppositions. For it must come to this at last: Either that *Prince* stands in need of the *Doctrine* of *Absolute Non-Resistance* to defend *Him*; or *He* doth not. If he do; then must these evil things be supposed true concerning *Him*, and *He* himself must in all History suffer under the worst of *Characters*. If he do not; then is it false that my *Doctrine* condemns *Him*, or justifieth his *Adversaries*; and evidently true that, upon this Supposition, it makes them utterly inexcusable. Much less can it be supposed to justify his *Murder*, unless those who pretend so great a Veneration for *Him*, will be so unworthy as to insinuate that *He* was a Person not fit to live;

live; or that his Life was absolutely inconsistent with the *Publick Security*. Such thoughts, for my own part, I never yet admitted: and I cannot but think that some Persons might consult the Honour of that *Prince* better, than by laying such Imputations upon their *Brethren* as cannot be true without supposing *Him* one of the worst of Princes. And let *them* see how they can answer for *this*, the very shadow of which they pretend not to be able to bear in *others*. Whatever degree of Opposition against Him was necessary for the *Publick Good*, I think, ought to be defended: and in this I have the concurrence of a *Noble Historian*, and a great Friend to the *Royal Cause*. Whatever was not necessary; or was inconsistent with the *Publick Good*, my *Doctrine* condemns as much as any *Doctrine* can possibly do. In one word, all that I have taught is founded upon the *Publick Good*: and therefore if any Persons have a mind to defend all the Transactions of his *Enemies*, they must find out other Principles than mine to do it; or else they must prove that it was necessary for the *Publick Security* to Murther him; that it was necessary for the Happiness of the Nation to destroy the excellent Constitution of our *Government*; to be averse to those Accommodations which might happily have prevented many following Evils; to act without Authority from *God*, or *Man*; and to bring the Nation under a more *Arbitrary Power* than it had before felt. These things, I am persuaded, can never be proved to have been consistent with the *Publick Good* of these Nations: And therefore, I may justly say, are not only not justified, but absolutely condemned, by my *Principles*. It is apparent that there was a conjunction of other malignant *Principles* to bring about these Evils; that some were moved by personal hatred, and revenge; some by a fondness conceived for a *Republick*; some by Ambition, and a desire of Self-advancement; many by

Enthusiastical Notions in Religion, and a mortal hatred to the *Established Form of Church-Government*, and *Divine Worship*; and many wrought upon by various unknown Causes, to carry matters to such extremity against the *King*. But,

3. Supposing that any of his most violent Enemies acted upon those *Principles* only which I have espoused; the blame cannot justly be laid upon the *Principles* themselves, but upon the Men who were so weak, or so passionate, as to imagine that these *Principles* would justify all their unreasonable Proceedings. Nor can any *Doctrine* be justly esteemed false, because some Men have mistaken, or misapplied it; as I have sufficiently shewn already. This is just such an Argument as some Writers of the *Church of Rome* make use of against our *Reformation*. See, say they, what Confusion and Schisms have been caused by your *Principles*: See how your allowance of Separation on any account is laid hold on to justify all possible *Separations*, and endless Disorders in the *Church*. We answer, that it is indeed unhappy that any should be so weak as to misapply the *Doctrine* we teach to particular Cases. They must answer for themselves: but our *Doctrine* is true notwithstanding their mistakes. And the same answer will serve in the *Case* now before us.

4. As there were, I doubt not, many Persons of the same *Principles* I have maintained, who espoused the *King's Cause* against the violences of his *Enemies*, and many more who at that time abhorred his *Murder*; so there were many whose respect for his Memory, and love to his Cause could never be suspected, who joyned in the first Motions of that Opposition, which was long after this made to King *James the Second*. From whence it appears that Persons might espouse these *Principles* without being Enemies to King *Charles the First*, and think it necessary and lawful, to defend
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the *Publick* against the *Son*, without vindicating, or justifying the *Proceedings* against the *Father*. And I need not desire to be thought to have a greater Veneration for King *Charles* the First, than any of those who maintained his Cause against his Enemies; or than many of those who approved, and promoted the late *Revolution*.

Having thus gone over several *Objections* against the *Doctrine* I have delivered, taken chiefly from the *Reason* of the thing, or the *Experience* of Mankind; and having given as fair, and impartial a *Reply* to them as I could; I come now to consider some other *Objections* taken from *Reveled Religion*; from the Principles and Behaviour of the *Primitive Christians*; from the *Doctrine* of the *Church of England*; and the like.

Obj. 17. *There are many passages in the Old and New Testament, in which such things are said of Kings, and Princes; and such an account given of the Duty of Subjects, that no room is left for their opposing, or resisting their Governours, in any Case whatsoever.*

It would be too tedious, and very unnecessary even to mention every particular *Text*, that hath been produced by some or other of the *Writers* in this Cause. Some have so fruitful an Invention, that they can find absolute and uncontrolable *Government* in every *Vers*e of the *Bible*, in which they can discover the footsteps of the word *Rule*, or *Obey*; and by the help of the *Apocryphal Books* taken in to supply the *Defect* of the *Canonical Scriptures*, can compose *Schemes of Government* (after the manner of *Romances*) unthought of and unknown to former Ages. And after they have amused themselves with the contemplation of them, till themselves believe

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them true, they seem to take it amiss of the World, that they are not universally regarded and embraced. But I must beg leave to pass over all which seems so entirely founded upon *Fancy* and *Imagination*, and to proceed to what is more generally, and more frequently urged against the *Doctrine* I have taught.

1. The *Texts* alleged from the *Old Testament* are such as forbid Men to *Curse the King*, even in their *thoughts*: such as in general command us to *Honour the King*, and to keep his *Commandments*; such as declare that against the King there is no rising up; that none may say unto Him, what dost thou? that God giveth the Kingdoms of the Earth to whom He pleaseth; that by him Kings Reign; and the like.

As to the *First* sort of these *Texts*, let it be considered that the same *Scriptures* forbid us to *Curse*, or speak evil of our Neighbours, and Equals, as positively, and in as unlimited expressions; and yet it hath been found necessary to add limitations to such Rules. Nor did any one ever infer from thence that we ought not to think those Men Sinners who are notoriously, and apparently so; and much less that all their Wickednesses must be permitted to go unresisted, and uncontroled. In this Cause frequent appeals are made to the *Primitive Christians*: but it is manifest that they did not understand any such Prohibitions after such a manner, as that they might not lawfully think and speak very bad things of *Princes* who deserved it, whom they scrupled not to lash with an inimitable Severity. Let their example be of as much force in one Case, as it is pretended to be in another: And let such expressions with relation to *Princes* be no more interpreted without restrictions, and limitations, than the like expressions with relation to private Persons are allowed to be. We are forbid to *Curse the King*, and the like: but this doth not forbid us to maintain our own *Rights*; nor can *Solomon* be supposed

posed in these or the like Words; to put the *Case* of an *Unjust, Oppressing Tyrant*, or to lay an obligation upon Men to think well of such, which is impossible.

The same may be said of those *Texts* in which it is declared that *against a King there is no rising up*; that none may say unto Him, *what dost thou?* which are sufficiently explained, and their full intent answered (for any thing that can be made appear to the contrary;) by applying them to such *Kings* as he then must be supposed to have in his thoughts; such as act the part of *Kings*, and are the *Ministers of Publick Justice, and Peace* to a Nation. Or rather they are only declarations that *Kings* are possessed of so much Power, that it is a very foolish thing for private Persons to provoke them, or contend with them. And this indeed seems the true interpretation: For in the former of these passages a *King* is numbered amongst other Creatures, named merely for the sake of their strength, or other bodily perfections. And in the *latter*, there is nothing expressly spoken of, but that Power they have for the most part to revenge the affronts of private Persons. But whatever was intended in this passage, there can be no such thing inferred from it, as that no Person may ever reprove, or check, or advise a *Prince*. For there are Men, and were in *Solomon's* days likewise, whose Duty it was on many occasions to say to the Highest as well as the lowest of Men, *what dost thou?* And yet this is as truly against the *Letter* of such *Texts*, as any opposition can be. If therefore this may be allowed; it is evident that this *Text* ought not to be interpreted according to the strictness of the Words used, and so can signifie little to the present purpose.

Those *Texts* which in general expressions command us to *Honour the King*, and *keep his Commandment*, and the like, necessarily require a limitation. At least, it can be no more shewn from these expressions, that no *Cases*

are to be excepted in the interpreting these *Texts*, than it can be from the like general expressions used in other places; that other *Texts* can admit of no restrictions, which yet are allowed on all Hands to require a limited interpretation. Besides, if the *Letter* of these *Texts* be strictly to be followed, and no Case allowed in which we may plead an exemption from these Rules; they will as necessarily infer *Active Obedience* to be due to the *Prince* in all possible Cases, as *Passive Obedience*. But if it be replied that there are other Rules which forbid *Active Obedience* in some Cases, and therefore it is necessary to except these Cases; the conclusion I draw from hence is this, that the Expressions used in these *Texts* do not necessarily exclude all limitations; and therefore it cannot be proved from these *Texts* taken by themselves, that *Passive Obedience* is here required in all possible Cases, any more than it can be proved that *Active Obedience* is so; and that concerning the one as well as the other, a judgment must be formed from Considerations distinct from the manner of Expression used in such *Texts*. They are parallel to those *Texts* concerning *Duty to Parents*, which do not imply the necessity either of *Active*, or *Passive Obedience* to them, in all possible Cases.

Lastly, As to those *Texts* which declare that *God giveth Kingdoms to whom He pleaseth*; and that by *Him Kings reign*, and the like; the design of them is no more than to assert *God's Providence* over this Earth; that nothing could come to pass in it, unless he saw fit either to order, or to permit it to come to pass. It will not so much as follow from hence, that he is the *Friend*, or *Patron*, of all who are possessed of *Thrones* and *Dominion* here below. This Supposition would indeed make Him, in a bad sense, the Patron of *Usurpation*, and a great deal of *Wickedness*. And as for *Non-Resistance* to be built upon these Expressions: it can no more follow from

from them that a *Prince* who invades the *Rights* of his own *Subjects* may not be resisted, than it will that a *Foreign Invader* may not be opposed, and resisted. Nay, it may as well be argued that it is unlawful to resist the attempts of any violent Robbers, or Murderers, because it is said in Scripture of all Men, that *God lifteth up one, and pulleth down another*, and that in Him they, as well as others, *Live, Move, and have their Being*. With the same degree of clearness some argue that because *God* is said to be the *only Ruler of Princes*, therefore, it is unlawful for any *People* to defend their *Rights*, and *Liberties*, given them by the same *God* who gave them their *Crowns*, against their Invasions. He is said in Scripture to *Rule* over all, and He alone, because he only of all Beings, can do whatsoever He pleaseth in Heaven, and in *Earth*: But it doth not follow from hence that the Affairs of this World, and of *Humane Society*, must be left entirely to his invisible *Providence*, without the Interposition of *Humane Wisdom*, and *Power*. So likewise he is the *only Ruler of Princes*, as indeed he is of all other Men, because he only can govern and influence their Hearts, and order the Scene of *Second Causes* so as that they shall work his Pleasure: But it cannot follow from hence, that their *Subjects* are entirely at their Mercy, or that they may not lawfully defend their Happiness against such Invasions of it, as *God* never directed them to, but indeed abhors. It may as well be said, that a *King* is the *only Ruler* of his *Subjects*, and therefore it is unlawful for them to resist one another in their sudden, and violent *Attques* upon one anothers *Lives*, and *Fortunes*.

2. The principal *Passages* cited out of the *New Testament* are, that in which our Lord commands the giving to *Cesar* the things that are *Cesar's*; that in which He forbids his Disciples to use any violence against the unjust proceedings of those in Power against Him; that

in which He acknowledges the Power of *Pilate* to be from above; those in which we are commanded to Honour the King, and the like, in general Expressions; to pray for *Kings* and all in *Authority*; and particularly *Rom.* 13. 1, 2, &c. and *1 Pet.* 2. 13, 14. together with what is said by *St. Peter* in the same place concerning *Servants*.

In the *First* of these, our Lord doth indeed command us to give unto Kings what is their due: And to this all the World will agree. But it is manifest that it was not his design to tell his Adversaries (whose ensnaring question was the occasion of this Precept,) what his Opinion was concerning the *Rights* of the *Emperour*, but only to evade the danger of such an answer as they hoped to have extorted from Him. So that, notwithstanding any thing in this Precept, we are left to judge what are the things which are *Cesar's*. But granting the utmost that this passage can pretend to, it will only follow from hence, that it was our Lord's Will that *Tribute* should be paid to *Cesar*: And I know not any whose Opinion this contradicts, unless it be those who plead against the lawfulness of Submission to any *Governours*, who come not to their *Governments* in the ordinary, and legal Methods.

Our Lord's forbidding his *Disciples* to resist those who came unjustly to apprehend, and Murther Him, doth not necessarily infer any thing, but that his design in coming into the World, being to lay down his Life voluntarily for the good of Mankind, and the proper time of doing it being now come, their Resistance and Opposition was not at all proper, and convenient. He doth not tell his *Disciples* that they who were now come out against Him, acted by Commission and Authority from God: He doth not so much as tell them that it was unlawful for them to resist such Violences. He only tells them that if he should make what resistance

stance He could, and call in all the Powers he had at his Command, the *Scriptures*, about his *Suffering*, could not be fulfilled. He founds not his Non-Resistance upon the unlawfulness of the contrary, but upon the Nature of his Design, and his own Resolution to fulfil the Prophecies concerning himself by a Passive Obedience. And it being his resolution not to call in the assistance which He could command, He might well require his Disciples to cease their fruitless endeavours; and put them in mind that by their resistance in this Cause, they would only endanger their own Lives, but not secure his, which He was now determined voluntarily to give up: Though he seems before to have encouraged their Zeal for his *Defense*, in order to try how far it would carry them; and to have permitted them to take with them Arms of *Resistance*, which he would not have done, had it been absolutely unlawful, in the nature of the thing, to have used them. But allowing the most that can be inferred from this passage; it will only follow from hence, that our Lord thought fit to submit in his own private Case, to *Injustice* and *Oppression*. This I never yet argued against. But I think it hard to infer from hence, that it was his Will that whole Nations should submit themselves, and their Posterity, to be ruined at the will of cruel, and unjust Governours; and impossible to draw such a Conclusion from this passage. And yet if this do not follow from it, it is of no importance to the Point now before us.

Our Blessed Lord's Declaration that *Pilate* could have had no Power against Him, unless it had been given Him from above, is, I think, as foreign to this purpose as any thing that can well be imagined. *Pilate* thought fit to put our Lord in mind that it was in his Power to *Condemn*, or *Release* Him; and therefore that it was not his Interest to displease Him by his Silence. And our Lord's answer is manifestly no more than this, that
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He could not have had it in his Power to do any thing against Him, unless God had seen fit to permit it so to be, for Wise and Excellent Considerations. Whatsoever Power comes to Men by the Providence of God, is given to them from above. The Power *Pilate* was possessed of, came to him by the Providence of God. Almighty God could have hindred him from exercising this Power against *Jesus Christ*, had he not seen fit to permit his unjust Suffering, for great and good Ends. This is the whole of what can be contained in this answer of our Lord to *Pilate*. But to infer from hence, that all who are by God's Providence possessed of Power, have likewise God's Authority for all they do; or to imagine that our Lord here teacheth that there was any thing in *Pilate's* Commission as a Governour, to justify him in his unjust Proceedings, is to make God, in a very bad Sense, the Patron of Wickedness, and to suppose our Blessed Lord to have represented his Father, as authorizing what He himself in the same passage plainly intimates to be a Sin in the Governour.

To those Texts which require Honour and Submission, in general Expressions, the same answer will be sufficient which I have just now made with respect to the like Texts quoted out of the Old Testament: To which, therefore, I refer the Reader.

Of that celebrated Passage, *Rom. 13. 1, 2, &c.* I have, I hope, given a full, and satisfactory account in the foregoing Chapter: And have nothing farther to add.

There remains only what St. *Peter* hath delivered, *1 Peter. 2. 13, 14, &c.* to which some add, likewise, what He hath in the same Chapter said concerning Servants, and Masters. In the 13, 14, 15, 16. Verses of that Chapter, He first commands Submission to Humane Authority in general Terms, without defining the Measures of it in the least: And it is manifest that absolute Submission

Submission cannot be inferred from such general Expressions, because they were designed to recommend *Active* as much as *Passive* Obedience, and very probably the former more than the latter. And all allow that some *Cases* must necessarily be excepted, in which an *Active Submission* is not only not due, but not lawful. Let the same Reason, therefore, hold for the exception of some *Cases* in which a *Passive Submission* may not be due, notwithstanding they be not expressly mentioned in the *Text*. In the next place He presseth *Submission* to *Governours* sent by the *King*, as his *Vice-Roys*, into particular Countries: But such a *Submission* only as can be interred to be due from the excellent usefulness of their Office; a Submission to them as to persons sent for the punishment of evil Doers, and for the praise of them that do well. And here I must observe, as I have before concerning St. Paul's Doctrine, 1 Rom. 13. 1. that no *Submission* being here pressed but what is due to those who execute so good an Office, and are so useful to *Humane Society*, it cannot be inferred from this passage, that *Submission* is due to those *Governours* who act a contrary part; and are, in St. Paul's Phrase, a *Terrour to good Works*, and not to the evil. St. Peter goes on to press this *Submission* from the Will of God, that by such a Behaviour with respect to so useful an Institution as *Humane Government*, they should put a stop to a scandal raised upon *Christians*, as if they pretended an exemption from such an Obedience, and were Enemies to so useful an Office as that of Magistrates: putting them in mind, last of all, that there was no such *Exemption*, or *Liberty* as this purchased for them by *Christ*; (whatever some amongst them might pretend,) and that they ought not to make use of any such pretense, as their *Christian Liberty* to disengage themselves from any thing that is pleasing to God, or useful to Mankind. The Reason of these Injunctions was,

was plainly an Opinion, (introduced probably by the *Judaizing Christians*, or taken up in imitation of one amongst the *Jews*,) that the *Christian Liberty* talked of by *Christ* and his *Apostles* excused them from all obedience to *Humane Authority*. *St. Peter* argues the *Christians* into *Submission* from the usefulness of *Magistrates* to *Humane Society*. And let any one judge from hence whether any such Obedience can be inferred from hence, as some would plead to be due to *Magistrates*, even when they are become the greatest *Curses*, and *Plagues* to Mankind; or whether it was not fully sufficient, in order to check the growth of the foremention'd Opinion, to remove the scandal founded upon it, to press only *Submission* to such *Governours* as answer, in some tolerable Measure, the good *End* of their Institution.

I cannot but think it very unreasonable that some *Writers* in this *Cause*, should not be content with the plain Declarations of the *Scriptures* concerning *Governours*, and *Subjects*; but should allege also what is said by *St. Peter* with relation to *Masters*, and *Servants*, and pretend to draw an Argument from thence for absolute *Passive Obedience* in *Subjects*. *St. Peter* advises *Slaves*, who were in a state of perfect Captivity; had forfeited their Lives, and were bought with a price into the Arbitrary Power of their *Masters*, to bear with the evil Treatment their *Masters* might sometimes wrongfully bestow upon them; putting them in mind that the great glory of *Patience* is to bear Injuries, and unjust usage, without Reviling, or revenge: And from hence some argue for absolute *Submission* in *Subjects*. Whereas *Subjects*, generally speaking, are not in a state of Captivity; never forfeited their Lives and Fortunes to their Prince; nor ever were bought with a Price into their Arbitrary Power: and therefore it is absurd to suppose that He would lay down the same

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Precepts for both: But there are many other observations to be made upon this. We see here that how invidious, and indecent soever it was, *St. Peter* is not content to preach Submission to these *Slaves* in general terms, or to speak only of Good *Masters*, as he doth only of Good *Governours*; but to put the *Case* of ill-natured, and hard, and unreasonable *Masters*, in order to teach them *Submission* even to such *Masters*; from whence one would be apt to argue, that if He had intended the same in the *Case* of *Tyrannical Princes*, He would as plainly have said so, as He doth in the *Case* of *Masters*. And his silence in that *Case* is so much the stronger Argument, because immediately in the following Verses, He expressly mentions hard and ill-natured *Masters*, when He comes to treat of the Duty of *Slaves*. But I should, notwithstanding this, admit this *Objection*, were the *Cases* parallel, or the Words, and Argument made use of by *St. Peter* to *Slaves* conclusive in the application of them to Subjects. The Words He useth do not so much as infer that even these *Slaves* were obliged in *Conscience* to bear all Instances of Cruelty, or Injustice from their *Masters*, but only to be *Subject* to their *Masters*, even though they were *Froward*, and unreasonable: from which it would be hard to prove the necessity of Submission in every possible *Case*. Much less will they prove Submission due from a whole Nation of *Subjects*, who are not *Slaves*, in all possible *Cases*. Nay, I remember, *Bishop Taylor*, after all the mighty stress He layeth upon this passage, doth allow a *Case* in which *Slaves* might resist their *Lords*: much more may it be allowed in the *Case* of *Subjects*. What is here said concerning *Slaves*, cannot be proved to hold good with respect even to *Hired Servants*, whom the *Christian Religion* doth not surely hinder from insisting upon the terms of their *Contracts*, or obliged to bear Misery, when they can honourably avoid

avoid it: much less, with respect to whole Nations of Subjects, who, I think, are something above the degree of *Hired Servants*. What is here said to *Slaves*, cannot so much as oblige any particular private *Subject* to the same Submission to Injustice that is required of *Slaves*; but such an Obligation must be drawn from other considerations: much less can it oblige whole Nations, who are not *Slaves*. It is indeed praise-worthy in a private Person to suffer patiently, and contentedly, but this is never required in the *Christian Religion*, but when such suffering cannot possibly, or honourably, be avoided. And this was the *Case* of the *Slaves* to whom *St. Peter* wrote. Their *Case* was a *Private Case*, and touched only themselves: and they could not perhaps at all, or at least, not honourably, avoid the ill usage of their *Masters*. Whereas the *Case* of a *Nation* is not a *Private Case*: and Submission in *National Tyranny* and *Oppressions* destroys Multitudes of Families, and involves future Generations in *Misery*. If therefore, there can be found an honourable and lawful way of avoiding such *Calamities*, there is not the least Obligation upon *Christians* from their *Religion*, or from the Example of their *Master*, to be oppressed by them. And whether there be or not, is not Determined in this *Passage* of *St. Peter*, nor can it be judged of from the *Case* of *Slaves*, and *Captives*. The only *Debate* here that can concern a *Christian*, upon *St. Peter's* reasoning, will be this, whether of the two is more Glorious, and Praise-worthy; to labour and suffer in maintaining the *Cause* of a *Nation's Rights*, and *Liberties*, or in such a *Submission* as betrays them for ever into the Hands of *Violence*, and *Ambition*.

I must not omit here those *Passages* in which *Christians* are commanded to pray for *Kings*, and all that are in *Authority*: from whence some have inferred that *Resistance* to them in all *Cases* must be a Sin, as it is inconsistent

sistent with such Prayers. But the Inference is without all Foundation. We are required in *unlimited Expressions*, to *pray for our Enemies*: but this doth not imply that We are to pray in an unlimited manner for them; any more than our obligation to *return them Blessing for Cursing*, implies in it a necessity of praying for their worldly Prosperity to our own Destruction. We are required, in general Terms, to *pray for all Men*: but we are left to *Common Sense* to inform us that *Charity* begins at Home, and that we are not oblig'd to pray for their *Success*, or *Life*, if it be inconsistent with our own; or to prefer the Temporal good of any Person, before the Happiness of *others* in whom we are more nearly concerned. So *Subjects* are certainly oblig'd to pray for their *Governours*; but in subordination to the *Publick Good*; nay, merely in order to it: not after such a manner as to prefer their single Prosperity before that of the *Whole Body*, and their Posterity after them; or to wish it at the expense of the *Life*, and Happiness of the *Common-Wealth*. And that in such *Passages* of *Scripture* as I am now considering, nothing farther can be intended than the praying for the *Success*, and *Prosperity* of *Governours*, in the due execution of their great Office, and in all their lawful, and honourable Undertakings, is manifest from hence, that it is a great Sin, and Mockery upon *Almighty God* to pray for their *Prosperity*, and *Success* in any other Sense. And this is perfectly consistent with the allowance, and practice of *Resistance* in some Cases.

As for *Examples* recorded either in the *Old*, or *New Testament*; I know not any that are urged, which can possibly be supposed to prove that a People universally Oppressed, and devoted to ruine by their *Governours*, may not lawfully oppose and resist them. I dare say, the *Adversaries* of this *Doctrine* would not willingly be concluded by the Example of the *Jews* in this Case, whose

whose Principles, and Practices, were generally Seditious, and turbulent to a great degree. And, therefore, they have little Reason to expect that others should be much moved, could they produce any single Instance in which that *Nation* shewed their regard to *Passive Obedience*. The *Example* of *David*, so celebrated in this *Cause*, ought indeed to have great weight, if his Conduct towards *Saul* be supposed to be justified by God himself. But I must observe that it manifestly pleads in favour of *Self-Defense*. *Saul* was his *Prince*: and *He* *Saul's Subject*. Had it been otherwise; or had He had any Authority from *God* to have seized the *Crown* during *Saul's* Life, He was oblig'd in Conscience to have done it. *Saul* unjustly sought after his particular Life; which was an injury of a private Nature. His Behaviour in these circumstances shews, that He was resolved to defend himself, as far as possibly He could. He abhorred, indeed, the thought of killing *Saul*, when he had it in his Power. Nor was it, in the least, necessary for his own Preservation; and therefore it would have been the highest Crime in *Him* to have killed a Man, whom He knew, *God* had appointed to Reign. There are some even of the *Patrons* of *Absolute Passive Obedience*, who think his Conduct unjustifiable: but surely, whatever may be inferred from it, it cannot follow from *David's* Behaviour under a private Injury, that a whole Nation, or the greater part of it, ought in conscience to suffer all their temporal Happiness to be ruined at the Will of their *Prince*. And as for any *Resistance* but what is necessary on account of the *Publick*, I am not at all concerned in it. If from the *Old Testament* we go to the *New*; we find nothing to be urged from thence, but the *Example* of our *Lord* voluntarily giving up his *Life*, which was the design he came into the World upon; and suffering Injuries patiently; and of his *Apostles* enduring contentedly

tedly those Persecutions for the sake of *Christ*, which they could not avoid; intermeddling as little as possible in the *Civil Affairs of Nations*, of which they were so small and inconsiderable a part; but yet strenuously asserting the *Rights and Privileges of Subjects* when they were violated. And in all this it will be hard to find any thing against the *Doctrine* I have taught.

Obj. 18. *The Judgment and Practice of the Primitive Christians are against the Doctrine of the foregoing Sermon: And therefore it ought not to be taught or received amongst Christians.*

But this Argument is not at all conclusive; nor allowed to be so by the *Protestant Writers*, and greatest Advocates for the *Church of England*, in many other Cases. The universal Testimony of the *First Christians*, as to *Matter of Fact*, must indeed of necessity be received: but their Judgment in any difficult Point, or any part of their *Practice* depending upon their judgment, ought not to be any farther regarded, than as it is founded either on the *Reason* of the thing it self, or on the declarations of *Christ*, and his *Apostles*. Some may say perhaps that this is to take away all deference to those worthy Persons of the first Ages of *Christianity*, who must be supposed to know the mind of our *Lord*, and his *Apostles* better than *We* at this distance. But I am not the first who have said this: and if they can find out any middle way between *this*, and the making them *infallible*, I promise to embrace it. So that supposing the *Foundation* of this *Objection* could be maintain'd, yet it will be very difficult to shew the necessity of admitting the *Conclusion* built upon it. But that I may not be thought merely to evade the force of this *Objection*;

or to grant what might be a great prejudice in the minds of Men, against the truth of what I have taught, I have several material things to offer upon this Head. It would be extreme vanity in me to pretend to an exact *Knowledge* in the *History* and *Writings* of the *Primitive Church*. All that is needful, and all that I undertake to do at present, is to examine into the most material passages alleged by *Learned Men*, about the *Passive Obedience* of the *Primitive Christians*; that so we may judge whether their *Case* be parallel to the *Case* now before us, and whether their *Practice* and the *Principles* upon which it was founded, are sufficient to condemn that *Resistance*, in *Subjects*, which I have justified. For if their *Practice* be not truly parallel to that *Passive Obedience* against which I have argued; or if the *Principles* on which they themselves declare they built that *Practice* be not sufficient to prove the Expedience and Duty of such *Passive Obedience*, this *Objection* must necessarily lose all its Force, how often and how zealously soever it hath been urged.

Now the *Passages* produced in this Cause out of the *Primitive Writers* are of several sorts. 1. Some are such as only declare in general forms of Speech that *Subjection is due to those in Authority*, without any express limitation; and others add, in all *Cases* in which Men are not under higher Obligations to *Almighty God*. And I know not any one who is not as ready to say this as those *Writers* themselves were; nor how this contradicts any thing I have said. 2. Some are such as only declare Princes to be *Second to God, less than God only*; and the like; exempting them from the common Rank of Men, and acknowledging their great and signal Pre-eminence. All which I can heartily subscribe to. For certainly they may, on the account of the Power they enjoy, and the usefulness of their Office to Humane Society, be justly said to be next to *Almighty God* in the govern-

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government, and management of this World. But this can no more prove them to be, in all Cases, *irresistible* than it can prove it unlawful to resist any Person in his violent attempts upon the Lives, or Fortunes of others, to say, that He is *Second* to the *King*, and distinguish'd by his Post from the rest of the Nation. For as it will not follow from thence, that He is in such a sense accountable to none but the *King*, as that *others* may not defend themselves from his violent Invasions; so neither will it follow from *Princes* being *Second to God*, that they are therefore in such a Sense accountable to *God* only, as that it is not lawful for Nations to defend themselves against their violent Invasions, and unjust Oppressions. 3. Some *Passages* alleged are such as declare that *God gave the Empire to the Wicked Princes, as well as to the good*, and the like: the only true Sense of which must be, that *Kingdoms* are not disposed of without his Providence, and that none come to the possession of *Thrones*, unless he think fit to order or to permit it to be so. But it is a sad conclusion to infer from hence, that He bore an active part in the bringing all the *Roman Emperours* into the possession of their Power. And as wretched a conclusion, to infer from such Expressions, that it is his Will they should be irresistible in their whole exercise of this Power, let it be managed after a manner never so contrary to the *End* of their *Institution*. It may be said of the greatest *Usurpers* upon Earth, that God gave them the Power they are in possession of, because they could not have any at all, but by his permissive Providence. But who will allow it to follow from hence that therefore they are irresistible in all their management of this Power? Or that therefore they have *God's* Authority for all they do? The meanest of *Subjects* possesseth nothing but what *God gives Him*, but what comes to him by his *Providence*. The very Power of doing the greatest Injuries to his

Neighbours is of God the Maker and Governour of all things: but will it follow from hence that therefore this Power may not be resisted? The Empire, and Power, of Foreign Princes are of God, nay their very Invasions upon their neighbouring Nations, could not be without his Permission: but doth He therefore, require those neighbouring Nations passively to Submit, and to use no Arms of *Resistance*? 4. If there be any *Passages* in the *Fathers* which, in general Expressions, Cloath *Princes* with a *Divine Authority*, it cannot be supposed from hence that it was their design to signifie by such Expressions that *Princes* were accompanied, in every single instance of their *Government*, with a *Divine Authority*: not only because this would give to *Almighty God* an active part in their Wickedness; but because this would extend so far as to lay an Obligation upon themselves to pay an Active Obedience to all their Commands; which they often denied to be due to them, and frequently refused to pay. For, upon this supposition, to refuse to Obey them at any time, and in any Case, is to refuse to Obey the Authority of God; which is a very great Sin always, and in all Cases. And then, if the *Divine Authority* attributed to *Princes* do not necessarily infer an absolute *Active Obedience*, it will be found a very difficult task to shew how it can infer an absolute *Passive Obedience*. 5. There are other *Passages* alleged which only relate it as a matter of Fact, in order to obtain the favour of their *Princes*, that the *Christians* were never found to be in any *Plots*, or any *Seditions* raised against them: which is only a Proof, that in their circumstances they knew their Interest so well as not to concern themselves in the *State Parties* then in being, and not to render themselves odious, and suspected, to the *Emperours* then in Possession. But it is impossible to prove from hence, that it was their opinion that a *People* ought passively to submit themselves

to be ruined at the will of their *Prince*. 6. As for the *Christians* not so much as wishing in any circumstances for a *New Emperour*, it is so very hard to believe, that it may rather seem a strain of Oratory in *Tertullian*, (as many other passages in his *Apology* must necessarily be esteemed,) than a Sentence to be literally understood of the whole Body of *Christians*. For whatever He thought fit to say, in his luxuriant and figurative manner of Writing; if they were like other Men, they could not love *Pain* and *Torment*, so as not to desire an alteration in the Usage they met with. At least it was lawful for them to pray to God to put an end to their *Persecutions*, and to order Affairs so by his overruling *Providence*, that his *Church* might serve him in all Godly quietness. Tho' in Truth their Condition seems at that time to have been such, that it was of small importance to them what Persons were at the Head of Affairs; so equally were they hated by all, and so universally were they abused, and misrepresented to the great Men of this World. But when the Scene was so changed that they might hope for an Alteration for the better, We do not find that they were so very indifferent about their *Emperour*, or so contented with a bad one, as not to wish for a better in his Room. But supposing it literally true that the *Christians*, who were an abused, and oppressed Party of *Subjects*, did not pray, or even wish, for a Change of their *Emperours*, this will not so much as prove it to have been their Opinion, that the whole body of their *Subjects* ought in *Conscience* to have submitted themselves to be ruined at their Will and Pleasure. 7. Some other *Passages*, and those of a late Date, only declare that a *Christian Bishop* did not think *Arms of Resistance* so proper for his Character, as *Prayers*, and *Tears*: which might be said as well with respect to a *Foreign Enemy*, as to his own *Prince*. For St. *Ambrose*, in the famous place so often cited for the purpose of

Passive Obedience, saith in so many Words, *Bishops have no other defense*, confining what he saith to his own *Sacred Order*, and rather implying that others were not concluded by the same Rule than the contrary. Besides, this was no *Case of Universal Oppression*, and *Tyranny*, and therefore nothing can be inferred from such Passages against what I have taught. 8. The *Two principal Testimonies* concerning the *Practice*, and *Principles* of the *Primitive Christians*, and those on which the main stress is laid by the best *Writers* in favour of *Passive Obedience*, are the *Accounts* given by *Tertullian*, and *St. Cyprian*. What is said to be affirm'd by these two *Primitive Writers* amounts to this, that the *Christians* were barbarously used by the *Emperours*, or those who acted under them; that they were very numerous, and able to defend themselves against the Violent invasion of their *Rights*, and *Lives*; but, notwithstanding this, that they never resisted their *Superiors*, or by force guarded themselves against their unjust Persecutions. And from hence it is concluded, by some, that *Resistance to Princes* is, in all Cases, unlawful. But I have a few *Observations* to offer which may, I hope, help us to form a right Judgment in this matter.

1. *Tertullian*, in the very same places, in which He gives this account of the *Behaviour* of the *Christians* of his time under Persecution, gives likewise such an account of their Behaviour, in many other respects, as is allowed by the *Patrons of Passive Obedience* to be such as other *Christians* are not oblig'd to imitate, and in some Cases such as cannot well be justify'd. That they ran unnecessarily to *Torments*, and desired rather to be condemned than absolved: and several other things, in which they were under no Obligation to act as they did, and in which we are under no Obligation to follow their steps. If, therefore, their *Universal Example*, be of so little force in

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one *Case*, it cannot, if we consider it by it self, be justly accounted of greater force in any other. And it may justly be expected that they who argue so strongly from their *Example*, according to the account given of it by *Tertullian*, should imitate it in all other Instances recorded in the same places by the same *Writer*, or, at least, argue for the necessity of doing so. But whilst they acknowledge no such necessity in many other *Cases*, we cannot think their bare *Example* to be, in this *Case* only, of great importance.

2. Neither *Tertullian*, nor *St. Cyprian* say any thing from which it can be certainly concluded, that the number of *Christians* was great enough to be a Match for the regulated Forces of their Emperors, and the rest of their Fellow-Subjects. *Tertullian*, in his *Apology*, writes more like a *Poet* than an *Historian* upon this Head, and saith the utmost that could be said in very high Strains of *Rhetorick*, not to be literally interpreted, without making Him to appear a *Writer* of no very good Character. And in another place the utmost that He can permit himself to say of *Christians* is, that they were *pars pene major Civitatis cujusque*, almost the greatest part of every City, which they might be without being near the half of the whole Body of the People. All that can be gathered from what *St. Cyprian* saith is that, in those parts He speaks of, He thought the *Christians* were numerous enough to rescue one another out of the Hands of their *Persecutors*, and to revenge themselves upon them. But it doth not appear plainly from their Words, that either of them thought them numerous enough to maintain a defensive War against all who were likely to be their Adversaries, should they attempt any such *Defense* of themselves. That the *Christians* were numerous I do not doubt: but that they were so numerous; so easie to be gathered together; and so well exercised in Arms, as that they might probably

have been a Match for their *Emperours* Armies, and their Fellow Subjects, is not at all evident from these two Authors. They were rather too much dispersed abroad into all parts, to be easily united in one common design of Self-Defense; and too little skilled, or exercised in Arms, to be capable of executing it effectually. Nay, It may be an hard task to make it evident that they were *Superior* in *Number*, and *Strength* to the rest of the World about them, even after they came by the *Providence* of *God*, to be govern'd by *Emperours* of their own Religion; which was many Years after these *Testimonies*. The same things might be said of the numbers of *French Protestants*; and yet considering all things it doth not appear that they could pretend to be an equal Match for their *King*, and all his Armies, and Adherents.

3. But the chief thing is yet behind, and that is to enquire into the *Reasons* on which this Behaviour of the *Christians* was founded. For *Tertullian*, and *St. Cyprian* not only declare what their *Practice* was, but do, in their Names, declare what the *Principles* were which this *Practice* was built upon. And if these appear not sufficient to support such a *Passive Obedience* as I have condemned; neither *these*, nor the *Practice* of the first *Christians* built upon them, can signifie any thing to the present Cause. Now we do not find that these *Writers* do, in any of the passages cited from them, ever so much as intimate that their *Persecutors* had the least degree of *Divine Authority* in their unjust Proceedings against them; or that they ever fixed their Obligation to that *Passive Obedience* which they exercised, upon the *Divine Right* of their *Emperours*. We do not find that they allege the celebrated Passage of *St. Paul Rom. 13. 1. &c.* to shew the Obligation they were under to *Non Resistance*: which I think ought to be taken notice of in a particular manner. We do not find that they once mention such a

Maxim.

Maxim as this, that *Subjects* may not lawfully prevent the Ruine of the *Publick*, by resisting their *Governours*, if it cannot be done by other Methods. Nothing of all this. But we find them speaking of the Injuries they suffer'd, as of Injuries of a private Nature; and of their *Adversaries* as of *Private Enemies*. St. Cyprian * declares that the Reason why they did not resist, and revenge themselves on their *Adversaries*, was because they were taught, that *Vengeance belongeth to the Lord*. And Tertullian * expressly declares that the *Non-Resistance*, and *Benevolence* the *Christians* shewed towards their *Emperors*, was the same which their Religion required them to shew towards all Men; and founds it not upon any thing in *Christianity* relating particularly to *Princes* and *Subjects*, but upon the general *Rules* of loving our *Enemies*, and patient bearing of *Injuries*; and upon the general *Prohibitions* of *Revenge*, and *Retaliation*: which He positively affirms to extend to all their *Neighbours*, and *Equals* as well as their *Emperours*, and *Governours*. What, therefore, can we infer from these two celebrated *Testimonies*? Something truly which one would hardly believe, and that is, that the *Christians* of those Days founded their *Non-Resistance* upon such *Principles*, and such *Interpretations* of some places of *Scripture*, as did in effect take away from themselves the Liberty of *Self-Defense* in all possible Cases. For from the foregoing account of their *Behaviour* and *Principles*, it will as well follow that *Resistance* to our *Neighbour*, in an attempt upon our *Lives* and *Fortunes*, is a damnable Sin, as that *Resistance* to *Magistrates*, in their attempts upon the *Publick Happiness*, is so. Let me, therefore, appeal to the modern Defenders of *Absolute Passive Obedience*, who build so much upon the Argument taken from the Practice of some of the earliest *Christians*. Will they allow the *Principles* they

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went upon to hold good? Will they say that the *Christian Religion* leaves Men open to the assaults of every violent Man without the Liberty of *Self-Defense*? This, I think, they universally deny. If, therefore, they will not allow the Truth of those *Principles* upon which the *Practice* of the *Primitive Christians* was founded, what signifieth it to urge their *Practice*, which was by their own Confession founded upon mistaken *Principles*? And if they take from them the *Principles* upon which they professed to *Act*, I desire to know how they can tell what their *Example* would have been, supposing them void of those *Notions*, by which they themselves declare they guided themselves. So that after all the noise some learned Men have made about the *Passive Obedience* of the *First Christians*, it is wonderfully surprizing to find of how small importance themselves must acknowledge it to be in the *Question* before us. For they deny the Truth of those *Principles* on which it was founded; they deny all obligation to imitate it in many *Cases* of *Private Injuries*; and therefore, we may justly expect they should much more acknowledge it to be an Argument of no force in *Cases* of *Publick*, and *Universal* Concern. What I would say is in short this, No *Example* declared to be founded upon any particular *Principles*, ought to be of any consideration in the Opinion of those, who acknowledge that those *Principles* are not sufficient to shew the necessity of the *Practice* founded upon them. And again, No *Example* ought to be of any force in one *Case*, which is not allowed to be so in others, to which the *Principles* on which it is built are confessed equally to extend. What I have said is, I hope, a sufficient reply to the Argument for *Passive Obedience*, taken from the Testimonies of *Tertullian*, and *St. Cyprian*. And if the force of these two Testimonies be broken by the Considerations I have alleged, I may I think affirm that there is nothing alleged from any other

ther of the *Antient Fathers* of much consideration in this Cause, even in the Opinion of the *Defenders* of it themselves.

4. It is very remarkable that *Origen*, (the same Person who challenged *Celsus*, that great Enemy to *Christians*, to name any *Sedition*, or *Tumult* in which the *Christians* were concern'd, and is by some alleged for this in Defense of *Passive-Obedience*; that *He*, I say,) should mention that celebrated *Passage* of *St. Paul*, *Rom. 13. 1.* upon which some have built so much, with such a remark as would incline one to think, that all the *Primitive Christians* did not see any such unlimited *Non-Resistance* in it as many have done since. The *Passage* I mean is towards the End of his *Eighth Book* against *Celsus*, where he takes occasion to cite this place of *St. Paul*, to shew the *Adversaries* of *Christianity* what *Notions Christians* had concerning *Princes*, and the *Subjection* due to them. But *He* immediately adds that there were many questions, and disquisitions about the meaning of this place of Scripture, arising from the consideration of the *Cruelty* and *Tyranny* of many *Princes*; and that upon that account *He* would not at present undertake to give an exact account of it. From whence I think it manifest, not only that many of the *First Christians* doubted whether the *Subjection* preached by *St. Paul* was due, in point of *Conscience*, to *Tyrants* and *Oppressors*; but also that *Origen* himself, when he wrote this, did not believe it to be so. For if *He* did, *He* had now the fairest occasion for declaring it: and *He* could not more effectually have defended the *Christians* from the *Objection* now before *Him*, than by saying so. And I think it is but a reasonable request, that this signal *Testimony*, about the Opinions of the *Primitive Christians* upon this Subject, may be regarded as well as others. It is very remarkable likewise, and ought not to be omitted, what is recorded of *St. Polycarp*, who was a *Disciple* of *St.*

John the Apostle, and a Martyr for the Truth of the Gospel, viz. that just before his Martyrdom, in his Discourse with the Proconsul, He took occasion to let him know what Obligations He thought Christians under with respect to Magistrates. Δεδιδάγμεθα ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἐξουσίαις ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τεταγμέναις τιμὴν, ὥτι τὸ προσήκον, τὴν μὴ βλαπτέσαν ἡμᾶς, ἀπονέμειν. *We are taught to give to Rulers, and the Powers ordained by God such Honour as doth not hurt our selves.* This is plainly said with reference to the same place of *St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans*; of which it is indeed too loose an Interpretation. But it manifestly shews that there were *Christians*, and *Martyrs* amongst the immediate Successors of the *Apostles*, who did not imagine that *St. Paul* had obliged them to Subjection in all possible Cases; and who interpreted his Rules about the Behaviour of *Subjects*, so as to leave them even greater *Liberty* than what is given them in the foregoing *Sermon*. Here are two express, and early *Testimonies*, making it highly probable that the *Christians* of the first Ages did not interpret the Precepts of *St. Paul* concerning Subjection to the *Higher Powers*, so as not to allow the lawfulness of *Resistance* in some Cases. And therefore I may reasonably desire some Persons to consider with what Justice it can be so often affirmed, and so vehemently urged, that I have interpreted *St. Paul* contrary to the universal Voice of the *Antient Church*; remembring withal, what I have already observ'd, that the *Primitive Writers*, who are chiefly cited for *Passive Obedience*, do not found that *Submission* they practis'd upon *St. Paul's Words*. I have here the positive *Testimonies* of some who mention this *Text* to bear me out; and the *Silence* of others, who had the fairest opportunity of appealing to it, had they suppos'd an absolute *Passive Obedience* enjoyned in it. And whether they have any thing of the like Nature, and of so early a Date, to allege to the contrary, I know not.

5. I have two Considerations more to urge upon this Head, before I leave it. 1. A particular Party of Men may be barbarously used in a Nation; and yet it may not be for the *Publick Good*, that they should defend themselves, by entering into an open *War* against their *Prince*; and especially when it is the Opinion of the whole Body, excepting themselves, that the *Publick Happiness* would rather be promoted by their utter Destruction, than by their *Preservation*. This was the *Case* of the *Primitive Christians*. They were a Party of Subjects barbarously used; and they had certainly a Right to better Treatment: but no one can shew that it had been for the Interest, and Good of the whole Body of *Subjects*, that they should have risen up in Arms, and, merely for their own particular *Self-Defense*, have put whole Nations into *Combustion*, and so have been the occasion of great, and universal Calamities. And therefore nothing can be concluded from their preferring the *Publick Happiness* before their own private *Defense*, against that *Resistance* which I have taught to be lawful, and glorious, *then* only when the *Publick Happiness* requires it. Their *Submission* was glorious, as it was built upon the *Publick Good*: but this doth not hinder, but that at another time their *Resistance* might be glorious also, when founded entirely upon the same *Publick Good*. 2. It was very much for the Honour, and *Propagation* of their *Holy Religion*, whilst they were but a Party of *Subjects*, not concerned in the management of *State-Affairs*, that they should engage the love of the *Princes* of this World, and attract the Hearts of all Men to their Profession, by their signal *Patience*, and *Submission* to the greatest Injuries, and Torments imaginable: but it must be extremely to the *Disgrace*, and hinderance of their *Religion*, if it obliged them, when they became the Majority, or the *whole* of a Nation, and many of them necessarily concerned

cerned in the management of the *Publick*, to submit themselves to be ruined, and made miserable, at the Will of their *Prince*. By the *former* they demonstrated to all the World the Power of their *Faith*, in *Cases* in which it was Honourable for them to suffer, and to prefer the *Publick Peace* before their own private *Interest*: but upon the *latter* Supposition, nothing could be concluded but that *Christianity* was an *Enemy* to the *Publick Good* of *Humane Society*; that it tended to conclude whole Nations under *Slavery*, and *Tyranny*; and that it obliged Men to give up the *Rights* of a whole *Society*, and the *Happiness* of the *Generations* to come. And something like this seems to have been the Foundation of the difference of the Behaviour of the *Primitive Christians*, when they were but a *Party*, from their Behaviour, when they had by their *Patience*, and *Submission*, gained so much ground as to become a *Majority*, and to be necessarily engaged in the management of *State-Affairs*. For after this we do not find that they thought themselves obliged by their *Religion*, to bear every thing with that *Quiet* and *Silent Submission* they had before practised. But it is time to proceed to the remaining *Objections*. It is sufficient to my purpose, if upon this Head I have shewn that nothing can be collected from the *Principles*, or *Practice* of the *Primitive Christians* against the lawfulness of *Resistance*, when the *Publick Safety* necessarily requires it.

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Obj. 19. *Christianity condemns all Perfidiousness, betraying of Trusts, Fraud, and the like. Now no Resistance can be practised by Subjects, without the guilt of such Vices: And therefore Christianity cannot allow of any Resistance.*

But it is a sufficient Reply to this, that the same Argument will prove that *Christianity* cannot allow of any *Resistance* to *Foreign Enemies*, or to the greatest *Ursurpers*. For if *Resistance* to *them* can be managed wholly without these Crimes; so may likewise *Resistance* to *Tyrants* at Home. If it cannot, and yet *Resistance* to *them* be acknowledged lawful; so likewise may *Resistance* to *Tyrants* at Home be, notwithstanding the same Unhappiness. Let *them* look to it who are guilty of these Crimes. This can no more hinder honest Men from defending themselves, or from making their Advantages of the Crimes of others in their own *Self-Defense*, in one Case, than it is allow'd to do in another. But it is a very unaccountable thing, in my Opinion, to suppose that a *People* cannot joyn together in defending themselves against any *Invader* either *Foreign*, or *Domestick*, without any such Crimes. For there is nothing necessary to this, that I know of, that requires any sort of *Perfidiousness*, or *Baseness*, or any thing but an open, and justifiable way of Proceeding. If any other Methods have been used, as they have been even in the most lawful Wars, this will only reflect upon the *Persons* who have made use of them, not upon the Justice of the Wars themselves.

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Obj. 20. But Christianity is a suffering Religion; and a Doctrine of the Cross; and therefore cannot allow of Resistance to Princes.

This is actually urged by *Persons* of great Reputation in this Cause: otherwise I should overlook it as an egregious and palpable Calumny upon the *Christian Religion*, to represent it as necessarily laying Men open, and unguarded, to all the Outrages the vilest part of the World think fit to offer them. For by the same Argument it may be proved unlawful to resist a *Robber*, or a *Cutthroat*. By the same Argument it may be proved unlawful to resist a *Foreign Prince* invading our Country. Nay, By the same Argument it may be proved unlawful for a *Christian Prince*, to resist the unjust violence of his *Subjects* rebelling against Him. For *Christianity* is to Him a Doctrine of the Cross, as well as to the meanest of His *Subjects*. But the true state of this Case can amount to no more than this, that *Christianity* obliges Men to suffer patiently, when they cannot by any lawful means prevent it. The Point therefore, to be proved is this, that *Resistance* to Princes when other Methods fail, is an unlawful Method for *People* to take in order to prevent their own Ruine: or that though the *Christian Religion* hath allowed *Resistance* to *Cutthroats* in private Cases; and *Resistance* to *Foreign Enemies* merely for the preservation of the *Publick Society*; it hath absolutely condemned *Resistance* in all Cases to *Princes* at Home, tho' it be equally necessary for the preservation of the same *Publick Society*. To prove this would not be much for the Honour of the *Christian Religion*. But in the mean while to speak of *Christianity's* being a *Suffering Religion*, and a *Doctrine of the Cross*, can signifie nothing. The Question is how

far it obliges Men to suffer. And that, all are agreed, is no farther than they cannot prevent it by lawful, and honourable means. And if it can be shewn that *Resistance* in all Cases is condemned in the *Gospel*: this must be the *Argument* against it taken from *Christianity*, and not that *Christianity* is a Doctrine of the *Cross*; For this it may be, and yet allow of *Resistance* in Cases of *Public Concern* as well as in some Cases of *Private Concern*. Nay, sometimes it is argued that *Resistance* tends to more *Suffering*, and more *Temporal Evils* than the contrary: and consequently, if *Christianity* be a *Suffering Religion*, it must allow of *Resistance*, rather than condemn it.

Obj. 21. Agreeably to this it is said by the same Persons, that Christians *have nothing to lose*; *that the greatest Tyrants cannot deprive them of their Innocence within*; and that they need not be concerned about other Matters.

This is an excellent Argument against all unnecessary concern about worldly Affairs, and for the most patient Suffering those Evils which We cannot honourably avoid. But it is a sad thing to find Men endeavouring to represent the *Christian Religion*, as teaching Men to throw off all care about the Happiness of *Humane Society*, and to look upon themselves as unconcerned in the outward good Estate of their *Families*, their *Neighbours*, and their *Posterity*: and all this, merely because it was thought necessary by the great Author of it, to lay down some *Precepts* in it against regarding the *Temporal things* of this Life above God, and our Duty. This must make People apt to believe it an *Enemy*, and not a *Friend to Humane Society*. But the best of it is, that the same reasoning will prove it unlawful to resist *Robbers*, and *Foreign Enemies*; nay unlawful for a *Christian*

stian Prince to resist any *Rebels* against Him. For they cannot rob *Him* of his *Innocence*: and He hath no more reason, or allowance, to be concerned about other temporal things than his *Subjects* have. But if it be said that the *Christian Religion* allows Him to regard the *Publick Good*; it may be said that the same *Religion* allows his *Subjects* to do so likewise, notwithstanding any thing in this *Objection*.

Obj. 22. Of the same sort likewise is that *Objection* against *Resistance*, taken from the *Spiritual Advantages* of suffering *Persecution*, and *Oppression*; that it promotes the *Eternal Happiness* of *Christians*; and the like.

Indeed one would think from some Persons representations of the *Gospel*, and their Interpretation of some figurative Expressions in it, that it is the *Duty* of *Christians* to desire, and pray for *Persecution* and *Misery* in this *World*: contrary to many plain Expressions of *Scripture*; to the *Liturgy* of our *Church*; and to the common *Sense* of Mankind. I know of no *Spiritual Advantages* of *Suffering*, unless it be in a good *Cause*, and when we cannot honourably avoid it: and no *Obligation* resulting from hence against *Self-Defense*, even in the *Case* of *private Injuries*. Much less can any thing of this Nature, in the *Gospel*, be intended to oblige whole Nations to forget the Interest of *Humane Society*, and to Sacrifice themselves, and their *Posterity*, to the unjust Will of one Man. The same reasoning will equally prove it unlawful for a *People* to resist *Foreign Enemies*; or for a *Christian Prince* to resist the violence of his *Subjects* rebelling against Him. For *Oppression*, and *Suffering*, are as much for His *Spiritual Good*, as that of his *Subjects*; and will as certainly, and as highly, promote his *Sal-*

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vation and Glory in the next World. I assure the *Reader*, I had not troubled Him with such *Objections* as this, if I had not found them seriously objected, and urged in this *Cause* by very considerable Persons.

Obj. 23. It is *objected* by some against the *Doctrine* of the foregoing *Sermon*, that it is the *Doctrine* of *Papists* and *Dissenters*: and from hence it is concluded that it cannot be true.

But if I could produce either *Papists*, or *Dissenters* affirming the contrary; would that be allowed to be therefore false? No such thing. But the Cry of this serves a present purpose, though it never yet was thought to be an *Argument* against any *Doctrine*, that *Papists*, or *Dissenters* taught the same. For if it were, what would become of many of the principal *Doctrines* of our *Common Religion*, and of many particular *Doctrines* taught in the *Homilies*? The *Papists* differ amongst themselves in this matter: Some allowing *Resistance*, and some condemning it; some allowing it at one time, and condemning it at another, just as their purposes may be best served; and those who do allow of it, generally allowing it, not on the account of the good of *Civil Society*, but of their own particular *Church*, and *Party*; which is directly contrary to me. And so, if this *Argument* have any thing in it, it will be unluckily proved that *Resistance* is neither *lawful*, nor *unlawful*; the like to which was never yet heard of. But if the agreement of the *Papists* with others in thinking it *unlawful*, shall not be accounted an *Argument* that they are in the wrong, why should the agreement of the *Papists* with those who think it *lawful* be urged against them? or how can any Man who hath a *Conscience*, and *Common Sense*, pretend to advance such an *Argument*, when He cannot but know that He is forced to hold the same

Opinion in many points that both *Papists*, and *Dissenters* hold? And for my own part, if they be of the same Opinion with me in this point, I only wish that they judged so rightly in other points, that I could agree with them in many more. For surely it can be no *Scandal* to agree with any Persons in what is true and reasonable.

Obj. 24. *This Doctrine is contrary to the judgment of most Divines of latter ages, and particularly those of the Church of England.*

I am heartily sorry it should be found so to be. But this can never prove any thing against the truth of it. There was a time in which any one who should have spoken against *Transubstantiation*, and many other absurd Opinions, would have had the same sort of *Objection* made against Him. And since the *Reformation* there was as universal a *Consent* against the lawfulness of all *Usury*, as there can be produced against the lawfulness of all *Resistance*: and yet later *Divines* have thought that no Argument against it, but are universally of a contrary Opinion. But indeed there is no Argument more destructive to *Truth*, and the *Cause* of *True Religion*, than that taken from *Authority*: which if once it be admitted in one *Case*, must be admitted so far in *others*, as for ever to ruine the *Cause* of *Truth* and *Goodness* in the World. Besides that it is the unfairest, and unmanliest thing in the World for any Persons to make such an *Objection* in one *Case*, as they know in many others carrieth not the least weight in it. But after all the noise that hath been made on this Head, the very Foundation of this *Objection* is not so certain as many would have it believ'd. There have been many *Divines* of the first Rank, in these later Ages, who have
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publickly espoused the *Doctrine* I have taught, or laid down such *Principles* as inevitably tend to it. The great, and judicious Mr. *Hooker*, Bishop *Bilson*, and others might be named. But what is of most moment, the whole *Convocation*, the *Church of England Representative*, in *Queen Elizabeth's* Reign, publickly acknowledged it glorious to assist *Subjects* in their *Resistance* to their *Sovereigns*, and their endeavours to rid themselves of their *Tyranny*, and *Oppressions*. It is now generally acknowledged that the *Doctrine* of *Non-Resistance* was carried too high in some late Reigns, and this acknowledgment is made by many of those, who unwarily joyned in opposing one extreme by running into the other; And the lawfulness of *Resistance* in some *Cases* is professed and taught by as great, and considerable *Divines* as any in this *Church*. Nay, Dr. *Falkner*, and many of the Highest Asserters of *Non-Resistance*, when they are oblig'd to speak out upon some Suppositions, do plainly allow the lawfulness of *Resistance*. So that notwithstanding the great zeal expressed by some, and the absolute Expressions in which *Resistance* hath been condemned, it doth not appear that there hath been any number of Men of *Sense*, and *Consideration*, who have in reality condemned it in all possible *Cases*. The only answer many of them give to some *Cases* put to them, is that they are not at all *probable*: and the same they would have said of the late King *James's* Proceedings, if that *Case* had been supposed. And others of them who believe as bad *Cases* as can well be supposed, to have been in *Fact*, do in plain Words give to *Subjects* the liberty of *Resistance* in such *Cases*. So that it is the most groundless imputation upon my interpretation of St. *Paul*, that it is *singular*, and without any *Precedents*, merely because it adds a limitation to the *absolute Expressions* used by Him. And upon the whole, if there be a necessity for *Company* in every Cause, I need desire no better

than I have in that which I have maintain'd. I say not this, as if it signified any thing to the truth or falshood of any *Doctrine*; for in reality it doth not: but only to answer some Men according to their own manner of reasoning. If therefore, any Person ask, as I find some ready to do, Whom they must follow in this point, their *Old Guides*, or *New Lights*, as they express themselves; I answer that there are many *Old*, and *New Guides* of one judgment, and many of another: but the only safe way is to follow neither, but to embrace that Opinion which, upon a serious examination, they find to be most agreeable to *Reason*, and the *Word of God*. In this Method, if they be sincere, they are the most likely to find Truth; and if they should miss of it, yet they may be sure of Pardon for their mistakes. Whereas to believe, and embrace, any Opinion, merely because it hath been taught by such particular Persons, or hath been the *Current Doctrine*, may prove without Remedy, the direct Road to *Error*; and cannot be pleasing to the *God of Light*, or lead to the Rewards due to an *Impartial Enquiry after Truth*.

Obj. 25. Some have objected against the *Doctrine* of the foregoing Sermon, *that it is against the Interest of the Church of England, as by Law Established.*

Now I have such an Opinion of the *Church of England*, whatever others imagine, as to think that No *Truth* can be against the Interest of it; and that it is but a bad Complement to our *Constitution* to suppose the contrary. And as for this *Truth* in particular; the last Trial we had of it in *Practice*, was that it saved the *Established Church* from imminent Ruine. What *Church* therefore, must be meant in this *Objection*? The *Church* which

which was actually saved by reducing this *Doctrine* to *Practice*, and which could not have been saved, in all Humane probability, without it? Can that *Church* be in danger from this *Doctrine* which it once saved, in its utmost distress? Or shall this *Doctrine* be true, when the *Church* hath occasion for it, and ungratefully discarded when the perillous times are over? Besides, this *Doctrine* is the greatest *Defense* possible of the *Laws*, against the *Encroachments* of any in Power: and how it can be an Enemy to that *Church*, which is established by those *Laws*, cannot well be imagined. But at a time when the *Church* is imagined to be in danger from those very Persons, and things, which do most support, and adorn it, it may be the less surprizing, that it can be supposed to be in danger from those *Principles*, which have actually heretofore saved it from Ruine, and are the most likely to do so for the time to come. And though I cannot but account it very hard to suffer in my Reputation as *No Church Man*, merely for maintaining those *Principles*, to which the *Church* owes its Well-being at this Day; yet I cannot complain, when I consider how many of the worthiest and best Persons in the *Church*, suffer under the same Calumny; and this merely for doing true Service to the *Church* it self. I shall only add, that this *Objection* would come from some of the greatest *Defenders* of *Passive Obedience* with no very good grace. For according to their own way of *Reasoning*, what need *Christians* be in any concern about the temporal Interest, and Prosperity of any *Church*? *Religion is an Internal thing*: and come what danger there will, they cannot be robbed of *that*. Their chief concern is to arrive at Heaven at last: and that they may do better perhaps *without*, than *with*, temporal Quiet, and Prosperity. Thus some Men argue for *Passive Obedience*: and thus it may be returned, in answer to this *Objection*.

Obj. 26. *The Doctrine of the foregoing Sermon is contrary to the Doctrine of the Church of England contained in the Homilies, and subscribed to by every Minister in the Established Church.*

I have reserved this *Objection* to the last place, because it seems to be the only thing many Persons can say either for their *Zeal* against the *Doctrine* taught in the foregoing *Sermon*, or for their *Unchristian Abuses* of the *Author* of it. And in reply to it I have many things to offer.

1. I desire all would observe that supposing this *Objection* true, it signifieth nothing to the *Truth* of the *Doctrine*, but only concerns my *Honesty* in *subscribing* the *Article* concerning the *Homilies*.

2. As for my own *Honesty* in *subscribing* that *Article*, I desire it may be judged from the true intent of that *Subscription*, whether I have contradicted it or no. The *Article* declares that the *Book of Homilies* doth contain a *godly and wholesome Doctrine*. And the *Question* is, how far the *Subscription* to these Words hath been supposed, and understood, to extend by all, both *Governours*, and *Governed*, in this *Church*. Now,

1. It is manifest that this *Subscription* was never understood, by any in the *Church*, to signifie that the *Person* who subscribes is obliged to believe every individual Sentence in all the *Homilies*, and the Interpretation, and Application of every particular *Text* of *Scripture* quoted in them, to be true, just, and reasonable. To suppose this, is to suppose almost every Person who ever preached, or wrote, in this *Church* to be dishonest and perfidious. For I may venture to say, that it will be hard to Name either a *Preacher*, or a *Writer*, who hath not contradicted some particular Sentence, or
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some particular Interpretation of *Scripture* in the *Homilies*. And this is so notorious, that I cannot but think it the most extreme *Malice* or *Ignorance* in some Men, in order to cast a Reproach upon a particular Person, who hath not pleased them, to speak as if this *Subscription* was always understood to signify an Approbation of every particular Sentence, and every Interpretation of *Scripture* in the *Homilies*; and by this means to bring a Disgrace upon the whole Body of *Ministers* in this *Church*; and amongst the rest upon many of those who have given *Credit* to the *Doctrine* of *Passive Obedience*, and carried it to the greatest height; than whom none have more plainly contradicted many *Sentences*, and many *Interpretations* of Texts of *Scripture* in the *Homilies*, upon other Subjects. This is what the *Dissenters* have been ever casting in the Teeth of the greatest Men of our *Church*: and yet those who now join with them in this, have the happiness of being esteemed by many the greatest *Friends* to the *Church* of *England*.

2. The only thing therefore, that ever was supposed, either by *Governours*, or *Governed* in this *Church*, to be intended by this *Subscription* was this, that the Person subscribing doth truly believe that the Tenor of the *Doctrine* contained in the *Homilies*, is just, and right; and that the main *Doctrines* designed to be taught in them are *Godly*, and *wholsome Doctrines*. Now amongst the rest there is a large *Homily* against *Disobedience*, and *Wilful Rebellion* in six Parts. And if it appear that I have not in the least contradicted the Tenor of this *Homily* throughout, or the main *Doctrine* designed to be taught in it, it will appear that I have not contradicted the *End* of my *Subscription*, or acted that false part some are pleased, out of their singular favour, to attribute to me.

What therefore, I am now to shew is, that it doth not appear to have been the design of that *Homily*, to

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condemn such a *Resistance* as I have defended; or to recommend such a *Submission*, as I have condemned. And,

1. It is to be presumed that the *Homilies* were not understood, at their first appearance in the World, to condemn the *Resistance* of *Subjects* to their *Princes* in *Case of Extreme Necessity*, both from the *Principles* publicly espoused by Mr. *Hooker* the greatest *Defender* of the *Church*, and from the *Acts* of the *Clergy* in *Convocation* assembled, in Queen *Elizabeth's* Reign, who esteemed it glorious to assist oppressed *Subjects* against their *Princes*. And this is the stronger Argument, because it is very incredible either that the *Clergy* at that time, should not understand the true meaning of this *Homily*; or that they should so soon contradict what they had solemnly subscribed to. So that here is a very probable Demonstration, not only that it was not intended by the *Authors* of it to condemn *Resistance* in all *Cases*, but also that it was not at first understood so to do by any considerable part of the *Clergy* of *England*.

2. It is to be presumed, likewise, that in after-times, even when the *Doctrine* of *Passive Obedience* came to its height, many considerable *Church-Men*, and those esteemed the greatest *Patrons* of *Non-Resistance*, never did understand the design of that *Homily* to have been to condemn *Resistance* in all *Cases*. This is to be presumed, I say, from hence, that they have not been able to deny that there are *possible Cases*, in which *Resistance* is allowable. Many confess the same at this Day, who yet are accounted great *Defenders* of *Non-Resistance*: and Dr. *Falkner*, and others, have acknowledged the same in Publick. Now the allowance of the *Lawfulness* of *Resistance* in any *possible Case* (though never so *improbable*) and merely upon a *Supposition*, is as much against the *Doctrine* of this *Homily*, as what I have taught can be, if the *Design* of it be what some would

would make it. Not but that those very *Cases* they put have been actually seen in the World, or some others as much, or more, destructive of the *Publick Good*: but this is not of importance in the present Argument. If there were an *Homily* absolutely condemning all *Resistance* in *Children* to their *Parents*, (as this is said to condemn all *Resistance* of *Subjects* to their *Princes*;) and any one should allow of *Resistance* in *Children*, upon *supposition* that a *Father* should attempt their Lives; let him never so much declare how *improbable*, and next to impossible He imagines it that this should ever come to pass; yet this allowance is as truly a Contradiction to such an *Homily*, as any other allowance can be. What I would infer from hence is this, that as considerable *Patrons* as *Passive Obedience* ever had, even in those times in which it was carried to the height, did not imagine that it was the *Design* of the *Homily* against *Rebellion* to condemn *Resistance* in all *Cases*: for otherwise surely, they would not have contradicted their own *Subscription*, by allowing it in any possible *Case*.

3. The same may be presumed from the *Practice* of many great Men of unsuspected *Zeal* both for the *Church*, and for the *Doctrine* of *Passive Obedience* in particular: who either joyned in inviting over the *Prince* of *Orange* to defend this *Nation* against the Late King *James*; or approved of the first *Motions* of the *Late Revolution*; -or went so far as to bear an *Active* part in them. From which one cannot but conclude that they did not imagine the *Doctrine* of the *Church* of *England* to be against *Resistance* in all *Cases*.

4. The same may be presumed likewise from the *Notions* of late, publicly espoused by many Persons of great *Authority*, and *Reputation* in the *Church*; who lodge the *Kingly Power* in these *Nations*, not in the Person of the *Prince*, but in all who bear a part in the making our *Laws*: by this means confining *Passive Obedience*

dience to the *Laws*, and absolving from all Obligation to *Non-Resistance* to the *Prince*, acting in contradiction to the two *Houses of Parliament*, or to the *Established Laws* of the *Land*. For whoever reads the *Homily*, must evidently see that the chief design of it was not to press *Obedience* under this Notion, but with respect to the *Prince* consider'd by *Himself*; unless such favourable *Suppositions*, and qualifying *Interpretations* be allow'd as, I have reason to fear, will be denied to me. What I would infer from hence is this, that it was never understood, by many Persons of as great consideration as any in our *Church*, to be the main design of this *Homily*, to preach an *Unlimited Submission* to all *Princes*; and therefore that I was under no Obligation to understand it to do so. And why should I desire either to understand the *Doctrine* of the *Homilies* better, or to *subscribe* the *Article* relating to them in a more honest sense, than such great Men as Mr. *Hooker*, and the whole *Convocation* in *Queen Elizabeth's Days*; than Dr. *Falkner*, and many of the greatest *Patrons* of *Passive Obedience*; than many of those who joined in the first motions of the *Late Revolution*; and than many of the most considerable Persons now living in our *Church*?

5. But this is not all I have to say upon this Head; (though this one would think ought to make some Persons a little more tender in their Censures.) For I shall be so bold, after all the Confidence some have expressed to the contrary, as to appeal to the *Homilies* themselves; and to affirm that it cannot be proved to have been the *Design* of the *Homily* against *Rebellion*, to condemn that *Resistance* which I have taught, or to teach that *Passive Obedience* which I have condemned. The Truth of this will best appear, by taking a view of the *Design* and *Contents* of all the Six Parts of this *Homily*.

The design of the *First Part* is to prove from several *Texts of Scripture*, the Dignity of *Princes*, and the Du-
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ty of *Subjects*. The two *special places* which are there declared to be such as *may stand instead of all others*, are *Rom. 13.* & *1 Pet. 2.* and what is concluded from them about the *Duty of Subjects*, is all expressed in general Terms, just as it is in the *Places* themselves. The most that is here inferred is, that *Subjects ought to be obedient, not only to their good and courteous, but also to their sharp, and rigorous Princes*. Now this must be confessed by all to extend to *Active*, as well as to *Passive Obedience*. If therefore, it ought not to be inferred from hence, that it was the *Design* of this Passage, to urge the necessity of *Active Obedience* in all possible Cases, (which is the greatest Indignity that can be offered to it,) neither can it be inferred that it was the design of this *Passage* to inculcate an absolute *Passive Obedience*. So that it doth not appear that I have interpreted *St. Paul, Rom. 13. 1.* contrary to the Interpretation laid down in this *Homily*. I grant indeed that the Lawfulness of all Rebellion to *undiscreet and evil Governours* is absolutely denied, but chiefly as it is manifest, upon this Foundation, because *Rebellion is the greatest of all Mischiefs, and Rebels the naughtiest of Subjects, ever readiest to rebel against the best Princes*; and therefore, not fit to be trusted or encouraged to pass any judgment upon the Conduct of their Princes. But doth this look as if the same *Persons* who wrote this would have said the same against *Resistance* in all Cases? Nay, I think it rather evident from the account they constantly give of *Rebellion*, and *Rebels*, and from this very Passage, that they would not have said the same with respect to those Cases in which the *best Subjects*, and those *who are ever ready to obey good Princes*, are generally convinced that *Resistance* is necessary, not for any private Ends of their own, but merely for the *Defense and Preservation* of the Happiness of the *Publick*. Besides that the Words *undiscreet and evil Governours* are

are capable of such infinite degrees, that it would be impossible to prove from any Persons using such loose Words, that there could not be a Case put of *undiscreet and evil Governours*, in which they would allow the Lawfulness of *Resistance*. Much less, when the same Expressions are used with respect to *Active Obedience*, can it be proved to be their Judgment, that there are no Cases in which *Passive Obedience* may be refused; unless it be granted likewise to follow from hence, that it is their Judgment that there are no Cases in which *Active Obedience* may be refused. Again, It is indeed declared that *a Rebel is worse than the worst Prince, and Rebellion worse than the worst Government of the worst Prince that hitherto hath been*. But this rather convinceth me that they would not have said the same of all *Resistance*, than makes me conclude the contrary: Not only because nothing can be more evident, than that this cannot be affirmed of some instances of *Resistance*; but because the *Authors* of this *Homily* give afterwards such an account of *Rebellion*, and of *Rebels*, as doth not at all touch the Case of *Resistance* for the necessary Defense of Publick Happiness, but doth indeed wholly exempt that from the imputation of *Rebellion*, or from being concerned in what they say against it. And I am sure it is but common Justice to take their own account of *Rebellion*, and *Rebels*, in order to know what it is they so severely condemn. The pretense indeed of *Publick Good* is mentioned: not as in reality certain of being destroyed without *Resistance*; but only as a Pretense made use of without Reason, to colour over the sordid, and base ends of *Ambitious Men*. And in this the *Doctrine* I have taught is wholly unconcerned. Besides, In this very place *Rebellion* is spoken of, as an *unfit Medicine to reform any small lacks in a Prince, or to cure any little griefs in Government*: which cannot be applied to that *Resistance*, which is made

made to preserve a State from that *Ruine* which is evident, and certain without it. It is here said likewise, that we must *pray for the Prince*, whether good or evil, *i. e.* as it is here explained, *for his continuance, and increase in goodness, if He be good, and for his amendment, if He be evil*: which I think is as consistent with defending our selves from being ruined by Him, as the praying in like manner for our *Enemies* is with our defending our selves against them. At the *End*, the *Wickedness* of the *Rebellion* then on foot is set forth, with a principal view to which, and the *Popish Pretenses* for *Rebellion*, this *Homily* was compiled: which would make one apt to think it very hard, to urge the *Doctrine* of it against such a *Resistance* as hath been found necessary for preservation of the *Protestant Religion*, and the guarding against these same *Popish Enemies*, at whom this *Doctrine* was chiefly directed. For one would hardly believe from hence, that the *Compilers* of it ever thought of having it made use of, to the support of those very *Enemies* against whom it was intended, and to the destruction of that very *Constitution* it was designed to preserve; or ever taught any *Doctrine* to such pernicious purposes as this must necessarily tend to, if it be supposed so *unlimited* as some would have it.

The design of the *Second Part* of this *Homily*, is to allege one *Example* or two out of the *Holy Scriptures*, of the *Obedience* of *Subjects*, not only unto their good and gracious *Governours*, but also unto their evil and unkind *Princes*; as it is there expressed. And this will help very much towards our judging what sort of *Disobedience* it was, which the *Authors* designed to condemn. Now the first and chief *Example* here alleged, is that of *David* in his Behaviour towards *Saul*. And as to this it is fully sufficient to remark, that the *Cause* between *Saul* and *David* being purely *Personal*, and of a private *Concern*; and the charge against *Saul* relating merely

merely to his personal Vices ; all that can follow from hence, supposing the *Example* of *David* to oblige our *Consciences*, is this, that it is not lawful for *Subjects* to endeavour to Dethrone, or Murther, a *Prince* for Vices merely *Personal*, or on any account of a private Nature : which is agreeable, and not contradictory to what I have taught. The *Example* of the *Virgin Mary* obeying the command of *Augustus*, and going to *Bethlehem* to be taxed, can prove no more than that it is the Duty of *Subjects* to obey those who are actually possessed of the *Government* though *Pagans*, and *Foreigners*, in their lawful Commands. I do not say that it doth prove this. But this is the utmost of what is or can be collected from it. And whether some others are not more likely to contradict the *Homily* in this than I am, I appeal to all impartial Persons. The *Example* likewise of our Lord's *Obedience* to the *Governours* he found in possession can extend no farther, nor is it alleged to any other purpose. If the most be made of them, they are all *Examples* of private Persons, submitting in Instances not inconsistent with the *Publick Good* of that *Nation* they belonged to. The *Example* of the *Jewish Nation* obeying *Heathen Governours*, in their submitting to be taxed by them, for which only it is alleged, is the *Example* of a *Nation* which never submitted to such *Governours* but of necessity ; and is an instance of their *Submission* in such a *Case* only as was no more contrary to their *Publick Interest*, than *Submission* in the like *Case* to *Governours* of their own *Religion* would have been. So that there is not the shadow of a difference between the *Doctrine* I have taught, and this *Second Part* of the *Homily*. But if any thing may be concluded from it, it appears evidently that the chief design of the *Authors* was to recommend such a *Submission* as is consistent with the *Publick Happiness*, and to condemn such a *Disobedience*, as is practised on private and personal Accounts ;

counts ; not such a *Resistance* as is necessary for the *Publick Safety*, and is entirely founded upon the consideration of that.

The design of the *Third Part* of this *Homily*, is to set forth the abominable Sin of *Rebellion*, and to touch upon the Grounds upon which Men turn *Rebels*: in which it is evident that the *Authors* speak of *Rebellion*, as of a complication of Villanies practised by Men void of all Honour and Conscience ; and of *Rebels*, as Men of desperate Fortunes, rising up against their *Governours* for private *Ends* of their own, out of *Pride*, and *Ambition*, and other vile Dispositions. Particularly it is remarkable that in their account of *Rebels* they speak of a few *Subjects*, out of a *Luciferian Pride and Presumption*, setting themselves up against the *Majesty* of their *Prince*, against the *Wisdom* of the *Counsellors*, against the power and force of all the *Nobility*, and the faithful *Subjects* and *People* of the whole *Realm*. From whence it still more plainly appears that it was not the design of this *Homily*, to condemn such a *Resistance* as is founded entirely upon the *Publick Good* ; especially if it be judged necessary by the *Counsellors*, *Nobility*, and main Body of the whole *Nation*. So that in this there is no contradiction to the *Doctrine* I have taught.

In the *Fourth Part* the *Authors* produce Instances of *Rebellion*, which are all Instances of *Resistance* to good *Governours* grounded upon base and private Motives: which makes it yet more probable, that their design was not to condemn such *Self-Defense* in any People as is manifestly necessary for their own Preservation. They speak likewise here of the *Pretenses* used by *Rebels*, particularly that of Religion (which I have not concerned my self with,) and that of the *Redress* of the *Common-wealth*, in treating of which they do not say that there are no *Cases* in which *Resistance* may be for the good of the *Common-wealth* ; but only that *Rebellion*

as they have before described it, of all other Mischiefs doth most destroy the Common-wealth; i. e. Resistance practised for base Ends, by the worst of Men, and in conjunction with all the worst of Vices. And that this was their principal aim, appears by the Application of all to the Rebels then in Arms, and the account given of their Vices, and the Motives upon which they manifestly entred into that Rebellion. So that neither in this part of the Homily is there any opposition to the Doctrine I have taught.

In the Two remaining Parts of this Homily, the most usual Causes of Rebellion are set forth: viz. Ambition, and Ignorance. From whence it will again appear evident that the Design of the Authors was not against such a Resistance as is manifestly necessary for the Publick Good: but against Rebellion founded upon Private Ambition, and Gross Ignorance. By Ambition they understand a restless desire in Men to be of higher estate than God hath given, or appointed unto them: and apply all that they say upon this Head to the Usurpation of the Church of Rome, and the pretended Authority of Popes to absolve Subjects from their obligation to Obedience. And in treating of that Ignorance which they make the other source of Rebellion, they apply all their Discourse to the Artifice of the Church of Rome, in keeping their People in perfect Blindness, in order to impose any thing upon them: and declare how by this means they have brought to pass the dethroning of Princes, merely for opposing some unjust Pretenses of the Popes; and have brought their Subjects to Rebel against them upon slender, or no grounds at all, as it is there expressed. After this they shew the necessity of Subjects seeking after so much Knowledge and Understanding, as to be incapable of being seduced by such miserable Pretenses, as were used by those of the Church of Rome to seduce them from their Obedience. In all which

which there is no *Case* put of a whole Nation in imminent danger of Ruine; and no Condemnation of any *Resistance*, but that which they before have called *Rebellion*, and declared to be founded upon *Ambition*, and *Gross Ignorance*; not upon any serious regard to *Publick Good*.

And now, to recapitulate what I have said concerning this *Homily*; it appears from the general Expressions made use of, that the *Authors* no more intended in it *Absolute Passive* than *Absolute Active Obedience*: it appears from the *Words* frequently used, and the *Examples* alleged, that they chiefly designed their *Doctrine* of *Non-Resistance* with respect to good *Princes*, or such as were only guilty of personal *Vices*, or of Instances of *Injustice* of a *private* Nature; not of any manifest Attempts to ruine the *Constitution*, and *Nation* committed to their *Charge*: it appears from the account they give of *Rebellion*, and *Rebels*, that it was not in their design, or in their thoughts, to condemn such a *Resistance* as is founded entirely upon the *Publick Security*, but that founded upon base, and unworthy *Motives*. And if after so plain a Demonstration, that I have not contradicted the main Tenor and design of this *Homily*, any one shall think it sufficient to produce any little piece of a *Sentence* brought in by the by, which is in appearance against me considered by it self, it will not much concern me. The only *Reply* to what I have here offered must be to shew, either that the *Subscription* imports more than an agreement to the chief *Doctrines*, and main Tenor of the *Homilies*; (which will be a noble piece of Service to the *Clergy* of the *Church of England*, and particularly to the Memory of *Archbishop Laud*, and the greatest *Church-men* of past times;) or that my *Doctrine* is against the main Tenor of the whole *Homily* against *Rebellion*, which doubtless will be a performance mightily for the Glory

of the *Established Church* amongst Persons of Thought, and Consideration. Whenever *either* of these is clearly made out, though I will not promise to acknowledge my self *dishonest*, or *perjured*, (which is an heavy Charge indeed, and void of all excuse, unless Men can see into my Heart;) yet I promise publickly to acknowledge my self *mistaken*, and publickly to recant what I have now written concerning the *Homilies*, and the *Subscription* to them. In the mean while it cannot but be a little surprizing on one hand, to find some Persons passing *Censures* which must light upon themselves, and the greatest *Patrons* this *Church* hath ever had, as well as upon that *inconsiderable* Person at whom they are aimed. And on the other hand, it cannot but appear very ridiculous, not to say worse, to find professed *Nonjurors* appearing publickly in the same Charge, and urging that *Homily* against my *Doctrine* which doth as expressly teach *Submission*, and *Allegiance* to *Pagans*; to *Foreigners*; to such *Princes* as came not to their *Thrones* in the ordinary and legal Methods, as to any other *Governours* whatsoever: and consequently absolutely condemns all their present Conduct.

Thus have I impartially considered all the *Objections* I could get together against the *Doctrine* I have taught. And lest it should still be mistaken, I will here again set down my Opinion, as it manifestly appears from all the foregoing *Discourse*. Every Sort, and every *Degree* of *Submission* which promotes the *Publick Good* I applaud, and recommend: Every Sort, and every *Degree* of *Submission* which helps to destroy the *Publick Good* I disapprove, and condemn. Every Sort, and every *Degree* of *Resistance*, which is necessary for the *Publick Good* I applaud, and recommend: Every Sort, and every *Degree* of *Resistance* which is inconsistent with the *Publick Good*, I absolutely disapprove, and condemn.

But

But now the difficult *Question* may be asked, as it often hath been, *Who shall judge of the Necessity of this Resistance?* I answer, the *Subjects* themselves who alone feel the necessity of it, and alone will suffer for the want of it. To this it is replied, that they are fallible, and easily imposed upon; and therefore it is of bad consequence to trust them with such a Power of judging. To which I answer,

1. If the Persons who object this will discover where the seat of *Infallibility* is, no one will be more rejoiced at such a discovery than my self. But this World is not designed a perfect State: and one Unhappiness in it is, that the Body of Mankind is very liable to *Error*, and very easily to be imposed upon; and that nothing is so clear and indisputable, but that it may be mistaken, and misunderstood. The only thing to be said to this is, that it is of the highest importance for Men to be rightly informed in so material a Point: but when they have taken all due care of that, they must be left to the guidance of their own Judgments. I never pretended that there is no Inconvenience accidentally attending the *Doctrine* I have delivered: But what is there in this World without its Inconveniences?

2. I have shewn under the *First*, and other *Objections*, that no *Doctrine* was ever accounted false, because some People might mistake in the understanding, or Application of it; and that therefore the *Doctrine of Resistance* may be true, notwithstanding this Inconvenience. I have shewn likewise that the *Body* of a *Nation* are as little likely to mistake in a Matter of such a Nature and Influence as *Universal Oppression*, or *Invasion* of their *Rights*, as in any thing in which they are allowed to judge.

3. In one Word, This *Question* can be esteemed of no force in the *Case* before us, whilst those who make it, find themselves obliged to allow to all private Persons

the liberty of judging in Matters of equal, or greater moment and difficulty. They are allowed to judge of all *Doctrines* deliver'd from the Pulpit, and in all *Cases* in which their very Salvation is concerned: otherwise they are under a necessity to believe all that is taught them, and amongst others so pernicious a *Doctrine* as mine is represented to be. Upon this the *Church of Rome* crieth out as upon the greatest Inconvenience possible; and hence infers the necessity of setting up an *Infallible Judge*, from whose determination there shall be no appeal. This the *Protestants* justly disapprove of, as a Remedy for an unavoidable Inconvenience, and a *Remedy* worse than the *Disease*. But do they upon this deny a Judgment to the People? No, They assert-it, and leave the *People* to answer to *God Almighty* for their own Honesty, and Care. All the groundless *Separations*, and *Divisions* amongst *Christians* are as truly owing to the allowance of this private Judgment, as any groundless *Rebellion* can be. And yet this is not thought a sufficient Reason either against the allowance of this liberty of Judging, or against the teaching the lawfulness of *Separation* in some *Cases*. In the *Case* of the *Injuries* of *Private Persons*, the *Injured Party* is allowed to judge of the Degree, and necessity of Resistance; yet is it very easie to be deceived, and to carry Resentments too far. But in many *Cases* of *Pubick Concern*, relating to *Government*, *Subjects* are allowed to judge, and to have a Right to do so. In *Kingdoms* perfectly *Elective* they judge of the *Qualifications*, and *Fitness* of *Persons* to rule; which is much more difficult than to judge when themselves are universally oppressed. In our own *Nation* they are allowed to judge, who are the fittest *Persons* to represent them, and to make *Laws* for them: which may be attended with as dangerous Consequences, as the same *Subjects* judging concerning the *Tyranny* of their
Gover-

Governours. By many who oppose this liberty of Judging, *Subjects* are allowed and required to judge of the *Titles of Princes* ; of the *Right* of any in Case of a *Competition*, and of several *Pretenders* to a *Throne* ; of the Legitimacy of the Births of *Pretenders* in suspected, and dubious Cases , of the Legality of the Accession of *Princes* to their *Crowns* ; and of all *incidental Questions* relating to these things. And a Judgment in these *Cases* is at least as difficult, and attended with as many Mistakes, and Inconveniences, as the *Subjects* judging about Matters in which they are sensibly, and immediately concerned. They are allowed likewise a *Right* to judge whether it be lawful, or their Duty to submit to all in Possession : which must be confessed likewise to be a Point, not without Difficulties ; and is known to have cost Persons of great Judgment, and Learning, a great deal of time, before they have been able to come to a settled Judgment about it. They are allowed also by all Persons a *Right* to judge when it is their Duty to withdraw, and refuse their *Active Obedience* to their *Governours*, in which Point there are as many Mistakes possible, (and those of dangerous consequence to *Rulers*,) as in the Application of the *Doctrine* about the *Lawfulness* of *Resistance*. Nay, what is more remarkable, it is impossible for *Subjects* to exercise *Passive Obedience* it self, after such a manner as to be acceptable to *God*, without this very Judgment, which the allowance of *Resistance* in some Cases permits to them. For this they cannot do without judging themselves universally oppressed , and Ruine hanging over the Nation. So that they must judge of this, whether they submit themselves to their *Governours*, or resist them : and whenever a *Nation* can be certain that they exercise that *Passive Obedience* which hath been taught by some, under a great and universal *Oppression*, they may at the same time be as certain that that *Resistance* is necessary

which I have taught. Whether *Submission* in all *Cases* be of better consequence than *Resistance* is another Point, and hath been before considered. But from what I have said it is evident that the *Argument* taken from the incapacity of *Subjects* to judge, can no more hold against their *judging* when *Resistance* is necessary than it is allowed to hold against their *judging* in many other *Cases* of as great Importance, and as great Difficulty ; or rather much greater.

But indeed I am now fully persuaded that all this Cry about the Incapacity of *Subjects* to judge, is in many Men only an Artifice to engross and secure all the Liberty of judging to themselves. For I find they always except themselves. None so free to pass severe Censures upon the Administration of Affairs as they, when their Maxims are not followed. Others indeed are not fit to judge at the very time when they feel themselves Oppressed : but *these* Men are so quick-sighted, they can discover Dangers at a vast distance ; and talk of certain Ruine to come no Mortal knows when : And if the *People* will but always take the Alarm, and judge with *them* against their *Governours*, I dare undertake for ever for the goodness of their Capacities ; and promise they shall never hear again of the weakness and fallibility of their *Judgments*.

Thus have I offered in this *Chapter* what I hope is sufficient to confirm the *Truth* of that *Doctrine* which I have taught, and to vindicate it from all the *Objections* usually made against it.

C H A P. IV.

Of the Seasonableness of the foregoing Sermon.

IV. **T**HE Fourth thing which I propos'd to do, in my own Vindication, was to offer some Considerations about the Seasonableness of the foregoing Sermon: and to lay before the World the Reasons, which induced me at this time publickly to teach the Doctrine contain'd in it. And this I shall dispatch in as few Words as possible: premising only that the Truth of the Doctrine is here supposed.

1. The First Reason I shall mention is, *The importance of this Doctrine to this Nation, in its present Circumstances, and Establishment.* I never design'd, by any thing I have said to this purpose, to insinuate that it was not lawful or reasonable to submit to an *Establishment*, the leading steps to which we cannot approve; or that Persons who come in to any *Government*, upon such a Principle of *Submission*, might not be very good *Subjects*, and ought not to be so accounted: for the contrary to this I have before now publickly declared. But I hope it can be no just *Offense* to any, (because I think it must be acknowledged by all) to say, That it would be happier, and a stronger Security to any *Establishment*, if the main *Methods* by which it came to be what it is, can be so defended as to be made appear to be Lawful, Just, and Honourable. Now this is the *Case* in our Nation. We have been actually saved from imminent Ruine by the Practice of that *Doctrine* which I have taught: and therefore, methinks, there is little reason to think it an *unseasonable* attempt to justify that *Resistance*, without which we had not now been in the good Estate in which we find our selves. For I must observe, that it is not
to

to the *Present Establishment* that we originally, and chiefly owe our Happiness, but to that *Resistance*, without which the *Present Establishment* could not have been made. Is it therefore *seasonable* to endeavour to render People perfectly satisfied and easy under the *Reign* of Her *Excellent Majesty*? If it be, how can it be proved *unseasonable* to endeavour to satisfy the Minds of Men about the lawfulness of that *Resistance*, without which *She* could not, in all humane appearance, have been Seated on this Throne? Is it *seasonable* to endeavour to make Men satisfied and easy in the Prospect of the *Protestant Succession*? Why then must it be thought *unseasonable* to endeavour to persuade the *Consciences* of Men that the *Foundation* of this *Establishment*, and that *Resistance*, without which it could not have been, are lawful and honourable? I see not how the *Friends* of the *Present Establishment* can deny it to be for the security of it, that the *Nation* should approve of the *Methods* by which it was compassed; otherwise it may be only submitted to as an *Usurpation* which could not be prevented. And if they cannot deny this, I think it very evident, that a *Doctrine* which tends to the *Security* of that *Foundation* upon which the Happiness of a *Nation* is intirely built, cannot be called an *Unseasonable Doctrine*. And as for the *Enemies* of this *Establishment*; it is evident, that the Game they have to Play, is sometimes to appear contented that People should fall in with the *Government* merely upon *Submitting Principles*, (because this is the next best thing, for the interest of their *Cause*, to *Rebellion* against it;) and at other times to arraign the whole *Settlement* as founded originally upon the damnable Sin of *Resistance*. And if they think it for their Interest to Play this Part; it cannot be *unseasonable* to oppose them: nor can an *Antidote* ever be *improper*, when the *Poison* hath been actually administred. The *importance* of the *Doctrine* I have taught to the present Interest of the *Nation* is likewise evident

evident from hence, that if you can but persuade *People* of the lawfulness of the first *Resistance* made to the late King *James*, you will seldom find any difficulty in engaging their Affections heartily to that *Establishment* to which it led: and that on the other hand, if you fail in this, you will find, by numberless Instances, that little Dissatisfactions and Uneasinesses remain in Mens minds even after their *Submission*; in which I do not wonder that the *Nonjurors* think to find their account. And now, had I nothing to say but what I have here offer'd, I might I believe maintain that no inconvenience can be urged against the *Preaching* of this *Doctrine*, of any weight against this single Consideration, that it tends to the greater Security of the *Protestant Establishment*; and to engage Mens Affections heartily to it. The Principles of *Liberty* are always of such Importance to a *Nation*, as to make it very convenient that Men should be sometimes reminded of them. But they are more so, when a *Case* hath of late Years happened in which they were put into *Practice*, and the present good *Estate* of the *Nation* is owing entirely to that *Practice*.

2. Is it *unseasonable* to persuade Men to a *Submission* to the *Present Establishment*? Or to Preach the Principles of such a *Submission*? If it be not, why should it be thought *unseasonable* to go farther, and to Preach such *Principles* as lead to the hearty Approbation of those beginnings on which this *Establishment* is founded? And again, if they who reap the *Benefit* of that first *Resistance*, which opened the way to this *Establishment*, think it not *unseasonable* to justify themselves in their *Submission*; why should they envy those Persons who laid the Foundation of all, a like justification, if their *Cause* will bear it?

3. The Memory of the late King *William* must suffer extremely, if it be thought so unjustifiable a thing publicly to lay down those *Principles* which alone can vindicate

dicate it from the injurious Aspersions of his *Enemies*. He was once Universally stiled a *Glorious Deliverer*; but how it was *Glorious* for Him to be the Instrument of the *Nation's Self-Defense* against their *Prince*, unless this *Self-Defense* was *Glorious*, cannot well be shewn: and how we can Solemnly give thanks to *God* for giving Success to his *Undertaking*, unless it was an *Honourable* one, I am not able to see. This I think of the more concern, because the *Enemies* of our present *Establishment* think it worth their while, and some Service to their *Cause*, to cast all the *Odium* they can upon his Memory, and to represent *Him* as an unpardonable *Rebel*, and *Usurper*.

4. The *Doctrine* contrary to what I have taught hath been so frequently so publickly so zealously espoused, and inculcated; and continueth so to be both from the *Press*, and the *Pulpit*, that this alone is sufficient to justify what I have done. For I think it was always allowed to be *seasonable*, in a very high degree, to defend a *Truth*, when it is either seriously contradicted, or ridiculously exposed. And what single *truth* is there in *Nature* which hath endured more opposition, and more Abuses, than this hath? And even to this Day how many public Affronts, and Insults do we meet with upon *Revolution Principles*, and the Principles of *Self-Defense*, even from some of those who submit to the *Government*? besides that the Professed *Enemies* of it are not sparing in their daily *Endeavours* to bring a disgrace upon these *Principles*, or even in their boasts that the good old *Doctrine* of *Absolute Passive-Obedience* is reviving from that Grave in which it seemed to be buried at the *late Revolution*, and is not so destitute of *Patrons* as many are apt to think it. Considering all which, I cannot but think it a little unkind, and unjust in some Persons to speak of the foregoing *Sermon*, as if the *Author* of it had been the *First* Man that ever put odious *Cases* concerning *Princes*, and had taught an invidious *Doctrine* without the least occasion,

occasion, or necessity: when in truth there is no *Case* put in it, but what hath been put a Thousand times by others, as well as seen in the *Nation*; and the *Doctrine* taught in it is such as hath been made necessary by numberless Contradictions. Add to this the loud and impetuous *Clamours* that have been raised upon the Preaching this *Sermon*; which, whatever they may be to *others*, are to me an Argument of the expedience and necessity of it, as they shew the fondness that still remains in many Persons for the contrary *Doctrine*. And this I believe verily is chiefly owing to the *silence* of the greatest part of those who acknowledge the *truth* of what I have taught: from whence it is, that People imagine it to be a *Cause* in which no Person of great Consideration thinks it honourable to appear; and so stand astonished at it, whenever it is publicly espoused, as a strange and unheard of thing.

5. It is manifest to those who converse in the World, that by means of what hath been spoken, and written, the *Consciences* of Men are as much perplexed, and as uneasy in this Matter, as in any other that can be named. Upon which sole Account, it cannot be unjustifiable in a *Christian Divine* to endeavour to teach *Christians*, what it is their *Religion* obligeth them to in this particular: which is the whole of what I have done, without the mixture of any of what is called *Politics*, or regard to any thing but the *Duty of Men, and Christians*.

6. By the same means likewise the *Christian Religion* it self hath suffered in the Opinion of some Persons, whilst it hath been constantly almost represented as condemning *Resistance* in all possible *Cases*. And if the contrary be true, this single Consideration is sufficient to justify a *Christian Divine* for endeavouring to remove such an *Offense* out of the way of the *Gospel*.

7. By the same means the Reputation of the *Establish'd Church*, and of the *Clergy* in it, hath suffered, under the
Notion

Notion of being *Enemies* to what hath been found necessary, (and may possibly be found so again in future times) for the Preservation of this *Nation*. And this is another Reason why those who are not so, should do so much justice to the *Church* they belong to, and to themselves, as openly to declare it.

8. The *Happiness* of the present *Administration* of Affairs, and the *Government* of Her *Excellent Majesty* is such, that there cannot be imagined a *time* in which it is less likely that any Persons should misapply the *Doctrine* I have taught; and therefore no more proper time for teaching it, considering the other Reasons there are for it. If any should object against this the Murmurings and Repinings of some particular Men, publicly proclaimed against the present *Administration*; I answer, that this is of small importance compared with the general bent of the *Nation*. And besides, nothing is more manifest than that it is not so much as the shadow of my *Doctrine* which they allege for themselves. For the *Resistance* they have been pleased to speak of, is not so much as pretended to be founded upon this, that the *Nation* is Universally oppressed; but upon this, that several Men of one particular Party are turned out of Places: nor is it a *Resistance* so much as pretended to be lawful, but a *Resistance* against their Principles, and their *Consciences*. So that it is evident, that such Persons will be just what they are, whether the *Lawfulness* of *Resistance* in some Cases be asserted or denied. But supposing they should be so absurd, as to apply the *Doctrine* I have taught to the *best* of *Governments*; the true way of opposing such Persons is not to deny, or dissemble the truth of that *Doctrine* when rightly applied, but to shew the Absurdity, and Crime of applying it to a good *Administration*: both which things are done in the foregoing *Sermon*. Just as it is in the *Case* of the *Dissenters*: The true way of dealing with whom was never thought to be, to deny, or dissemble

dissemble the lawfulness, and justifiableness of *Separation* in some *Cases*, but plainly to allow, and plead for it; and then to endeavour to shew that they have not any just Reasons to apply such an Allowance to the *Establish'd Church*. The same *Considerations* may be urged to prove it *Unseasonable*, or *Imprudent* to plead for the *Lawfulness* of *Separation* in any *Case*: yet it hath been always thought *reasonable* to do it, and not in the least to justify *Separation* from the *Church of England*.

And now, If a *Doctrine*, which is of great importance to the present *Establishment* of these *Kingdoms*; which is opposed as such by the professed *Enemies* of the *Government*; which is necessary for the Justification of many of the greatest Persons now living, as well as of our great *Deliverer* of Glorious and Immortal Memory; which hath been, and is still, publickly and zealously exploded, and condemned, to the perplexing of Mens *Consciences*; to the prejudice of the *Christian Religion*, and of the *Established Church* in the Opinion of many: If such a *Doctrine* be *unseasonable*; and this at a time when there is the least danger possible of *Subjects* making an ill use of it: I desire to know what is *sufficient* to make a *Doctrine Seasonable*; or whether there ever was such a thing known as a *Seasonable Truth*.

This is the whole of what I have to offer in *Vindication* of the *Foregoing Sermon*. And all the *Favour* I desire is, that it may be impartially considered; and received or rejected, as it appears agreeable, or contrary, to *Truth*, and *Reason*.

F I N I S.

Some Books lately Printed for
TIMOTHY CHILD,

At the White Hart in St. Paul's Church-yard.

THE Reasonableness of Conformity to the Church of *England*, represented to the Dissenting Ministers. In answer to the Tenth Chapter of Mr. *Calamy's* Abridgment of Mr. *Baxter's* History of his Life and Times.

A Defense of that Book, in answer to the Objections of Mr. *Calamy*, in his Defense of Moderate Nonconformity.

A Brief Defense of Episcopal Ordination. In which, I. The Arguments for it are propos'd. II. The Pleas for the Right of Presbyters to Ordain are examin'd. III. The Pleas alleged for the same Right, in the Laity, are considered. To which are added, a Reply to the Introduction to the second part: And a Postscript relating to the third part of Mr. *Calamy's* Defense of Moderate Nonconformity.

A Persuasive to Lay-Conformity: Or the Reasonableness of constant Communion with the Church of *England*, represented to the Dissenting Laity.

All Written by BENJAMIN HOADLY. M. A.



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